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Title: 
Social/energy policy: an inquiry into the intersection of two policy domains with Australia’s 
national electricity market 
Abstract: 
The introduction of competition to electricity markets has been a priority of energy policy in 
Australia for over 20 years. Throughout this process, economic efficiency objectives have had 
explicit primacy over social or environmental objectives. Neoliberalism, or economic 
rationalism as it is often referred to in Australia, not only radically changed the provision of 
electricity from the 1990s but recast the provision of welfare services by transferring many 
services from provision by government to provision by ‘private welfare agencies’. Energy 
policy and social policy can therefore be seen to have been placed on similar paths towards 
market-based provision of service to households. Importantly this has shifted many frontline 
responsibilities away from governments to energy retailers and community sector 
organisations. 
The electricity market’s consumer safety net has been described as a shared responsibility 
between industry, governments and community sector organisations. This shared responsibility 
represents the intersection of energy policy and social policy in Australia akin to fuel poverty 
policies internationally. However, this intersection is ill-defined and not systemically 
governed. The key role of community sector organisations in particular is rarely formalised. 
This research represents the first attempt to develop a coordinated national policy framework 
for the consumer safety net of Australia’s National Electricity Market. 
The research question that this thesis seeks to answer is:  
• When considering a consumer safety net for consumers in a liberalised electricity market, 
what is an appropriate analytical framework for policy and practice that can be used by 
stakeholders to improve governance and consumer outcomes? 
• Subsequently, what priorities emerge from this framework that could be advanced 
through the policy cycle? 
In response, this thesis provides a comprehensive, structured review and analysis of the 
relationship between energy policy and social policy at a time when electricity pricing is 
undergoing significant changes in terms of structures (tariff reform) and upward pressure as 
a result of climate change policies and the development of a natural gas export industry.  
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The theory and practice of public policy analysis is summarised and guides the structure of 
the thesis. The research argues for a systematic approach based on the pursuit of 5 public 
policy outcomes that reflect the interaction between household energy bills and energy, 
climate and social policies: 
● Stable and Efficient Pricing AND 
● Informed and engaged consumers AND 
● Energy consumed efficiently and productively AND 
● Robust consumer protections AND 
● All households have a capacity to pay their energy bills 
This thesis provides context in Chapters 1 and 2 then a chapter is dedicated to each of the five 
policy outcomes. In each case, the research and analysis is presented in four parts that 
represent key stages of a policy cycle, the way in which public policy evolves over time: a 
review of the current arrangements; analysis to identify key issues; empirical analysis and; 
policy formulation. Consequently, priority policy issues are identified, and recommendations 
made in the concluding chapter. 
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1 Introduction 
The political economy of electricity pricing in Australia has been charged by rapid price rises 
over the last decade. Australia-wide average electricity prices increased around 85% above 
general inflation in the decade to the September quarter 20171. As shown in Figure 1, 
electricity prices have also significantly outpaced wages and, as shown later in the thesis, 
wages have outpaced pensions and other government income support (ACOSS, 2016). This 
has challenged the budgets of most households and, perhaps not surprisingly, consideration 
of climate policy measures that may increase prices is being resisted from many quarters.  
 
Figure 1: Electricity price growth in Australia compared to all consumer sector prices and wage growth 10 years 
to September Quarter 2017 (Source: ABS Consumer Price Index 6401.0, Wage Price Index 6345.0 September 
2017 release) 
However, climate policy is far from the only pressure on energy markets – a technology-
driven transition is occurring anyway. The ability of the electricity system to deliver ongoing 
security and reliability through this transition has increased in importance since the ‘system 
                                               
1 ABS Consumer Price Index 6401.0 Table 9, June 2007 to September 2017 
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black’ event in South Australia of September 2016.  These three related issues – energy 
security, affordability, and decarbonisation - are the ‘energy trilemma’. The interaction of the 
elements of the trilemma, and the balance of achievement across them, is receiving significant 
policy attention. The grand policy challenge is to solve for all three and a new body, The 
Energy Security Board, was established in 2017 to coordinate efforts of the key energy market 
institutions. The Board’s first Annual Report The Health of the National Electricity Market 2017 
identifies gaps in the market’s safety net (Energy Security Board, 2017, p. 40): 
… recent high price rises have been difficult for some customers and increased 
numbers of consumers are falling behind on their bills, being disconnected, and 
struggling to complete hardship assistance programs. This raises serious questions 
about the effectiveness of consumer protection programs and the adequacy of the 
consumer protection safety net. 
Energy policy is inherently reliant on social policy settings to ensure households have a 
minimum capacity to pay their electricity bills. However, while statements of energy policy 
in Australia have explicitly expected social policy to keep pace with market reforms and 
preserve access and affordability, no governance arrangement has ever been put in place to 
ensure that these expectations can be effectively met. 
The research question that this thesis seeks to answer is:  
• When considering a consumer safety net for consumers in a liberalised electricity market, 
what is an appropriate analytical framework for policy and practice that can be used by 
stakeholders to improve governance and consumer outcomes? 
• Subsequently, what priorities emerge from this framework that could be advanced 
through the policy cycle? 
This Chapter first outlines the methodology adopted for the research and introduces the five 
key policy outcomes that have been distilled from the literature to represent the market’s 
safety net. A short history of electrification is then presented to highlight the intertwined 
nature of energy policy and social policy during the 20th century before economic rationalism 
oversaw their divergence in the century’s final decades. Market reforms in energy and social 
policy have created organisations outside of government that have key roles to play in the 
provision of a safety net and these are introduced before the rest of this introductory chapter 
outlines the contemporary context for the research. 
1.1 Methodology 
This thesis represents the first attempt to develop a coordinated national policy framework 
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for the consumer safety net of Australia’s National Electricity Market. This thesis combines 
the researcher’s foundation discipline, Electrical Engineering, with Policy Analysis, Applied 
Economics and aspects of Social Science. The multi-disciplinary nature of the topic is a 
defining and positive feature of the work that must also be acknowledged as a limitation: this 
thesis does not necessarily conform to the academic conventions of any of the disciplines 
traversed. A further limitation is the dynamic nature of the material covered. Energy issues 
are developing at a significant pace and keeping all of the sources as up to date as possible 
has been a substantial challenge. These limitations though could be overcome in future work 
that builds on the framework herein, the nature of the topic is well suited to a research 
collaboration rather than a single researcher’s thesis. The unique contribution is the 
foundational nature of the approach. Despite these limitations, at every opportunity the 
analysis has followed Charles Lindblom’s advice (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993): 
Targeting analysis toward helping actual partisans interact with each other would 
increase the chances that research will have some impact on social problem solving 
Energy market regulation is dynamic and highly complex and the need for a simple analytical 
framework for consumer advocates and policymakers has been reinforced by the process of 
trying to develop one: over the 8 years that this thesis was developed, the researcher has been 
engaged by a range of organisations on vulnerable energy consumer related research and 
advocacy projects including the South Australian Council of Social Service, the Australian 
Council of Social Service, The Climate Institute, the South Australian Financial Counsellors 
Association, Uniting Communities, the South Australian and New South Wales Governments, 
South Australian Power Networks and Energy Consumers Australia. Common to each of 
these projects was a challenge to locate individual issues in a repeatable and easy to 
understand frame.  
This research has relied heavily on Content Analysis of regulatory and academic publications 
as well as submissions from stakeholders (Lindblom’s partisans) into regulatory processes 
(Krippendorff, 2004): 
Content analysts who start with a research question read texts for a purpose, not for 
what an author may lead them to think or what they say in the abstract. 
In the Australian context there is substantial regulatory and policy material (so called grey 
literature) but limited academic publications on the relationship between energy policy and 
social policy. Internationally, academic publications related to ‘energy poverty’ and/or ‘fuel 
poverty’ are much more plentiful. Beyond the analysis of documents, the concepts described 
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have been refined over several years through various discussions and debates with colleagues 
in the Community Sector and staff from the various Regulators and Government agencies 
involved in energy and water regulation – particularly in the researcher’s home state of South 
Australia. The majority of material used has been from regulatory consultations – the 
consultation and decision documents of the AEMC and AER in particular – and the 
submissions made to these processes by consumer organisations and energy businesses. 
These documents are considered to provide a rich source of views on the relationship between 
social policy and energy policy as high level statements are intermingled with commentary 
on detailed issues. 
Alternate frames were tested but subsequently abandoned. An example was early efforts to 
appropriate the term energy security at the household level as a unifying objective for the 
energy policy, social policy nexus (see Appendix B for discussion of an earlier model). Energy 
security is often defined in terms of adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy (Sovacool, 
2010). Historically applied to nations, the term and concepts had begun appearing in the 
context of poverty and sustainable development. Slay for example argued the need to “ … 
disaggregate concerns about energy security … from the nation-state to the households, and 
particularly to poorer households…” in discussions of transitioning economies of the former 
Soviet Union (Slay, 2009). However, given the semantic issues already existing with this 
subject matter – energy poverty compared to fuel poverty for example (Chester and Morris, 
2011; Li et al., 2014) - this framing of energy security for households gained little traction when 
presented to community sector stakeholders and was not pursued. 
A significant amount of time was also spent analysing unit record files from Australian 
Bureau of Statistics surveys (2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey and the 2012 Household 
Energy Consumption Survey). The aim of this was to deepen understanding of energy 
affordability – particularly in relation to housing costs - and to see if ‘energy poverty’ could 
be measured in an Australia context in a similar way to the measurement of Fuel Poverty in 
the UK. The report, Relative Energy Poverty in Australia is attached as Appendix A. Ultimately, 
the analysis reinforced the merits of considering energy affordability in the context of housing 
affordability and household size. The comprehensive statistical analysis required to do this 
justice though was beyond the scope of this thesis and is therefore reflected in the 
recommendations from the thesis rather than contained within it.  
A model of the factors that influence the related objectives of “access to” and “affordability 
of” energy was also developed, tested and refined as part of the project. Figure 2 illustrates a 
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disaggregation into key influences: 
 
Figure 2: Influencers of access to, and affordability of energy in the NEM 
In relation to ongoing access, an energy specific set of consumer protections exist. The National 
Energy Customer Framework (NECF) is the set of laws and other instruments that 
complement the general consumer protections of Australian Consumer Law (ACL). 
Independent dispute resolution is provided through an Ombudsman scheme in each state 
and territory. The community sector has a direct role through the provision of Financial 
Counselling and advocating for individual consumers to energy retailers, Ombudsman 
schemes and private debt collection agencies. 
In relation to affordability, this will always be a function of some measure of a household’s 
capacity to pay and the size of their energy bills (expenditure). Capacity to pay for energy is 
represented by a combination of disposable income, obligations to meet other cost of living 
essentials (such as housing, transport and healthcare) and other debts that need to be serviced. 
Expenditure is driven by consumption and prices (retail tariffs) as well as other fees and 
charges collected via energy bills. The provision of energy concessions – generally paid 
directly to retailers – has the effect of lowering expenditure for eligible households and hence 
appears there rather than on the income side of the ledger. 
The objective of this research has been to develop, and then apply, a simple analytical 
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structure for the relationship between social policy and energy policy, and with electricity 
market policy in particular. A model of this policy space has been developed that represents 
a spectrum of responsibility between the traditional domains of energy policy and social 
policy. Along this spectrum, key categories of policy activity have been identified and framed 
in terms of their intended outcomes. A repeated process of categorisation and distillation has 
reduced the number of policy outcomes down to five as listed below and illustrated in Figure 
3:  
Outcome 1: Stable and Efficient Pricing  
Outcome 2: Informed and engaged consumers 
Outcome 3: Energy consumed efficiently and productively 
Outcome 4: Robust consumer protections 
Outcome 5: All households have a capacity to pay their energy bills 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the combination of energy policy and social policy responsibilities required to achieve 
access and affordability of energy for households 
The shading of the blocks depicting the five outcomes in Figure 3 represents a broad estimate 
of the sharing of responsibilities between energy policy and social policy domains. For 
example, stable and efficient pricing is a primary responsibility of energy policy, yet social 
policy has a valid role in advocating for supportive policies. Similarly, at the other end, 
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ensuring a capacity to pay is primarily a social policy domain yet energy policy has a role in 
ensuring policies reflect the needs of providers of essential services such as energy. In the 
middle is an outcome related to how efficiently and productively energy is used. This outcome 
arguably relies on both energy and social policy given the central role of the energy 
performance of housing alongside access to efficient appliances and an understanding of 
consumer behavior. The prevailing market model relies on consumers being informed and 
sufficiently engaged to avoid the highest prices and a robust consumer protection regime is 
vital for a non-discretionary essential service. 
These five outcomes can also be considered as representing the main elements of the National 
Electricity Market’s consumer safety net: the combined effect of energy policy and social policy 
at both state and Commonwealth levels of government. Other policy domains such as 
Consumer policy and Climate policy add further dimensions to these outcomes and are 
included in the analysis presented in the later chapters. However, it is contended that these 
other domains interact with the five outcomes presented rather than add additional outcomes.  
For the majority of the 20th century, public policy in Australia and elsewhere held a focus on 
electrification: the pursuit of near-universal access to the electricity grid in each state and 
territory. An open question is whether electrification should be considered social policy or 
energy policy or both? The following section will retrace some of the history of electrification 
in Australia in order to highlight the clear divergence of energy policy and social policy in the 
last decades of the 20th Century. 
1.2 Electrification 
The ubiquitous availability of electricity in the 21st century makes it easy for many of us to 
take electricity for granted. In order to highlight the sometimes forgotten significance of 
electrification Booth’s History of Power Development in Australia (Booth, 2003) opens with 
reference to the US National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and their list of the 20 
engineering achievements that had the greatest positive impact on society in the twentieth 
century. In a speech to the US National Press Club, Engineer and Astronaut Neil Armstrong 
emphasised links between engineering and ‘quality of life’ as he announced that top of the list 
was ‘electrification’ (Armstrong, 2000): 
Electrification changed the country’s economic development and gave rural 
populations the same opportunities and amenities as people in the cities... If anything 
shines as an example of how engineering has changed the world during the twentieth 
century, it is clearly the power that we use in our homes and businesses. 
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Electrification in Australia was undertaken by State and Territory Governments during the 
20th Century. Privately owned electric companies were common in the early parts of the 
century but evolved into state ownership by the 1950’s (Booth 2003). Various state-owned 
statutory authorities operated as vertically integrated monopolies until the 1990’s (Industry 
Commission, 1991a): 
• Electricity Commission of New South Wales; 
• Queensland Electricity Commission; 
• State Electricity Commission of Victoria; 
• State Energy Commission of Western Australia; 
• Electricity Trust of South Australia; 
• Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission; 
• Northern Territory Power and Water Authority; 
• Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority; and  
• ACT Electricity and Water Authority.  
As one example, nationalisation of the electricity industry in South Australia was, according 
to Spoehr (2003), a result of the political imperative of industrialising the state in the wake of 
the 1930s Depression. The nationalisation of the Adelaide Electric Supply Company (AESC) 
in 1946 by Premier Tom Playford formed the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA). A 
pivotal issue was the development of SA’s indigenous coal reserves at Leigh Creek as an 
alternate to the continued importation of NSW black coal (Booth 2003; Spoehr ed. 2003). Prior 
to the 1945 Royal Commission into the AESC, a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into 
Electricity Supply in South Australia was formed in 1943 to determine if a new power station 
at Port Augusta was in the public interest. As cited in Spoehr (2003, p. 20), public interest in 
relation to electricity supply was defined as: 
a. Security – In the form of reliability, continuity and sufficiency of supply; and 
b. Economy – In the form of the cheapest supply to consumers 
Premier Playford also used the relatively slow pace of rural electrification in the argument to 
nationalise. At the time stating that (Spoehr, 2003, p. 21): 
… the service has not extended appreciably to many rural districts … Scant regard seems to 
have been paid to approximately half of our population which is resident outside the 
metropolitan area  
However, by the 1980s, public policy in Australia was embracing neoliberalism and attention 
turned to the potential benefits of a more competitive electricity sector as was being pursued 
elsewhere, including the UK and New Zealand (Booth, 2003; Chester and Morris, 2011).  
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Neoliberalism, or economic rationalism as it is often referred to in Australia (Pusey, 2003), also 
recast the provision of welfare services at around the same time by transferring many services 
from provision by government to provision by ‘private welfare agencies’ from the 1990s 
(Jamrozik, 2009). Electricity Policy and Social Policy can therefore be seen to have been placed 
on similar paths towards a more market-based provision of service to households. 
Importantly this has shifted many frontline responsibilities away from governments to 
community sector organisations and, particularly in the case of energy, spawned a number of 
statutory regulatory agencies. These are introduced next. 
1.3 The main stakeholders 
Policy development often relies on the competition of ideas between stakeholders and Charles 
Lindblom, as a prominent example, argued strongly that good policy is whatever the key 
interests can agree on (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993). With this in mind, it is constructive 
to introduce the key stakeholders operating in the energy policy domain. 
1.3.1 Community Sector 
Vulnerable consumers are often represented in policy debates by community sector 
organisations. As mentioned, many welfare services historically provided by governments 
have been outsourced to community sector organisations (Jamrozik, 2009). These 
organisations, largely but not entirely not-for-profit, provide a range of services relevant to 
energy markets. These include the assessment and distribution of emergency relief, housing 
services, aged care, financial counselling, advocacy (for individuals to debt recovery agents, 
utilities etc), legal representation and community education programs. The sector has national 
peak bodies including the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), National Shelter and 
Financial Counsellors Australia (FCA). A number of other organisations are active advocates 
for the interests of vulnerable energy consumers including the St Vincent de Paul Society, 
Uniting Care Australia, state-based Councils of Social Service (SACOSS, QCOSS, VCOSS, 
ACTCOSS, NCOSS, NTCOSS, WACOSS, TASCOSS) and Brotherhood of St Laurence (BSL). 
Some prominent advocacy organisations are informed by their legal case-work including 
Victoria’s Consumer Action Law Centre (CALC) and NSW’s Public Interest Advocacy Centre 
(PIAC). Resourcing for this advocacy work, which often involves written submissions to 
policy and regulatory processes, tends to come from Energy Consumers Australia (previously 
the Consumer Advocacy Panel) and/or state governments. 
1.3.2 Energy retailers 
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The Retail Energy Industry is represented by the Australian Energy Council (AEC). This 
includes retailers of electricity and gas and also generators of electricity. The dominant 
business model in electricity is the combined generator and retailer, discussed in section 3.4.1. 
Historically, vulnerable consumer policy work was driven by the Energy Retailers Association 
of Australia (ERAA). The ERAA merged into the AEC on 1 January 2016 and combines both 
generators and retailers. The ERAA published a policy on hardship in 2013 that outlined the 
(limited) role seen by the industry: 
The role of an energy retailer is not to administer social welfare policy: this is a core 
function of Governments. Hardship is best addressed through comprehensive social 
welfare policies, because after all, if someone is having difficulty paying their energy 
bills, then they are also probably having trouble paying their other bills and debts. 
Energy retailers are responsible for the direct contact with energy customers and have 
obligations under The National Energy Retail Law (NERL) Clause 47 to ensure that 
disconnection for unpaid bills is a ‘last resort’: 
47—General principle regarding de-energisation (or disconnection) of premises of 
hardship customers  
A retailer must give effect to the general principle that de-energisation (or disconnection) of 
premises of a hardship customer due to inability to pay energy bills should be a last resort 
option. 
1.3.3 Energy networks 
Energy Networks Australia (ENA) represents the interests of the regulated electricity and gas 
network owners. There is a natural tension between the interests of the AEC and the ENA as 
they, in effect, compete for shares of the total electricity market. Ring-fencing of the regulated 
network businesses from 1 January 2018 to prevent cross-subsidisation of competition with 
AEC members on metering and services such as solar and storage is exposing conflicts evident 
in submissions to the accompanying regulatory processes. 
The ENA published an options paper by consultants HoustonKemp titled ‘Supporting 
Vulnerable Energy Customer’s in 2015 and hosted a series of roundtables in 2015 (ENA, 2015; 
Kemp et al., 2015). Network businesses have little direct contact with household energy 
consumers as this is the domain of electricity retailers. However, context for the ENA work 
was provided by rules requiring the network businesses to develop more ‘cost reflective 
tariffs’ and concerns that this may exacerbate hardship for some households. South Australian 
Power Networks (SAPN), the regulated monopoly electricity distributor in South Australia 
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proposed a ‘social tariff’ as part of its 2015-10 Regulatory Proposal that offered lower network 
tariffs to customers participating in a retailer hardship program. The social tariff was opposed 
by the South Australian Council of Social Service (SACOSS, 2016a, p. 34) and rejected by the 
Australian Energy Regulator under the National Electricity Rules. The rejection was appealed 
by SAPN but ultimately the proposal was dismissed by the Federal Court (CKI Utilities 
Development Pty Ltd v Australian Energy Regulator [2016] FCA 17). Anecdotally, an appetite for 
such a tariff still exists within some network businesses. 
1.3.4 Commonwealth Government 
The Commonwealth Government is a significant stakeholder in this policy space and chairs 
the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) Energy Council. The Australian Constitution 
is silent on electricity and responsibility rests with the states. An Intergovernmental 
Agreement underpins the governance arrangements for electricity and gas markets (the 
Australian Energy Market Agreement or AEMA) but the issues relevant to vulnerable 
consumers overlap with other Intergovernmental Agreements for Housing, Energy 
Efficiency, Consumer Law and Federal Financial relations. 
1.3.5 State and Territory governments 
State and Territory governments historically lead electrification but have passed substantial 
parts of energy policy over to national institutions. They remain responsible for politically 
sensitive local issues such as concessions and reliability standards. Some governments 
continue to own network and/or generation assets – South Australia and Victoria are the only 
two to have effectively privatised their industries (although New South Wales is close after 
asset sales in 2016 and 2017). A number of states have implemented or are considering, state-
based renewable energy targets and accompanying mechanisms (ACT, NT, VIC and QLD). 
These schemes sit alongside state-based energy efficiency mechanisms. 
1.3.6 Energy Consumers Australia 
Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) is a not for profit company established under the Statutes 
Amendment (Energy Consumers Australia) Act 2014 (South Australia) funded through a levy on 
electricity sales. The entity commenced operating in January 2015 with a clear mandate to 
represent ‘all consumers’ and to include, but not to focus solely on, vulnerable consumer 
issues. So, while vulnerable consumers are very much in scope for ECA (evidenced by work 
on disconnections and energy efficiency for low-income and vulnerable customers through 
the Power Shift initiative) a strategic approach to interactions with social policy settings is still 
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maturing. 
1.3.7 Australian Energy Market Commission 
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) is the market institution responsible for 
assessing changes to the National Electricity Rules and National Energy Retail Rules. These 
rules are the general statutory framework under the National Electricity Law and National 
Energy Retail Law regulating operation of the NEM. The AEMC is also responsible for market 
development and design and provides advice to the COAG Energy Council (Energy Security 
Board, 2017). The AEMC has been a strident defender of the primacy of economic efficiency 
over social welfare issues (see section 2.4 for examples of this) but has acknowledged 
limitations of competition in recent reviews (AEMC, 2016a, 2017a; Newgate Research, 2016). 
1.3.8 Australian Energy Regulator 
The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) is responsible for the economic regulation of the non-
competitive sectors of the NEM, essentially distribution and transmission networks. The AER 
is also responsible for the enforcement of compliance with the National Electricity Law and 
Rules and the National Energy Retail Law and Rules and for providing information to 
consumers. (Energy Security Board, 2017). As enforcer of the rules, the AER also gathers data 
and reports on retailer performance in areas such as disconnections, payment plans and 
hardship programs. The AER’s annual performance reports on the retail energy industry 
include commentary around affordability as context (AER, 2017a). 
1.3.9 Australian Energy Market Operator 
The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) operates the power system and gas and 
electricity spot markets. AEMO is the body that keeps the electricity system operating. Like 
all market participants and the AER, AEMO is responsible for implementing changes to the 
rules that impact on its operations and importantly is also responsible for the provision of 
information to market participants, for long term planning of the interconnected power 
system, including forecasting demand and supply and network development (Energy 
Security Board, 2017). AEMO has little direct influence on specific market outcomes for 
vulnerable consumers, rather its functions impact on outcomes for consumers at large. 
1.4 Contemporary Context 
This section presents the contemporary policy context for the interaction between energy 
policy and social policy. Climate policy exerts a strong influence over energy policy. 
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Australia’s international commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement provides some 
guidance on future directions even though details of policy mechanisms remain in 
development at the time of writing. 
This chapter also introduces the building block components of a typical electricity bill in order 
to explain the myriad of influences on household electricity costs. An introduction to energy 
consumer vulnerability is provided by considering the range of typical electricity costs for 
households segmented by disposable income. This is then taken further by considering how 
changes to the structure of electricity prices now appearing in the Australian electricity market 
may exacerbate or relieve energy bill pressures on different households. 
1.4.1 Trends in residential electricity prices 
Figure 4 is based on ABS Consumer Price Index data (Electricity Price Index) from the 
September Quarter of 1992 as an index number of 100 in each capital city as well as the national 
weighted average result. The results are presented in real terms (i.e. adjusted for movements 
in the All Groups Consumer Price Index in each capital city) and cover a period of 25 years 
over which energy market restructuring has occurred. 
 
Figure 4: Real electricity price movements since 1998, Australian Capital Cities (Source: ABS Cat No. 6401.0 
Table 9) 
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The chart illustrates that: 
● Electricity prices have risen at rates well above inflation in most locations, especially 
since 2007 but significant differences exist between jurisdictions 
● The five-year period to mid-2012 saw the strongest growth in prices in all locations. 
● The national carbon pricing mechanism applied from July 2012 until June 2014 and is 
shown in the shaded area. This represented the high-tide mark in prices until the price 
rises apparent from July 2017. 
● Price growth has been markedly lower in Tasmania, WA, ACT and NT where there is 
effectively no retail competition and prices remain regulated by jurisdictional 
regulators and/or Governments. Government ownership prevails in each of these 
jurisdictions. 
1.4.2 Climate Change 
In December 2015, 195 countries, including Australia, adopted an international climate deal 
to bind all countries to take action to reduce emissions, referred to as the Paris Agreement 
(UNFCCC, 2015). The core element of the agreement is to limit global warming to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. The agreement 
also obliges signatories to consider children, persons with disabilities and other people in 
vulnerable situations when taking action to address climate change.  
There is increasing recognition that people experiencing poverty and inequality, even in 
developed countries such as Australia, are more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate 
change (including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events) than the general 
community, having the least ability to cope, to adapt, to move and to recover (Mallon et al., 
2013). The impacts of climate change on people experiencing poverty and inequality in 
Australia also include the way that public policy responses influence the cost of essential 
services – especially household energy costs.  
To achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement the 195 countries are required to submit 
comprehensive national climate action plans and to review them every 5 years to enable more 
ambitious targets to be set as required. The Australian Government has a 2030 greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction target of 26-28% below 2005 levels and undertook a review of climate 
change policies in 2017 to ensure this target and the international commitments are achieved. 
Under the terms of the Paris Agreement Australia is required to update and resubmit its 2030 
target by 2020. 
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The electricity sector generates around one-third of Australia’s total Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory and will be required to make a substantial contribution to Australia’s international 
commitments to reduce emissions. Electricity sector emissions are dominated by the 
combustion of coal (around 62% of electricity generated and around 88% of emissions) (CCA, 
2016, p. 15). 
The Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) held an extraordinary meeting on 7 October 
2016 and launched an Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity 
Market. The expert review panel was chaired by the Chief Scientist and had the task of 
addressing the so called ‘energy trilemma’ (Finkel et al. 2016, 10): 
… policies that simultaneously provide a high level of energy security and reliability, 
universal access to affordable energy services, and reduced emissions. 
This thesis considers existing and future policies related to energy access and affordability for 
low-income and vulnerable people in Australia in the context of needing to rapidly reduce 
electricity sector emissions. This is not an issue unique to Australia. In the UK, Europe and 
elsewhere, energy affordability for vulnerable households is generally referred to as fuel 
poverty. The 2012 Hills Fuel Poverty Review commissioned by the UK Government put a 
climate policy perspective to this quite succinctly (Hills, 2012, p. 2): 
Some argue there is a tension between fuel poverty and climate change policies. 
Certainly, some people live in homes that are too cold and making them warmer could 
increase their carbon emissions. But any tension cuts both ways. The continuing 
existence of fuel poverty, especially on the potential scale we outline in this report, is 
an obstacle to delivery of our carbon objectives as well as a source of health problems 
and a compounding of the problem of poverty. This does not mean that low carbon 
efforts should be put on hold while fuel poverty is tackled. Quite the reverse. But it is 
clear that the impact of policies on those in fuel poverty must be considered so that 
they are not left behind as we make the changes needed to meet our carbon emission 
obligations. 
[p8]: … fuel poverty also acts as a barrier to the implementation of other policies to 
mitigate climate change, since those on low incomes are least able to afford any 
increase in prices that may result from them. 
1.4.3 Australia’s International Emissions Reduction Commitments 
In 2016 Australia ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change, which entered legal force 
on 4 November 2016. The objectives of the Paris Agreement are to limit global average 
temperature rise to “well below 2oC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5oC above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change” (Article 2).  A further objective 
is to achieve global net zero emissions in the second half of this century (Article 4), with 
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developed countries required to do more of the effort. The Agreement’s temperature goals 
imply a deadline for net-zero emissions from developed countries of 2045-55 (Hare et al., 2016; 
Höhne et al., 2014). 
Australia has committed to reduce emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 2020 and 26-28% 
below 2005 levels by 2030. The Australian government is to consider a longer-term emission 
reduction target as part of its 2017 review of climate policies, and under the Paris Agreement 
is required to update and resubmit its target by 2020. It is important to note that some 
observers argue that Australia’s current targets are inconsistent with the target of “well below 
2oC“ and achieving net-zero emission by between 2045 and 20552.  
As at the end of 2017, it is not clear just what the electricity sector’s eventual emission 
reduction requirements will be as part of the Paris commitment. However, a range of public 
policy responses have been proposed to decarbonise Australia’s electricity sector including 
the recently announced National Energy Guarantee (NEG). Some have been modelled and 
their impact on electricity prices compared (see Appendix C). The modelled options, even the 
option of ‘no new measures’, suggest there will be upward pressure on electricity prices as a 
result of: 
● how and at what pace Australia responds to the risks of climate change; 
● the technologies used to produce electricity; 
● the market designs used;  
● how we manage significant increases in the price of natural gas; 
However, the price of electricity is only part of the story. What really hurts vulnerable 
households is the total cost of securing their energy needs, and this is influenced by;  
● how much energy is consumed and when; 
● other price pressures across the supply chain, including network and retail charges; 
● fixed charges and eligibility for concessions; 
● housing circumstance (including number of people in a dwelling, tenure, condition 
and design). 
The following sections add to the context by giving a sense of scale to Australia’s residential 
                                               
2 As examples, see Climate Action Tracker at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/australia.html, Climate Change 
Authority Observations on Australia’s 2030 target – Statement by the Chair August 2015 “However it is viewed, the reduction 
in emissions embodied in the government's target is substantially weaker than that recommended by the Authority.” Available 
from http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/node/366  
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energy consumption. 
1.4.4 Australia’s residential energy market – Estimate of Expenditure 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) 2013-14 estimates 
total occupied dwellings with a mains electricity connection at 8,766,400. 
The Australian Energy Market Commission publishes estimates of typical electricity bills in 
each National Electricity Market jurisdiction. Applying the 2016 estimates to the household 
numbers provides an estimate of national market turnover of around $12,500 million ($12.5 
billion) including an estimated $1,135m in Goods and Services Tax (GST). 
Residential gas consumption in Australia was 162PJ in 2014-15 (OCE, 2016). Average 
Residential Gas price has been estimated (Oakley Greenwood, 2016) to be approximately 
$28/GJ in 2015 (ex GST) indicating a total market spend of $5 billion and raising approx. 
$450m in GST receipts. 
Combined, household expenditure on electricity and gas was approximately $17,500 million 
and generated approximately $1,600 million in GST receipts in 2015-16. 
1.4.5 Australia’s residential energy market – Greenhouse Emissions 
Australia’s Greenhouse Emission Information System (AGEIS) allocates just over 180Mt CO2-
e of greenhouse gas emissions in 2014 to the electricity sector (latest inventory year data year 
in AGEIS at time of preparation). This is 34.5% of the National Inventory Total (523Mt) and 
the single largest sector of the inventory. 
Household consumption is responsible for 23% of electricity sector emissions and therefore 
8.1% of the National Inventory Total (42.5 Mt, 2014). Households are also responsible for 
direct emissions from stationary energy use (mainly natural gas for heating, hot water and 
cooking) and transport (mainly private cars). The trend in these emissions categories can be 
seen from 1990 in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: Total residential sector greenhouse emissions – 25 years from 1990 to 2014 (Source: AGEIS) 
Stationary energy (labelled as Scope 1) and Transport can be seen to rise steadily. Emissions 
from electricity (labelled as Scope 2) peaked around 2009-10. The 2014 inventory year was the 
first time since 1990 that transport emissions exceeded electricity emissions, as shown in 
Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6: Residential sub-sector emissions – 25 years from 1990 to 2014 (Source: AGEIS) 
1.4.6 Components of a typical electricity bill 
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It is important to understand the ‘building blocks’ that comprise a typical electricity bill, as 
each block is subject to change in different ways and has different implications for 
affordability. Figure 7 provides estimates of the key components of the national average 
residential electricity bill in 2015-16 (noting that state-by-state breakdowns show clear 
differences in proportions (AEMC, 2016b), however the differences are not germane to the 
analysis presented in this thesis). 
● Network costs – the transmission of electricity from large generators and distribution 
to and between customers - represent around 45% of the average bill. 
● Retailer controlled costs – the cost of wholesale electricity including risk management 
and the costs of billing and administration of customer accounts – represent around 
38% of costs. Of the total bill, around 20-25% is attributable to wholesale electricity 
costs – the cost of electricity generation. This is the component that will be most 
impacted by climate policies that seek to change the mix of generation sources. 
● Australia’s renewable energy target, state-based feed-in tariffs and energy efficiency 
schemes represent around 8% of the average bill. 
● GST adds 10% to the above costs and therefore represents around 9% of the final bill. 
 
Figure 7: Breakdown of average national residential electricity price, 2015-16 (Source: Based on Climate 
Change Authority Electricity Research Report 2016 Figure 8 (CCA, 2016), (AEMC, 2016b)) 
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1.4.7 Beyond averages 
The previous section presented average residential electricity prices from across Australia’s 
electricity sector. This section goes beyond average prices to consider the distribution of 
electricity costs between different households and then explains why changes in pricing 
structures and energy technologies are important to understanding vulnerability to future 
electricity prices. 
A number of different presentations of energy related vulnerability are apparent; they include:  
● Households who have difficulty paying their energy bills, accrue debt with their 
retailer and are subsequently on retailer energy hardship programs or are 
disconnected from supply. 
● A small but significant proportion of these households that are unable to afford to pay 
the ongoing costs of the energy they need with no room to repay debt. 
● Households who require emergency relief provided by governments and the 
Community Services sector. 
● Households who may pay their energy bills but suffer detriment in other areas of their 
lives including rationing their energy usage in a way that is detrimental to their health 
or well-being, or trading off energy usage for other basic needs such as food or 
education (Chester, 2013). 
Chester and Morris produced an early study of the consequences of rising prices on low 
income and vulnerable households in the Australian context (Chester and Morris, 2011). That 
study concluded Australia was yet to explicitly recognise energy poverty as a distinct social 
problem and was without a substantive evidence base to inform policy making. A number of 
studies have subsequently sought to identify demographic attributes of households 
considered most vulnerable to rising energy costs. Overall, these studies have painted a 
complex picture of measurement from which there is no universally accepted measure or 
indicator of household energy affordability in Australia. These have been summarised in 
Section 7.4.1.  
Analyses of historic income and expenditure suggest that a diverse range of household types 
are represented in the vulnerable household cohort although some are at much higher rates 
than their proportion of the wider community. Further, close relationships to the costs of other 
essentials – such as housing and transport – regularly recur. Housing circumstances are 
clearly a key indicator of vulnerability since the cost of housing determines how much room 
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exists in the household budget to pay energy bills and tenure determines the scope of actions 
available to change consumption. 
A summary perspective is that vulnerable households are very diverse, but two common 
factors are: 
a. they need to respond to electricity cost pressures, and;  
b. they can't 
Any measure of affordability would need to relate energy expenditure to a measure of 
capacity to pay. The ABS Household Expenditure Survey (HES) is a key source of information 
in this regard. The HES was last conducted in 2015-16 as part of the Survey of Income and 
Housing. Figure 8 illustrates that, in 2015-16, the expenditure category Domestic Fuel and Power 
represented 2.9% of the average Australian household’s expenditure on goods and services.  
 
Figure 8: Average Household, proportions of goods and services expenditure. Source: (ABS, 2017a) 
Figure 9 shows the relative proportion of expenditure on energy (Domestic fuel and power) by 
households based on their equivalised disposable income from the 2015-16 HES. The 
proportion is clearly higher for those on lower incomes. The adjusted lowest income quintile 
is the lowest income quintile excluding the first and second percentiles since these tend to 
exhibit expenditures comparable to households with higher incomes (ABS, 2017b). 
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Figure 9: Proportion of household income spent on stationary energy by equivalized disposable income quintiles. 
Source: (ABS, 2017a) 
The largest expenditure items for most households is housing costs – either rent or mortgage 
payments. The UK’s official indicator of Fuel Poverty (the Low Income High Cost or LIHC 
indicator) uses an after housing cost income measure (DECC, 2013a). The ACOSS Poverty in 
Australia series uses after housing cost disposable income (i.e. after income tax and Medicare 
levy) in the consideration of capacity to pay for goods and services (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Further, the methodologies in both of these take account of household size when considering 
income). Equivalisation provides a comparison of income that takes into account the 
economies of scale of household size. Per person expenditure is not as precise as equivalence 
scales3 but can be used to illustrate the effects (Hogan and Salt, 2017). 
When considering capacity to pay electricity bills, it is therefore appropriate to consider not 
just gross income but housing costs and, where possible, household size as well. Figure 10 
shows household expenditure on housing and energy as proportions of equivalised 
disposable income and illustrates the much greater incidence of these costs on those with the 
lowest incomes. 
                                               
3 The modified OECD equivalence scale assigns a value of 1.0 to the first adult in the household, 0.5 to each additional adult 
and 0.3 to each dependent child. For example, a household with two adults and one child would need (1.0 + 0.5 + 0.3 = ) 1.8 
times the income to achieve the same material wellbeing of an adult living alone. 
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Figure 10: Proportion of household income spent on housing and stationary energy by equivalized disposable 
income quintiles. Source: (ABS, 2017a) 
Recent research by The St Vincent De Paul Society (SVDP, 2016a) analysed and mapped 
approximately 200,000 electricity disconnections for non-payment raised by AGL in South 
Australia, Victoria, NSW and South East Queensland between July 2012 and July 2015. This 
analysis identified 6 broad categories of households correlated to high disconnection rates. 
Four of the six categories were households in housing stress (spending more than 30% of 
income on housing costs) while the other two categories had lower housing costs but higher 
transport costs. In all cases though, disconnection rates were correlated with high expenditure 
on other key items in the household budget. Figure 11 reproduces Figure 10 but adds 
expenditure on transport, medical care and health. The relative capacity to pay for energy of 
these low-income households is clearly compromised by their expenditure on other 
necessities. 
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Figure 11: Proportion of household income spent on housing, stationary energy, transport and health by 
equivalized disposable income quintiles. Source: (ABS, 2017a)  
The following chart (Figure 12) has been derived from unit record files for the 2009-10 HES to 
illustrate the range of relative energy expenditures by households of different incomes. The 
horizontal axis divides the households into 5 equal-sized groups (quintiles) based on after-
housing-cost disposable income (only households whose main source of income was reported 
as wages, salaries or benefits were included in the sample). The vertical bars show the median 
result (the central marker in each one) as well as the spread of the results with markers for the 
5th and 95th percentile (i.e. 90% of individual results lie within these limits for each group). 
The standout result is the 20% of households with the lowest disposable incomes. This group 
reported a median value of 7% of disposable income on energy. 25% of this group spent 11% 
or more, 5% spent 30% or more. A broad estimate then of the scale of vulnerable household is 
the 5-10% of households for which energy costs are 10% or more of after housing cost 
disposable income: in the order of 400,000 to 800,000 households nationally.  
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Figure 12: Average expenditure on household energy as a proportion of relative capacity to pay (after housing 
cost disposable income) by equivalized disposable income (Source: author’s analysis of ABS 6530.0 Household 
Expenditure Survey, Australia 2009-10) 
1.4.8 Understanding vulnerability to future prices and costs 
The Network Transformation Roadmap work by the CSIRO and Energy Networks Australia 
(CSIRO, 2017) has provided a useful conception of the vulnerable consumer in their vision of 
the future grid. In their work, vulnerability is used to describe customers who are unable to 
take up opportunities that would enable them to save on electricity bills. Vulnerability is 
further characterised as being ‘service dependent’ and being at the opposite end of an 
empowerment spectrum to the autonomous, independent, tech-focussed and empowered 
customers (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Example of market segmentation curve for residential customers in 2027 (CSIRO, 2017) 
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Newgate Research undertook segmentation analysis of the electricity market as part of the 
AEMCs 2016 Retail Competition Review. This research conceived of a spectrum of 
vulnerability from ‘secure higher income’ to ‘vulnerable low income’ as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 14: Newgate Research market segmentation estimates (Newgate Research, 2016) 
Historically, expenditure on energy has been driven by a simple combination of total 
consumption and average prices plus a fixed supply charge. Looking forward though, 
changes to the structures of electricity tariffs and the uptake of technologies such as solar, 
storage, efficient appliances and energy management systems are expected to drive a re-
distribution of electricity costs. It is not yet clear whether this will introduce new households 
to the cohort of vulnerable customers or simply worsen the situation of those already 
considered vulnerable or both.  
Three trends redistributing costs are identified and discussed below.  
1.4.9 Access to technology and capacity to invest  
The ability to generate and store electricity is a defining characteristic of the energy market 
transition underway. It is therefore also worth distinguishing between expenditure on energy 
‘from the grid’ vs energy generated ‘behind the meter’. However, for the purposes of this 
analysis and to borrow terms from business, a more useful alternative may be to consider 
energy costs as either an operational expense (or ‘opex’) or a capital expense (‘capex’) for 
households. 
Solar, with or without storage, is largely a capex item for households. This technology allows 
a household to purchase the capability to meet a part of their future energy needs (i.e. using 
capex to lower future opex). Other energy capex includes major appliances such as hot water 
systems and fixed heating and air-conditioning systems as well as structural elements of 
housing such as insulation and high-performance windows. These technologies are all long-
lived and can generally be considered to be fixed to the dwelling rather than portable with the 
occupant. 
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Household energy opex refers to the more regular outgoings for electricity and gas – the 
monthly or quarterly bills from the energy retailer or the fortnightly payment plan.  
As in the case in business, there is usually a capex vs opex trade-off – this is where prudent 
capex can reduce opex. Examples include capex on a solar system, or more efficient air-
conditioner to reduce grid electricity costs. Capex often also provides a degree of insurance 
against future electricity prices for many years whereas a household reliant on opex is often 
completely exposed to future prices (albeit able to fix prices for a period of time in some 
electricity market contracts). 
Access to technology is clearly emerging as the key driver of a redistribution of electricity 
expenditure between households. And, clearly, the ability to take advantage of these 
developments pivots on access to and affordability of these technologies. 
1.4.10 Network pricing reform 
Historically, all households in a state paid the same fixed and per-unit prices for their 
electricity. Substantial reforms to the National Electricity Market (NEM) are underway 
following recommendations to the state and federal governments in November 2012 by the 
AEMC’s Power of Choice review – giving consumers options in the way they use electricity (AEMC, 
2012a). The AEMC received a number of rule change requests from the COAG Energy Council 
and other parties in response to these recommendations. The Distribution Network Pricing 
Arrangements Rule Change was a key one of these changes (AEMC, 2014).  
Network costs average 45% of the final electricity bill of households in the NEM (AEMC, 
2016b). The Distribution Network Pricing Arrangements Rule Change requires the structure of 
electricity tariffs for residential and small business customers to commence a transition to 
better reflect the efficient costs of providing services to each consumer. This is often referred 
to as ‘cost reflective pricing’. In general terms this means pricing must reflect that future costs 
are related to providing network capacity at times when electricity demand peaks. 
All other things being equal, the pursuit of cost-reflective pricing will mean that some 
consumers will be able to pay less than they currently are while others will pay more. The 
significance of these changes on individual customers has been acknowledged since the 
Ministerial Council responsible for Energy Policy (the Standing Council on Energy and 
Resources, SCER at the time has been replaced by the COAG Energy Council) initiated the 
tariff reform [(AEMC, 2014) SCER Rule Change Request (p3)]: 
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“The changes implied by this reform package point to a significant shift in the way 
customers use, purchase, interact with and are charged for, electricity. Electricity 
however is an essential service, and major changes to its provision are not to be taken 
lightly.” 
The diversity of consumption patterns amongst residential electricity consumers is what will 
drive the redistribution of costs foreshadowed in the originating Rule Change Request. The 
expanded use of advanced metering infrastructure (also referred to as smart meters) 
necessitated by the rule change allows for segmentation of the market based on consumption 
patterns and can be expected to reveal even greater diversity in prices. 
As at March 2017, the first round of tariff proposals from the NEM Distribution businesses 
have been developed and all are to be offered as opt-in. Most businesses have developed 
tariffs based on the maximum demand recorded in a half-hour interval during peak times. 
The majority of tariff structures include a peak demand charge window during the late 
afternoon / early evening peak consumption periods. The NSW businesses are the only ones 
not to propose an opt-in demand tariff, preferring to offer time-of-use or flat tariff structures. 
These tariffs are discussed further in a case study included in Chapter 5. 
1.4.11 Increasing fixed charges in retail offers 
The Victorian Electricity Retail Market is considered to be at the forefront of market reforms 
in the National Electricity Market in many ways (the first to privatise, the first to de-regulate 
electricity prices, the first to mandate advanced metering, highest number of active retailers, 
highest switching rates). However, Figure 15, below, illustrates a clear trend of increasing 
fixed supply charges in residential retail electricity contracts since the deregulation of prices 
in 2009: 
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Figure 15: Average fixed supply charges, Victorian retail standing contracts. Source: (SVDP, 2016b) 
This trend is also cited as a symptom of a market that is not operating efficiently (Ben-David, 
2016, 2015, 2012, Mountain, 2016, 2015) despite being judged as having effective competition 
by the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC, 2017a) 
The critique of the retail energy market outlined in Mountain’s (2015) report to the 
Brotherhood of St Laurence, posits that the market is failing to deliver lower prices for many 
consumers, rather the potential savings are being captured by the energy retailers. While there 
is limited data on the actual contracts households are on, research by Newgate Research for 
the AEMC found that those on low incomes, older people and people with less internet access 
were over-represented in those who reported they would not switch in the next 12 months 
(Newgate Research, 2016). The Victorian government initiated a review of the retail market in 
late 2016 that reported in 2017 (Thwaites et al., 2017). The Commonwealth Government 
referred an inquiry into retail electricity pricing to the ACCC in March 2017 that will report 
progressively over 2017 and 2018 (ACCC, 2017). These developments are discussed further in 
Chapter 3. 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has set out a policy context for this research. 
Australia committed to an emissions reduction target in 2015 that is expected to require net-
zero emissions from the electricity sector by mid-century. The current policy cycle is seeking 
to align energy policy and climate policy and pursue the energy trilemma of lower emissions 
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and lower prices from a stable and secure market. Various mechanisms have been proposed. 
Household expenditure on electricity and gas in Australia is estimated at $17,500 million in 
2014-15, including approximately $1,600m in GST revenue. Historical trends in residential 
electricity prices show a rapid rise from around 2007 to 2012 and then again from mid-2017.  
Beyond average price outcomes, simple analysis of results from the 2009-10 Household 
Expenditure Survey (HES) illustrates the potential for some low-income households to have 
very high relative expenditure on energy. Using after housing cost disposable income as a 
proxy for capacity to pay, some households spend 10% or more of this capacity on energy bills. 
This expense is competing with other essentials such as transport and health care. 
A summary perspective is that vulnerable households are very diverse, but two common 
factors are: 
a. they need to respond to electricity cost pressures, and;  
b. they can't 
Recent work by CSIRO and Newgate Research (for the AEMC) gives further insight into 
vulnerability in a changing market. Three trends redistributing costs were identified and 
discussed. These are: 
● Access to technology and capacity to invest 
● Network pricing reform 
● Increasing fixed charges 
Looking forward, changes to the structure of pricing enabled by the increasing prevalence of 
interval metering and rising fixed charges is expected to redistribute costs between consumers 
and generate winners and losers over coming years.  
With this as the contemporary context for a review of policies, the following chapter presents 
a literature review in order to locate the research in the gaps that exist in public policy and the 
NEM’s consumer safety net.  
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2 Literature Review 
The literature review enables the researcher to demonstrate knowledge of previous work in 
the field and to situate the research in the context of this work (University of Sydney, 2017). 
This chapter presents relevant history, locates the research questions within gaps in existing 
knowledge and highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the research questions. 
Restating, the research questions that this thesis seeks to answer are:  
• When considering a consumer safety net for consumers in a liberalised electricity market, 
what is an appropriate analytical framework for policy and practice that can be used by 
stakeholders to improve governance and consumer outcomes? 
• Subsequently, what priorities emerge from this framework that could be advanced 
through the policy cycle? 
This chapter starts with a review of literature related to the analysis of public policy and 
introduces the concept of the policy cycle. Next, the governance context for energy policy and 
social policy in Australia is presented. Australia’s federal system of government means that 
responsibilities for relevant parts of energy policy and social policy are shared between two 
layers of government as well as usually two or more different Ministerial portfolios in each of 
the seven jurisdictions that make up the NEM (five states, one territory and the national 
government). Intergovernmental agreements form the basis of co-operative federalism on 
these issues. 
It is shown that energy market reform has its origins in National Competition Policy from the 
1990’s. Social policy areas relevant to the interaction with energy policy are the tax and 
transfer system (social welfare policy), Housing Policy and Consumer Policy. Historically, 
statements of energy policy tend to reinforce the primacy of the efficiency objectives over 
equity concerns and imply a “keep up!” message for social policy’s role. This highlights the 
gaps between the policy domains. 
The review then outlines the historic need for governments to provide a consumer safety net 
and how this has become a shared responsibility with energy businesses and community 
sector welfare organisations. International case studies are drawn from the UK and New 
Zealand. Both examples reiterate that energy and poverty are important connected policy 
areas and the community sector has important roles to play. Policy responses in both the UK 
and NZ have gravitated towards efforts to improve the energy performance of housing as 
well as financial subsidies. With their long histories, both cases also highlight the persistent 
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nature of the problem. The formalisation of fuel poverty as a distinct and important policy issue 
in the UK has led to evolving approaches to measurement that allow for estimates of the size 
of the issue and the level of expenditure necessary to tackle it. 
The shared responsibility approach to the provision of a consumer safety net has been 
acknowledged by many stakeholders but a gap clearly exists in providing a structure for its 
analysis and development. This is the unique contribution of this thesis. 
2.1 Public policy and its analysis 
2.1.1 What is meant by Social and Energy Policy? 
The literature presents a range of definitions for the term public policy depending on the 
context in which the term is used. There is general agreement at least that policy relates to the 
choices made in solving complex problems or managing complex issues; and that these 
choices are a result of decisions and the influence of one decision on another.  Much of the 
theoretical literature draws on decision making theory. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, in their 
popular text Studying Public Policy, begin from Thomas Dye’s simple definition of public 
policy as ‘… anything a government chooses to do or not to do’ (Dye, 1972) and emphasise that a 
policy is a conscious choice of government (Howlett et al., 2009). In the context of social policy, 
Titmuss defined policy as ‘ … the principles that govern action directed towards given ends’ and 
emphasised use of the word in an action-oriented and problem-oriented sense (Titmuss, 1974).  
This thesis has been written from a perspective of energy policy practitioners seeking to 
integrate social policy issues and so the preface energy in the term energy policy is relatively 
self-evident in meaning. This thesis is primarily concerned with a subset of broader energy 
matters (which more broadly includes primary energy such as oil, coal and gas) related to the 
provision of electricity to end-users. The preface social in the term social policy is likely to be 
less clear to energy policy practitioners. The following extract provides some guidance 
(Dalton et al., 1996): 
But when is a personal issue a social issue? And when is a social issue a social policy 
issue? The process of policy making begins when people come together to identify 
and name an issue of common concern, and to seek a collective or social solution to 
concerns in their everyday lives – or in the wider world in which they live. The concern 
may be about their housing, jobs or childcare, a wider issue in the environment, human 
or civil rights, or, as in the case of protests over war, about actions their government 
has taken which they don’t support. When a plan of action is developed, the people 
have a ‘policy proposal’. If this is adopted by a level of government it is likely to be 
called ‘policy’ or ‘public policy’. If it is widely recognised to be about quality of life, then 
it may be called ‘social policy … 
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It is important to acknowledge that the term social policy does not have a precise or 
necessarily agreed definition. However, for the purposes of this research it is perhaps most 
important to recognise that social policy is largely about the non-economic factors in human 
relations (Titmuss 1974, p139) and hence a precise definition of the full scope of Social Policy 
or Energy Policy is not necessary in order to examine the relationship between them.  
The next section accepts these broad definitions and then considers how public policy is 
developed and reflects on perspectives of how policies are developed and analysed. 
2.1.2 Policy Analysis 
A significant academic literature exists on the development and analysis of public policy. The 
term policy science was coined by Harold Lasswell and refers to an approach to understanding 
and solving problems. A critical emphasis is on placing problems and potential solutions in 
context “… in order to develop recommendations that are both realistic and desirable”(Policy Sciences 
Center, 2016). 
Harold Lasswell is also often quoted for his interpretation of politics as “who gets what, when 
and how”. Both aspects, politics and policy, are relevant to this research. From Lasswell’s work 
in the 1940’s and early 1950’s, the literature traces the analysis of policy, the role of politics in 
policy and debates the relative merits of each dimension.  
Herbert A. Simon appears in the literature in the 1950’s as the first to articulate the limits to 
rationality in decision making through his enduring terms bounded rationality and satisficing (a 
blend of satisfy and suffice) (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Charles Lindblom’s The Science of 
‘Muddling Through’ built on Simon’s observations of the limits to rational decision making and 
pioneered an approach to analysing policy referred to as ‘incrementalism’. In this model, 
decision makers move from the status quo ‘step-by-step and by small degrees’ (Lindblom, 1959).  
According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984), while both Lindblom and Simon (and their 
collaborators and supporters) saw limits to rationality they differed in their stance on what 
should be done. For Simon, it was for decision makers to become more rational. For Lindblom, 
it was to accept the ‘reality’ of incrementalism as both what is and what should be. 
Other scholars held a less binary view of the options and proposed a middle ground. Etzioni 
(1967) introduced “Mixed Scanning: A “Third” Approach to Decision Making” as combining 
elements of both to overcome limitations of each (Etzioni, 1967). His approach sought to 
distinguish fundamental decisions from incremental ones. Etzioni also distinguished the 
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rationalistic and incrementalist models in terms of the “… degree of control over the decision-
making situation on the part of the decision-maker”; with the rationalistic model assuming a high 
degree of control and the incrementalist model much less (1967, p385). John Forester’s 
contribution was to emphasise the importance of context in considering the “boundedness” 
on rationality for any given problem or issue (Forester, 1984). 
A large part of the literature that followed can be seen to debate the relative merits of 
rationalism versus incrementalism while making a distinction between description and 
prescription: how policies are made compared to how they should be made (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Wildavsky, 1987).  
Another critical and inescapable element of policy making that limits rationality is that of 
values. The values of the decision maker, the community and the analyst will influence how 
policies are made, analysed and evaluated. In his paper The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, 
Charles W. Anderson (1979) used energy policy as an example of the range of perspectives 
and values that must be reconciled when assessing a policy initiative (Anderson, 1979): 
In such a field as energy policy, for example, the policy maker or citizen must somehow 
decide what to make of the various arguments and analyses presented by economists, 
environmentalists, engineers, scientists, lawyers, and so on, each claiming to be 
authoritative for a specific aspect of the problem, each justified by its own premises of 
inquiry and rigorous logic of analysis, each containing imperatives for definitive public 
action. 
Anderson also provided an alternative model of rational policy making that was more a 
process of reasoned deliberation and debate rather than a “pragmatic calculus” (1979, p722). 
Consistent with this view, Wildavsky (1987, p xviii) wrote: 
I would like to return to a (by now) ancient verity of policy analysis: economic analysis 
by itself is insufficient; compleat analysts place their studies and their search for 
organizational support within a broader political and organizational context. 
Charles Lindblom’s blunt assessments of the realities of policy making in the US highlighted 
the influential role of business in policy making as not just trying to influence solutions but 
also creating some of the problems needed to be addressed (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993):  
Public policy making by business, in other words, helps create significant pieces of the 
agenda for public policy making by government 
Emphasising the inherent limitation on objectivity this implies, he interpreted this as further 
supporting the incrementalist model (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993) 
Political interactions and flawed human judgments play a primary role in making policy 
… 
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Lindblom strongly emphasised the importance of tailoring analysis to an understanding of 
the inevitable primacy of politics over policy (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, p127): 
In other words, analysis should aim to improve the quality of political interaction, not 
try to substitute for it. 
Lindblom’s emphasis on the limits of analysis are as important as his observations on 
“agreement in lieu of complete understanding”. By being clear on these limitations, the view 
was that there is no way to calculate a “correct” approach to a complex policy issue. Lindblom 
liked to encourage the competition of ideas between key stakeholders and felt that good policy 
is whatever the key interests can negotiate and agree on4. Inequities in power and influence 
are often highlighted in his writing as stifling this competition of ideas. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Wildavsky (1987) have expressed similar views on the role of 
policy analysis as a supplement to, not substitute for, political advocacy. Hogwood and Gunn 
were also explicit of their bias to the prescriptive aspect of policy analysis for the purpose of 
improvement of policies. They emphasised clarity of terminology; what is meant by policy 
and what type of analysis is being performed (1984, p31) and being alert to the analysts 
potential to introduce subjectivity with their own views. Importantly, they encourage careful 
consideration of how analysis is consumed as well as how it is produced. 
The preceding discussion has significant implications for this research. An option would have 
been to assume a ‘clean slate’ and attempt to form a prescriptive assessment of how electricity, 
as an essential service in modern society, could be provided to meet economic, social and 
environmental goals given the opportunity to start again. Alternatively, the work could de-
construct and critique the path taken in Australia as an example, given the evident high prices 
and high disconnection rates, of how not to restructure electricity provision. Instead, the work 
has followed Lindblom’s incrementalist approach and seeks to provide a basis for advancing 
the situation of households at risk of losing access to electricity supply based on the 
contemporary situation in Australia. 
This undoubtedly presents a limitation on the application of this research as it assumes that a 
market-based supply of electricity (and welfare services for that matter) can eventually meet 
the needs of these households and that meeting their needs is worthy of collective pursuit. 
The option of more radical change should not be dismissed. 
                                               
4 The concept of ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ appeared in several of Lindblom’s works. 
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In the case of this thesis, the research and analysis aim to provide practical, useful 
contributions to the evolution of this specific policy territory. To do so, the research aims to 
be consumed by Lindblom’s partisans5 - in this case; households, community sector providers 
of welfare services, electricity businesses and governments (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, 
p130): 
Targeting analysis toward helping actual partisans interact with each other would 
increase the chances that research will have some impact on social problem solving 
2.1.3 The policy cycle 
Contemporary texts aimed at students, such as Studying Public Policy (Howlett et al. 2009) or 
The Australian Policy Handbook (Bridgman and Davis 2004), tend to focus on understanding 
common elements of the policy process and often depict the process as a cycle of between 5 
and 10 key steps. While orderly sequential steps are not necessarily an accurate portrayal of 
how the policy process actually works, such a depiction is considered useful for structuring 
analysis and providing rigour. This has inspired the adoption of a policy cycle as the basic 
framework for the policy analysis components of this thesis.  
This approach compels the analysis to be grounded in contemporary evidence and cognisant 
of the need to contain recommendations to the scale of policy evolution that is politically 
achievable – consistent with Lindblom’s incrementalist approach as discussed above. 
 
Figure 16: Depiction of a policy cycle 
This cycle framing for analysis is useful as it reminds the analyst of two things:  
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● Firstly, that analysis can be applied as part of continuous improvement of policy – for 
good analysis to provide practical recommendations, the idea of the cycle 
acknowledges that it is impractical to start from scratch and that context changes over 
time.  
● Secondly, the cycle also acknowledges the political context of public policy and is 
pragmatic about the difference between what is rational policy and what is likely to 
attract consensus. In this way the cycle will allow for the issues to be revisited at some 
point in the future and refined further in another reform cycle. Any practical changes 
will be iterative in nature. 
In order to provide a consistent structure, the key chapters of this thesis follow four generic 
stages of a policy cycle: 
1. Policy Review – an outline of current policy settings 
2. Agenda Setting – identification of the key issues 
3. Policy Analysis – empirical analysis of key issues 
4. Policy Formulation – recommendations for reconciling social/energy policy objectives 
Australia’s form of government provides vital context for this thesis. In order to understand 
the public policy approach to electricity markets in the Australian context, it is necessary to 
obtain an understanding of public policy governance – the roles and responsibilities of 
different actors and institutions. This is the subject of the next section. 
2.2 The Governance Context for Energy Policy 
Responsibilities for key parts of energy policy and for parts of social policy are scattered 
between two layers of government and usually two or more different Ministerial portfolios in 
each of the seven jurisdictions that make up the NEM (five states, one territory and the 
national government). 
2.2.1 Form of government 
Australia is governed via a federation of state governments and a national government 
(sometimes referred to as the Commonwealth or federal government) that are bound together 
under Australia’s Constitution. The Constitution is the fundamental law of Australia that 
binds the parliaments of the Commonwealth and States – an Act of any Parliament is in fact 
invalid if it is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. 
The Constitution took effect on January 1st, 1901 at a time when Australia’s markets for 
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electricity and gas were very much in their technical and economic infancy. The Constitution 
brought together six self-governing British colonies as States in a Federation. The Constitution 
lays out the roles and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Parliament and establishes the 
matters over which the Commonwealth has exclusive powers. Section 516 of the Constitution 
lists the powers specifically vested in the Commonwealth parliament (CoA, 2003). Due to the 
infancy of the technologies (at this time electricity and gas were mainly used for lighting city 
streets) downstream energy issues receive no explicit mention in the Constitution and 
therefore default to being the responsibilities of the States. 
Of note is the inclusion of specific reference in section 51 to telecommunications services (s51 
(v) postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services) which, by the nature of the technologies 
involved and service provided, did cross state borders. Arguably, had electricity or gas been 
traded between colonies at the time of Federation, they too may have been included in the list 
of Commonwealth powers. One of the main reasons cited for pursuing federation was that of 
a nationwide ‘common market’7 and Section 92 of the Constitution provides that trade 
between the states shall be ‘absolutely free’8. 
In the case of electricity, the first ‘cross border’ electricity trade came with the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme in 1959 (supplying both New South Wales and Victoria). Thirty years later, 
in 1990, the state-owned electricity businesses of South Australia and Victoria commissioned 
the ‘Heywood’ interconnector between the two states. The interconnector operated under an 
Operating Agreement between the states (Industry Commission, 1991a). The eastern states 
subsequently added several interconnections to form the National Electricity Market (NEM) 
of Queensland, NSW, Victoria, South Australia and, in 2006, Tasmania.  
However, the pursuit of ‘free’ interstate trade of energy has not been as significant an issue in 
the recent move towards harmonised national electricity and gas laws as has been an economy 
wide push towards a more “competitive Australia” – the Competition Policy Reforms of the 
1990’s (Parer, 2002). 
                                               
6 s51 Legislative powers of the Parliament 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to: … 
7 Chapter IV of the Constitution (sections 81–105A) contains provisions regulating, among other things, trade and commerce 
throughout Australia. The desire to have a single trade area throughout Australia was one of the main reasons for the 
movement by the Australian people towards federation. 
8 92 Trade within the Commonwealth to be free 
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of 
internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free. 
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The ‘liberalisation’ of electricity and downstream gas markets in Australia has been underway 
since the 1990’s. Initial activity occurred as part of a period of competition reforms that 
included a focus on Government owned monopolies. All state-based electricity markets were 
owned and operated by government owned entities and this attribute alone ensured that 
electricity would be included in the reform process. 
National Competition Policy is discussed briefly in the following section and this is followed 
by a discussion of how Australia’s Energy Policy has continued to follow the direction set by 
competition policy reforms. 
2.2.2 National Competition Policy 
The internationalisation of the Australian economy – represented most notably by the floating 
of the Australian Dollar in 1983 – foreshadowed an economic reform program that focussed 
on productivity and competition. A key event in this process was a Ministerial Statement to 
Parliament on March 12th, 1991 by Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke entitled “Building a 
Competitive Australia”. The following extract from PM Hawke’s speech highlights the 
situation at the time (Kain, 2003): 
The Trade Practices Act is our principal legislative weapon to ensure consumers get 
the best deal from competition. But there are many areas of the Australian economy 
today that are immune from that Act: some Commonwealth enterprises, State public 
sector businesses, and significant areas of the private sector, including the 
professions.  
This patchwork coverage reflects historical and constitutional factors, not economic 
efficiencies; it is another important instance of the way we operate as six economies, 
rather than one. The benefits for the consumer of expanding the scope of the Trade 
Practices Act could be immense: potentially lower professional fees, cheaper road and 
rail fares, cheaper electricity. (emphasis added) 
The importance of competition policy was restated by PM Hawke’s successor Mr Paul Keating 
as he launched what was to become known as the “Hilmer Review” (The National 
Competition Policy Review). The Review committee’s report was delivered to government in 
August 1993 and recommended, amongst other things, extending the reach of the Trade 
Practices Act to apply to all business activity in Australia, competitive neutrality and 
restructuring for government owned monopolies and a policy of providing third-party access 
to “nationally significant infrastructure”. Many of the Hilmer recommendations underpin the 
Energy Market Reform process still underway in Australia today, 25 years later. 
By way of background, the Trade Practices Act (TPA) was implemented by the Whitlam Labor 
Government in 1974 and has continued to be the central legislative instrument for market 
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liberalisation and competition reform. The head of power for the TPA was the ‘corporations 
power’ at section 51 (xx) of the Constitution9. The TPA has been revised and expanded 
numerous times and from January 2011 was recast as the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
and includes, as a schedule, a new Australian Consumer Law (ACL) that consolidates and 
replaces provisions from the TPA and 20 pieces of State and Territory Legislation (CoA, 
2010a). 
2.2.3 Electricity Market liberalisation 
Competition reforms had influenced the Electricity and Gas sectors during the 1990s – 
‘unbundling’ the previous vertically integrated businesses and introducing a degree of 
competition between retailers and between generators while ensuring access and price 
regulation of the natural monopoly energy networks (Parer, 2002). The National Electricity 
Market (NEM) comprising, the states of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia was launched in 1998. 
The next wave of reform followed from a Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) meeting 
in 2001 (CoAG, 2001a). CoAG was established in 1992 as the peak intergovernmental forum 
in Australia. CoAG is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes the Premiers of each state 
and first ministers of the ACT and NT. CoAG prefaced subsequent announcements by stating 
(CoAG, 2001b): 
The energy sector, both stationary and transport, provides an essential underpinning 
of Australia's economic, environmental and social goals. Competitively priced and 
reliable energy services are a key to our international industry competitiveness and 
standard of living … Energy is a shared responsibility among the Commonwealth, 
State and Territory Governments. The Commonwealth has a national leadership role 
to ensure overall prosperity and that Australia's international obligations are met. 
States and Territories have particular responsibilities within their jurisdictions, including 
in relation to the provision of energy services to the communities they serve. 
All Australian Governments recognise that effective operation of an open and 
competitive national energy market contributes to improved economic and 
environmental performance, and to delivering benefits to households, small business 
and industry, including in regional areas. 
The CoAG meeting established a new Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE, comprising 
federal, state and territory energy ministers and a pre-cursor to today’s COAG Energy 
Council) and initiated an Energy Market Review headed by Mr Warwick Parer (the Parer 
                                               
9 s51 [with respect to] ... (xx) foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth 
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Review) that tabled a report in December 2002 entitled “Towards a Truly National and 
Efficient Market” (Parer, 2002). The Review concluded that despite progress in the 1990s: 
Australia’s energy sector had confused governance arrangements and excessive 
regulation [p10]; 
There remained a ‘regionalised’ NEM, with five markets rather than one, and a severe 
limitation on trading interstate and market liquidity in general [p9], and; 
Some prices to consumers are (or will soon become) higher than necessary [p9] 
These findings spawned a focus for the Energy Market Reform agenda on regulation from a 
national perspective and the establishment of new national institutions to carry out these 
functions. Relevant to maintaining momentum in the reform agenda was industry pressure 
to harmonise regulation across jurisdictions.  
2.2.4 Co-operative Federalism for a National Market 
Energy Market Reform is not the first instance of a national approach being adopted for a 
sector of the economy that has been constitutionally performed by the States. Other examples 
include Corporations Law, Industrial Relations, Air Transport and Family Law. The referral 
of powers from a State to the Commonwealth is provided for in Section 51 (xxxvii)10 of the 
Constitution. However, rather than outright referral, it has been stated that much of 
Australia’s economic success is, at least in part, a consequence of Commonwealth-State 
cooperation on competition policy in the 1990’s (Twomey, 2000). 
This notion of cooperation has flowed into the downstream energy sector via an 
intergovernmental agreement established in 2004 and referred to as the Australian Energy 
Market Agreement (AEMA). The AEMA provides the basis of a cooperative legislative 
framework auspiced by what is now known as the CoAG Energy Council. 
The AEMA has led to the establishment of four key institutions (introduced in section 1.3): 
● The Rule Maker (Australian Energy Markets Commission, AEMC) 
● The Rule Enforcer (Australian Energy Regulator, AER) 
● The Market Operator (Australian Energy Market Operator, AEMO) 
● Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) 
As the Commonwealth had very limited powers in this area, the states have established these 
                                               
10 s51 (xxxvii) [The Parliament shall have power ... with respect to] ... matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments 
the matter is referred, or which afterwards adopt the law; 
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organisations (and assigned their roles, functions and powers) under virtually identical pieces 
of legislation enacted by the participating states’ parliaments. South Australia has been 
designated as the lead legislator and legislation is prepared collaboratively between 
Commonwealth and State officials and tabled in the South Australian parliament. 
The legislative packages (major elements of the new framework are prepared and progressed 
in blocks) generally comprise new or amended statutes, regulations and rules. This includes 
the National Electricity Law (NEL, a schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 
1996), National Electricity Rules and Regulations. For gas there is the National Gas Law (NGL, 
which is a schedule to the National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008) which is applied in 
different ways via statutes in each participating jurisdiction. There is also the National Gas 
Rules and Regulations. 
A legislative package, known as the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF), was 
presented in 2010. The key component, the National Energy Retail Law was passed by the 
South Australian parliament and received assent into Law from the Governor in March 2011. 
Once enacted by a jurisdiction this package transfers a number of retail and distribution 
regulation functions to the AER in an effort to harmonise the rights of customers and 
obligations on Energy Retailers around the country. The AEMA was amended in October 2011 
to reflect the passage of the Australian Consumer Law, the National Energy Retail Law and 
the subsequent allocation of new retail market responsibilities to the energy market 
institutions. 
Central to the new arrangements that followed the initial AEMA was the establishment of the 
AER as a single, national energy market regulator on July 1st, 2005. The legislative foundation 
for the AER is contained within an amendment to the Trade Practices Act (now the 
Competition and Consumer Act, CCA). The amendment inserted a new Part IIIAA into the 
CCA to establish the AER as a Commonwealth body. The AER’s functions and powers have 
been conferred through the application of the National Electricity Law, National Gas Law and 
associated Regulations and Rules by the Commonwealth, States and Territories. 
The AER amendments to the CCA included content designed to overcome Constitutional 
issues with the re-allocation of powers. The Bills Digest published by the Parliamentary 
Library’s Information and Research Services for this legislation discussed previous cases that 
had challenged the ‘re-assignment’ of powers between the states and Commonwealth (CoA, 
2004). Particular attention was paid to the High Court decision in R v Hughes (2000). Mr 
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Hughes had challenged the conferral of state functions and powers on Commonwealth bodies 
and officials under the Corporations Law scheme of the time (Govey and Manson, 2000) – a 
scheme based on Commonwealth legislation enacted in the Australian Capital Territory and 
then applied in the other states and Northern Territory in an arrangement not dissimilar to 
the legislative framework for Energy Market Reform. His case was not successful but the 
Court’s reasoning had significant implications for Corporation Law at the time and similar 
Commonwealth-State cooperative agreements into the future (Govey and Manson, 2000). 
After R v Hughes, a new Corporations Law scheme was established via a formal referral of 
powers from the States to the Commonwealth and a degree of review was undertaken on a 
number of other cooperative legislation schemes (SCLACA 2006). 
While the Hughes case seemed to instil doubt over the validity of the re-allocation of powers 
from State to Commonwealth, the literature also refers to earlier High Court comments that 
spoke positively about the notion of ‘cooperative federalism’. The example quoted by Govey 
and Manson (2000) of Chief Justice Gibbs in R v Duncan (1983) is particularly relevant: 
“There is no express provision in the Constitution, and no principle of constitutional 
law, that would prevent the Commonwealth and the States from acting in cooperation, 
so that each, acting in its own field, supplies the deficiencies in the power of the other... 
[to achieve] a uniform and complete legislative scheme”, 
and; 
“... cooperation between the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and the States is in no 
way antithetic to the provisions of the Constitution: to the contrary, it is a positive 
objective of the Constitution.” 
Clarity over the re-allocation of powers is often raised as an area of potential Constitutional 
amendment although there is often reluctance to pursue such a change due to the cost and 
historically low success rate in the referenda required for Constitutional changes (Govey and 
Manson, 2000; SCLACA, 2006; Twomey, 2000; Williams, 2005). Constitutional law expert 
Professor George Williams (2005) argues that while Constitutional amendment to provide a 
simpler and unambiguous regime of cooperation is an ideal, the referral of powers is not 
necessarily a preferred end result over a cooperative legislative scheme. Professor Williams 
has stated that a scheme based on “applied legislation” is: 
“... arguably the best model because it does not depend upon a transfer of power, 
allows for change over time and is built upon Commonwealth-State cooperation.” 
“Applied Legislation” or “Cooperative Legislation” refers to legislation enacted by one 
jurisdiction and then applied in others. This was the case with Corporations Law from 1991 
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to 2001 - prior to the Hughes case. It is also the model employed for the Energy Market 
legislative framework albeit with special consideration given to the implications of the 
Hughes case (CoA, 2004). 
Twomey has written a relevant paper on cooperative legislation schemes in the context of 
infrastructure in which she concludes that (Twomey, 2007): 
“The centralisation of power in the Commonwealth is not the only way of achieving a 
level of consistency and co-ordination in the provision of national infrastructure. There 
are other co-operative means ... [which] utilise the existing expertise of the states and 
ensure better coordination ... “ 
This is very relevant to the case of electricity and downstream gas. A comprehensive referral 
of powers under s51(xxxvii) seems likely be unworkable at present due to the complexity of 
the reforms, the limited experience of the Commonwealth in such matters and the rather 
strained relationship between the Commonwealth and the states and territories on energy 
policy. However, it is possible to imagine that at some point in the future that a referral might 
be possible. 
In summary, Electricity Market reform is a working example of Cooperative Federalism that 
has evolved with the underlying technology and markets. It has also incorporated lessons 
from other parts of the economy. Part of the original objectives of federalism was that of a 
‘common market’ premised on the idea that the whole could be greater than the sum of its 
parts. However, despite the national energy market institutions having been established for 
over 10 years (since July 1st, 2005) the transferral or harmonisation of functions from the states 
is still progressing incrementally and does not include Western Australia (except for aspects 
of gas pipeline regulation) or the Northern Territory (although a transition process is 
underway). Victoria remains outside the National Energy Customer Framework. 
 
2.3 Governance Context for Social Policy  
Social policy in Australia incorporates a progressive tax and transfer system that aims to 
provide a capacity to pay for most goods and services. For the purposes of this research, social 
policy includes income support, energy specific concessions and rebates as well as interactions 
with housing affordability policy. Uniform tariff policies (postage stamp pricing) are also an 
important feature of most state and territory regimes. 
2.3.1 Welfare Policy context 
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In 2014, 3 million people (13.3% of the population) including over 730,000 children (17.4% of 
all children under the age of 15) were living below the poverty line after taking account of 
housing costs (ACOSS, 2016). Having such low incomes risk vulnerability to disconnection in 
the energy market. 
The Australian Government initiated a review of Australia’s Welfare System in 2014 “… to 
identify improvements to ensure the social support system is sustainable, effective and 
coherent, and encourages people to work” (DSS, 2014a). The review stated (DSS, 2014b): 
Australia’s social support system includes cash transfer payments to individuals and 
families, and a range of support services funded or provided by all levels of government 
and by civil society (commercial and community organisations). The system is intended 
to help meet the costs of daily living, increase participation in work and social activities, 
and build individual and family functioning. 
According to the review, in 2012–13, the Australian Government provided more than $110 
billion in cash transfer payments (DSS, 2014b). From a population of over 23 million, almost 5 
million Australians receive some form of “income support”; a term that refers to a range of 
pensions, allowances, family payments and other supplements. The review also distinguishes 
some of the different short-term and long-term purposes of income support (DSS, 2014b): 
● long-term support to meet basic costs of living for those such as older people and 
people with severe disability who cannot work and have no access to other resources.  
● transitional payments as support during a period between jobs, the transition from 
education to work, a period of re-skilling or temporary incapacity. 
● partial support such as those only able to work part-time due to a disability or low-
paid working families who need additional assistance to provide for themselves 
and/or their children 
Unlike the case for energy, Section 51 of the Constitution makes explicit reference to the 
Commonwealth’s obligations in this regard: 
Legislative powers of the Parliament  
(xxiii)  invalid and old-age pensions;  
(xxiiiA) the provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, 
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental 
services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students 
and family allowances;  
In the Australian context, distinction has been made between ‘tied’ and ‘untied’ supports. The 
final report of the 2009-10 Review of Australia’s Taxation System (Henry Tax Review) covers 
the Transfer System and explains ‘tied’ vs ‘untied’ transfers (Henry, 2010): 
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“While transfers are usually thought of as cash payments, governments also provide 
transfers such as concessions and payments that are 'tied' to the purchase, or supply, 
of a particular good or service.” 
The economic argument for ‘tied’ transfers lies in the concept of a merit good that is, a good 
that people should consume regardless of their preferences for other things(Ver Eecke, 1998). 
At a time when energy market liberalisation was gaining momentum in the UK, Dilnot and 
Helm concluded that energy for households was both an absolute and a participation merit 
good (Dilnot and Helm, 1987): that there is both an absolute requirement for survival and a 
relative requirement for ongoing participation and inclusion in society11. 
The Henry Tax Review made a number of wide-ranging observations about the eligibility for 
and distribution of the various concessions at the different levels of government. State and 
Territory Governments are responsible for energy specific concessions and rebates. Henry’s 
Recommendation 107 called for a review by the Productivity Commission for report to COAG. 
As at January 2018, this has not occurred. The 2014 Review of Australia’s Welfare System “A 
new System for Better Employment and Social outcomes” Final Report continued to support 
concession cards and pointed to the Federation White Paper for implications on how 
concessions might be funded and delivered in the future (DSS, 2015, p. 16). The Federation 
White Paper process was terminated in April 2016 and  the state-federal funding issues remain 
unresolved 
Most NEM jurisdictions offer a fixed rebate for electricity and gas as well as allowances for 
medically-defined heating and cooling needs. The structures, values and eligibility criteria 
vary between jurisdictions, but each is generally paid by governments directly to energy 
retailers for crediting against customer accounts. In addition, each jurisdiction operates an 
emergency payment scheme where access to additional funds is available on a more ad-hoc 
basis but under strict eligibility criteria12.  
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)13, around one in four households have 
government pensions and allowances as their main source of income. 64% of these (15% of all 
households) report that government pensions and allowances made up 90% or more of their 
                                               
11 In this context, the relevant attribute of merit goods is that households tend to under-consume even though there is a private 
or public benefit in them doing so. The most obvious case for energy is that of avoiding the negative health impacts of cold 
homes. In Australia this would translate to both cold winters and summer heat waves. 
12 Home Energy Emergency Assistance Scheme (Queensland), Energy Accounts Payment Assistance Scheme (NSW), Utility 
Relief Grant Scheme (Victoria), Emergency Electricity Payment Scheme (South Australia) 
13 ABS 6523.0 Household Income and Wealth, Australia, 2015–16 Table 7.3: 2,171,800 out of 8,963,300 = 24.2% 
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household income (ABS, 2017c). The eligibility criteria for energy concessions and rebates in 
each jurisdiction are largely aligned with eligibility for specific Australian Government 
concession cards (such as the Pensioner Concession Card, Health Care Card, Department of 
Veteran’s Affairs Gold Card). By implication, social policy settings are a key determinant of 
capacity to pay electricity bills for somewhere between 15% and 25% of households. 
In summary, the social policy context is that a combination of income support and energy 
specific concessions is made available to households. The Australian government is 
responsible for providing the income while the state and territory governments are largely 
(but not entirely) responsible for providing the energy specific aspects. There is little doubt 
that household energy costs would constitute one of the ‘costs of daily living’ referred to in 
the 2015 Welfare Review but there is an obvious dilemma. The adequacy of the Australian 
Government’s income to cover the cost of energy is heavily influenced by the adequacy of 
state-level concessions to keep energy bills affordable. The states and territories rely on the 
Commonwealth for around 45% of their revenue and are not often in a budget position to 
extend the value or reach of concessions (CoA, 2015, p. 9).  
Other aspects of the broader social support system are also relevant to this policy area. 
Housing in particular is both a driver of energy demand as well as a key variable in a 
household’s capacity to pay their energy bills. This is discussed further below as well as in 
Chapters 5 and 7. Consumer policy is also relevant as outlined below and in Chapter 6. All 
three domains involve a federal structure and are governed through COAG processes. 
2.3.2 Housing Policy Context 
Surveys of household income and expenditure reveal housing costs as the largest expenditure 
category for all household income segments as presented in section 1.4.7. The relative capacity 
to pay for energy of these low-income households is clearly compromised by their 
expenditure on housing and other necessities. 
Housing affordability is a complex public policy objective that is strongly researched and 
debated in Australia. The housing policy agenda, similar to energy policy, also fractures over 
federal lines. State and Territory Governments provide public housing but significant funding 
is provided from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth also provides Rent Assistance to 
those renting privately as a non-taxable income supplement to eligible recipients of 
allowances and benefits whose rental costs exceed pre-determined thresholds. Rent 
Assistance is provided for in Australia’s Social Security Law (Social Security Act 1991 and 
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subordinates). 
Housing policy in Australia, as a subset of the broader domain of social policy, has governance 
similarities to those of energy markets. An overarching intergovernmental agreement similar 
to the AEMA exists. The first Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement (CSHA) was 
finalised in 1945 (CoA 2001) and was triggered by reported housing shortages. The 
Commonwealth has made financial allocations to the states ever since. The CSHA was 
replaced in 2009 by the National Affordable Housing Agreement (CoAG 2012b) and a number 
of National Partnership Agreements on homelessness, social housing and remote Indigenous 
housing (CoAG 2012a).  
2.3.3 Consumer Policy Context 
The nexus of energy policy and social policy also overlaps with consumer policy. The essential 
nature of electricity supply justifies a consumer protection regime beyond that of the general 
consumer marketplace.  
The AER and AEMC have echoed the Productivity Commission view that (PC, 2008, p. Vol II 
108): 
Energy is an essential service, necessary to provide a basic standard of living 
The AER has stated (AER, 2013, p. 6): 
In developing the Retail Law, the Ministerial Council on Energy14 Standing Committee 
of Officials (MCE SCO) considered the ‘essential service nature of energy supply for 
the health, safety and well-being of the citizens of Australia.’15 It noted that customers 
should be able to access a basic supply that meets their need. Moreover, because 
energy is an essential service, energy consumers require comprehensive protections 
beyond those offered under generic consumer protection legislation.” 
Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework was comprehensively overhauled in 2010 with the 
implementation of the Australian Consumer Law in 2011. These reforms were informed by a 
preceding Productivity Commission Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (PC 
2008). The Productivity Commission made specific reference to energy markets in establishing 
the context for the Inquiry and to explain why energy consumers warrant explicit protection 
beyond the generic provisions of the broader consumer policy framework, the Commission 
stated (PC 2008): 
                                               
14 The MCE is the body now known as the COAG Energy Council 
15 Ministerial Council on Energy, Standing Council of Officials, A National Framework for Regulating Electricity and Gas 
(Energy) Distribution and Retail Services to Customers – Policy Response Paper, June 2008, p. iv 
 - 62 - 
“There are good reasons to supplement the generic consumer law with specific 
measures to protect and empower energy consumers. They are essential services, 
with disconnection having potential harmful effects; billing is lumpy increasing the risk 
of financial stress for low income households; price menus and product bundling can 
be complex; and some areas of supply are not yet fully competitive.” 
Reference was also made to the heterogeneous pace of reform amongst the states and 
territories as being further reasons why national Consumer Law would not be appropriate for 
energy markets. Energy markets therefore featured in the Productivity Commission’s 
considerations of Industry specific consumer regulation. 
Highlighting governance similarities to energy market reform, the ACL is a cooperative 
reform of the Australian Government and the States and Territories, through the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG). An Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) signed by the 
Council of Australian Governments underpins the establishment of the ACL. 
The electricity market’s industry specific consumer regulation approach is known as the 
National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) and comprises the National Energy Retail 
Law (NERL), Rules and Regulations. The National Energy Retail Law was passed by the South 
Australian parliament and received assent into Law from the Governor in March 2011. The 
NECF is being adopted progressively by the NEM jurisdictions. As at January 2017, only 
Victoria had not adopted the framework. 
Reference was also made to the different pace of reform amongst the states and territories as 
being further reasons why national Consumer Law would not be appropriate for energy 
markets. Energy markets therefore featured in the Productivity Commission’s considerations 
of Industry specific consumer regulation. The PC recommended: (Recommendation 5.3): 
… Australian Governments should agree to the longer term goal of a national 
consumer protection regime for energy services, with a single set of requirements to 
apply in all jurisdictions participating in the national energy market. Those 
requirements should be enforced by the Australian Energy Regulator. 
This recommendation precipitated the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF). The 
NECF complements the generic consumer protections provided by Australian Consumer 
Law. The NECF is a package of legal instruments centred on the National Energy Retail Law 
(NERL) and includes a set of Rules that complement the National Electricity Rules and 
National Gas Rules. Consumer Law is supplemented by state-specific provisions in Victoria, 
Western Australia and the NT. 
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2.4 The Energy Policy perspective on Social Policy 
It is not uncommon for energy policy and regulatory statements and publications in Australia 
to acknowledge concern over matters of energy affordability for households and the existence 
of vulnerable consumers. However, policy and regulatory frameworks tend to emphasise a 
limited obligation for energy markets in this regard.  
Australian Governments have used a White Paper process as the primary statement of 
national energy policy. The 2004 Energy White Paper by the Howard government 
(conservative Liberal-National Coalition) was the first economy wide energy policy statement 
since the productivity reform process built momentum in the late 1980s. The frequency of 
publication subsequently increased. An update was commissioned by the Rudd government 
(Labor) in 2008. The process was suspended in early 2010 following the stalling of the Rudd 
government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) emissions trading framework and 
the subsequent 2010 Federal Election. The process was restarted in mid-2011 by the Gillard 
government (Labor) with a Draft released in December 2011 and a final document released in 
November 2012. Following the 2013 Australian federal election, the Abbott government 
(conservative Liberal-National Coalition) produced a new White Paper in April 2015. 
The energy policy perspective on social policy outcomes is well summarised in a quote from 
the 2012 Energy White Paper: energy vulnerability is an important public policy issue but 
alleviation through pricing controls is not the answer (CoA, 2012, p. 10): 
Ensuring that consumers, particularly those who are most vulnerable, are able to 
manage energy costs effectively is also increasingly important. The continued 
provision of adequate assistance to vulnerable consumers through a sound general 
safety net, well-targeted jurisdictional concession regimes and appropriate community 
service obligations remains critical.  
Such assistance should be transparent and not undermine competitive pricing 
structures, which reflect, as efficiently as possible, the underlying costs of supply. It is 
more efficient for assistance to be provided through properly targeted social policy 
settings, rather than energy policy settings, to ensure that energy market signals are 
preserved. 
The 2012 Energy White Paper dedicated a lot of space to the ‘vulnerable’ customer. In 
summary, the 2012 EWP position was: 
● Energy policy is seeking to pursue economic efficiencies through price de-regulation, 
smart meters and more cost reflective tariffs 
● Distributional impacts are more efficiently dealt with by social policy settings 
● The evidence base for detailed responses to these distributional impacts is weak 
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The 2015 Energy White Paper stated:  
Our guiding principle is that markets should be left to operate freely, without 
unnecessary government intervention. Competition, productivity and investment will 
deliver reliable and cost competitive energy to households and business.” (Minister’s 
foreword) 
It identified the Australian Government’s priorities in energy market reform to include: 
rollout of cost-reflective tariffs to reduce cross-subsidies between consumers and drive 
better uptake of enabling technologies (particularly advanced metering) that allow 
consumers to respond to price signals (p6) 
The 2015 EWP made very little mention of ‘vulnerable consumers’ and did not refer to any 
links to social policy.  However, it did signal the introduction of a National Energy 
Productivity Plan (NEPP) that was subsequently released in December 2015. The NEPP 
includes a workstream focussed on vulnerable consumers.  
These policy positions are consistent with the intergovernmental agreement between the 
Commonwealth and States and Territories. The Australian Energy Market Agreement (AEMA) 
was implemented on 30th June 2004 and replaced the National Electricity Market Legislation 
Agreement of May 1996. The AEMA has explicit objectives outlined at Section 2 (CoAG, 2013). 
Overall, the objective is: 
“2.1 (a) The promotion of the long term interests of consumers with regards to the 
price, quality and reliability of electricity and gas services” 
Further, the agreement seeks to establish a framework for further reform in order to: 
2.1 (b)(i) strengthen the quality, timeliness and national character of governance of the 
energy markets, to improve the climate of investment; 
(ii) streamline and improve the quality of economic regulation across energy markets 
to lower the cost and complexity of regulation facing investors, enhance regulatory 
certainty, and lower barriers to competition; 
(iii) improve the planning and development of electricity transmission networks, to 
create a stable framework for efficient investment in new (including distributed) 
generation and transmission capacity; 
(iv) enhance the participation of energy users in the markets including through demand 
side management and the further introduction of retail competition, to increase the 
value of energy services to households and businesses; 
(v) further increase the penetration of natural gas, to lower energy costs and improve 
energy services, particularly to regional Australia, and reduce greenhouse emissions; 
and 
(vi) address greenhouse emissions from the energy sector, in light of the concerns 
about climate change and the need for a stable long-term framework for investment in 
energy supplies. 
As can be seen, the agreement places strong emphasis on the climate for investment [(b)(i), 
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(ii), (iii) and (vi)] as well as the interests of end users [(a) and (b)(iv)]. 
The AEMA makes explicit the allocation of various Distribution and Retail functions (Section 
14.7 and Annexure 2) between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories. Of 
particular relevance to this thesis are the inclusions: 
States and Territories retain responsibility for 
community service obligations … which are to be clearly specified and transparently 
publicly funded [AEMA 14.7(a)]; and, 
… social welfare and equity objectives will be met through clearly specified and 
transparently funded State or Territory community service obligations that do not 
materially impede competition. [AEMA 14.14] 
The intent to separate social and environmental policy objectives from the energy market 
frameworks has been explicitly stated on numerous occasions, particularly in relation to what 
is known as the National Electricity Objective (NEO): the single market objective that seeks to 
provide clear decision making guidance to regulators, rule makers and policy makers in the 
National Electricity Market. The NEO is to be found at section 7 of the National Electricity 
Law (A schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996): 
7—National electricity objective 
The objective of this Law is to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and 
use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of electricity with respect 
to— 
(a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of electricity; and 
(b) the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
The Second Reading Speech that accompanied the amendments to the legislation (as recorded 
in South Australian Parliaments Legislative Assembly Hansard p1452, 9th February 2005) 
clarified the intended interpretation: 
National electricity market objective 
An important feature of the new National Electricity Law is that it defines the scope of 
the national electricity market which is regulated under the new National Electricity Law 
and Rules, and provides a single clear national electricity market objective. 
… The national electricity market objective in the new National Electricity Law is to 
promote efficient investment in, and efficient use of, electricity services for the long 
term interests of consumers of electricity with respect to price, quality, reliability and 
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security of supply of electricity, and the safety, reliability and security of the national 
electricity system. 
The market objective is an economic concept and should be interpreted as such. For 
example, investment in and use of electricity services will be efficient when services 
are supplied in the long run at least cost, resources including infrastructure are used 
to deliver the greatest possible benefit and there is innovation and investment in 
response to changes in consumer needs and productive opportunities. 
The long term interest of consumers of electricity requires the economic welfare of 
consumers, over the long term, to be maximised. If the National Electricity Market is 
efficient in an economic sense the long term economic interests of consumers in 
respect of price, quality, reliability, safety and security of electricity services will be 
maximised. 
The Second Reading Speech by then South Australian Energy Minister the Hon PF Conlon 
(27th September 2007) upon the introduction of amendments to the same legislation provided 
further guidance: 
The National Electricity Objective is to promote efficient investment in, and the efficient 
use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of electricity with 
respect to price, quality, reliability and security of supply of electricity, and the safety, 
reliability and security of the national electricity system. 
Just as the Australian Energy Market Commission must test changes against the 
objective of the law when making rules, the Australian Energy Regulator must perform 
its functions in a manner that will or is likely to contribute to achieving the objective of 
the law. 
It is important to note that the National Electricity Objective does not extend to broader 
social and environmental objectives. The purpose of the National Electricity Law is to 
establish a framework to ensure the efficient operation of the National Electricity 
Market, efficient investment, and the effective regulation of electricity networks. As 
previously noted, the National Electricity Objective also guides the Australian Energy 
Market Commission and the Australian Energy Regulator in performing their functions. 
This should be guided by an objective of efficiency that is in the long term interest of 
consumers. Environmental and social objectives are better dealt with in other 
legislative instruments and policies which sit outside the National Electricity Law. 
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These speeches commit to the public record that the objective of the electricity market is to 
pursue economic efficiency in the long term interest of end-users (LTIE) and that social and 
environmental objectives were to be dealt with elsewhere. This concept of LTIE builds on 
substantial experience in the economic regulation of the telecommunications industry by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The ‘long-term interests of end-
users’ objective is the basis of operation of Part XIC of the Australian Consumer Law 
(Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) and its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act. It is 
also used in the objects of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). 
In order to further characterise the interface from an energy policy perspective, the following 
quotes from publications of the Australian Energy Market Commission are provided as 
representative of the Commission’s approach to assessing the competitiveness of energy 
market’s in states and territories: 
 “It is also important to distinguish between competition issues and non-competition 
issues. Where concerns arise regarding issues going beyond the operation and 
performance of the competitive energy market, such as the affordability of energy for 
low income households, these issues need to be addressed through appropriately 
targeted policies rather than by intervening to distort the efficient operation of the 
market.” (AEMC, 2008a) 
“The Commission recognises the importance of ensuring the affordability of energy for 
low income households but considers these issues go beyond the operation and 
performance of the competitive energy market. As such, they should be addressed 
through appropriately targeted policies rather than by intervening to distort the efficient 
operation of the market.” (AEMC, 2008b) 
“Ultimately, energy subsidies (including adjustments to indexation) and associated 
programs to address fuel poverty are matters for consideration by the South Australian 
Government.” (AEMC, 2008b) 
The issue and approach is of course not just restricted to electricity and gas. It is also apparent 
in the industry reform process for the supply of another essential service or utility: water, 
through the National Water Initiative (NWI). the following quote is indicative (CoA, 2010b): 
“The selection of appropriate and ‘affordable’ water supplies, and addressing social 
and equity issues are better addressed via specifically targeted and transparent 
subsidies and appropriate social policies such as community service obligations. 
These policies may then apply in conjunction with NWI best practice pricing.” 
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So, just as has been the case for energy market reform, there is explicit intent in water market 
reform to separate economic efficiency from equity considerations. However, as is also the 
case with energy, this separation is not as clear-cut in detail as it appears in policy statements.  
The matter of relevance to this thesis is not so much that a focus on economic efficiency and 
cost reflective pricing may reduce affordability for many vulnerable consumers but that the 
reform agenda fails to ensure that a formal public policy link between market outcomes and 
‘social and equity issues’ is preserved. It is perhaps the breaking of this linkage – or the lack of 
a formal structure for the linkage - that lies at the heart of the issue. Both the Australian Energy 
Market Agreement (AEMA) for energy and the NWI for water – intergovernmental 
agreements relating to the economic reform of utility markets – seek to elevate economic 
efficiency to primacy in regulation and pricing and are clear that matters of affordability are 
better addressed by social policy settings. And while the governments that are parties to these 
agreements are also those obliged to deliver these complementary measures, there is little 
evidence that this attracts the same policy attention or implementation resources. 
To summarise, public policy statements in relation to energy policy tend to reinforce the 
primacy of economic efficiency objectives over equity concerns and imply a “keep up!” 
message for social policy.  
2.5 A Consumer Safety Net 
The research questions presuppose the need for a “consumer safety net” for household energy 
supplies. It is important to acknowledge that the provision of energy concessions, rebates, 
efficiency advice and emergency relief payments pre-date the liberalisation of energy markets 
in Australia and elsewhere. However, as will be shown, the process of energy market reform 
exposed how intertwined energy and social policy were in the 1990s and then ultimately 
unravelled this relationship. 
The relevant aspect of the reform process was what has been referred to as the ‘Community 
Service Obligations or CSO debate’ that can be traced to the late 1980s and early 1990s and 
reform of the telecommunications industry (Economic and Budget Review Committee, 1991). 
The Economic and Budget Review Committee of the Victorian Parliament conducted a 
Community Service Obligations (CSOs) Inquiry that reported in November 1991 (Economic 
and Budget Review Committee, 1991): 
(p20) Committee recommendation 2.1: A Community Service Obligation should be 
defined as arising when the Parliament or the executive government expressly 
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requires a government business enterprise to carry out an activity which it would not 
elect to provide on a commercial basis, or which would only be provided commercially 
at a higher price. 
Of specific relevance was the consideration of the CSOs provided by the Victorian 
Government Business Enterprise (GBE) known as the State Electricity Commission (SECV). 
These CSOs included a ‘Home Energy Advisory Service’, the provision of concessions and 
rebates to pensioners, those requiring life-support equipment and others in financial difficulty 
as well as sate-wide uniform tariffs. 
Importantly, the timing of the Victorian review was at the early days of energy market 
liberalisation:  
The possibility of corporatisation and privatisation of GBEs now also provides a reason 
to review the continuing relevance of CSOs provided by Victorian GBEs. (p2) 
There is now an urgent need to clarify Government objectives for CSOs as these 
monopoly suppliers of essential services are corporatised (and then privatised?). (p19) 
The subject was also on the national agenda: The Committee report acknowledges links to 
social policy that were articulated around the same time (1989) by the Commonwealth 
Treasury (Economic and Budget Review Committee, 1991): 
Ideally community service obligations should be precisely specified in the light of 
clearly identified social policy objectives. Once this is done, the cost effectiveness of 
alternative means of achieving those objectives can be considered. 
The Industry Commission (the precursor to today’s Productivity Commission) inquiry into 
Energy Generation and Distribution proposed a model for GBE corporatisation that also made 
recommendations regarding CSOs (Industry Commission, 1991b): 
(p61) If governments wish to assist disadvantaged groups and/or rural residents, it 
would be more efficient and more equitable to provide assistance by means of social 
welfare programs or, in the case of rural users, through the taxation system (eg zone 
rebates) rather than by subsidising the consumption of electricity and gas.  
(p81) ... abolishing requirements for utilities to undertake CSOs. If, however, some 
residual CSOs remain, they should be individually identified and costed, and directly 
funded by government. 
The Victorian Inquiry reflected the Industry Commission position but acknowledged 
concerns by some stakeholders about the abandonment of CSOs, quoting the Victorian 
Council of Social Service (VCOSS) submission (Economic and Budget Review Committee, 
1991): 
VCOSS has a number of serious concerns as to how the rights of all Victorians will be 
maintained as public utilities are commercialised. In particular, will access to, and 
equity of, essential goods and services be maintained? 
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According to the Industry Commission, assistance for pensioners and other ‘social equity’ 
programs were in existence in all states and territories prior to the 1990’s (Industry 
Commission, 1991a): 
In New South Wales, for example, the Electricity Councils provide welfare agencies 
(eg the Salvation Army) with $30 electricity vouchers for distribution amongst the poor. 
In South Australia, ETSA is involved in a similar program, whereby it assists in the 
payment of electricity bills for people in acute, short-term financial difficulty. 
In some cases, these were funded by Government (with the utility often bearing the 
administration costs), in other cases the obligation fell on the utility. South Australia provided 
examples of both: 
(p75) … as part of its licensing arrangement, Sagasco offers pensioner rebates of 
$6.60 per annum. Despite similar rebates offered by ETSA being funded by the 
Government, Sagasco is required to fund and administer these rebates internally. 
(p75) … Reflecting Government policy, Sagasco introduced an Emergency Payments 
Scheme to provide one-off assistance to customers in severe financial crisis. 
Beyond welfare related CSOs, the Industry Commission was also strongly critical of uniform 
tariff policies (also known as ‘postage stamp pricing’) arguing that such cross-subsidies 
compromised allocative efficiency. Submissions from state governments however defended 
the practice (Industry Commission, 1991a). The Commission, reflecting the economic 
efficiency objectives of the Inquiry’s terms of reference, responded by concentrating on the 
method of provision more than the intent or rationale for their provision (Industry 
Commission, 1991a): 
The Commission does not dispute the importance of these [CSO] objectives, but rather 
seeks their implementation in the most efficient manner possible … Where a strong 
equity case is identified for the maintenance of particular CSOs, direct subsidies are 
the preferred funding method. Alternatively, levy systems can be introduced. Both of 
these funding methods have the advantage of being efficient, transparent and 
compatible with competitive market operation. 
If electricity and gas utilities were freed of the need to implement CSOs, they would be 
able to focus on commercial objectives and the provision of electricity and gas in the 
most efficient manner possible. 
The reference to ‘competitive market operation’ is of particular relevance to this thesis. The 
energy market liberalisation agenda of ‘unbundling’ (the separation of previously vertically 
integrated monopolies into generation, transmission, distribution and retailing), 
corporatisation, privatisation and competition had commenced in the United Kingdom (firstly 
gas from 1985, then electricity from 1988) and was being watched closely from Australia 
(Booth, 2003; Industry Commission, 1991a). Corporatisation of electricity provision was also 
underway in New Zealand from the mid-1980’s (Industry Commission, 1991a). The election 
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of the conservative Kennett Government in Victoria in 1992 lead to an acceleration of energy 
market restructuring in that state and represented the frontier of energy market liberalisation 
in Australia. The reforms took many cues from the UK experience (Booth, 2003). 
In A Dictionary of Public Health, the entry for ‘social safety net’ highlights that provision is not 
just the domain of government but a combination of services (Last, 2007): 
social safety net 
A combination of tax-supported, voluntary, and charitable community agencies that 
provide services for many kinds of disadvantaged people in most liberal democratic 
nations, as well as in socialist nations such as Cuba. The disadvantaged people 
include single-parent, mostly mother-led families who are dependent on welfare for 
financial support, unemployed and unemployable people, elderly and shut-in people, 
people with chronic impairments, and those with disabilities or handicaps. 
This notion is often referred to by the term ‘shared responsibility’ in the policy literature and 
this is discussed further in the following section. 
2.6 A Shared Responsibility 
The Hardship Inquiry conducted by the Victorian Essential Services Commission in 2016 
(ESCV, 2016) and the subsequent Payment Difficulties Safety Net project can be regarded as the 
frontier of vulnerable customer policy development as at 2017. The Inquiry was triggered by 
a spike in disconnections in 2013-14 and a spike in the number of ‘wrongful disconnection’ 
cases being investigated by the Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria). In the words of the 
ESC (ESCV, 2017): 
These trends indicated that more people were being disconnected, and more 
appeared to be disconnected for the wrong reasons. 
The AER’s Sustainable Payments Plans Framework (‘A good practice framework for assessing 
customers’ capacity to pay’) was released in July 2016 and is a voluntary arrangement that 
retailers can adopt (AER, 2016a). However the new ESCV framework for Victorian households 
moves away from ‘capacity to pay’ assessments by retailers to an entitlement to ‘Tailored 
Assistance’ as a ‘more outcomes-based approach’ (ESCV, 2017).  
In October 2017, the Victorian Essential Services Commission released its final decision on a 
new Payment Difficulty Framework (PDF) that will apply from 1 January 2019 (ESCV, 2017). 
The new framework follows the rejection by consumer advocates and retailers of the ESC’s 
first draft and is claimed to be ‘vastly simpler’ (ESCV, 2017) in its pursuit of disconnection as 
a last resort.  
Both reviews (AER and ESCV) identified a cohort of customers who are unable to afford 
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ongoing consumption let alone being able to repay existing debt. This group is considered 
particularly vulnerable. The AER framework refers to this as ‘Option C’ and suggests: 
The customer and retailer should try to agree on an affordable repayment amount that 
is as close as possible to the amount required to cover the customer’s ongoing usage. 
This limits the growth of the customer’s debt, keeps their energy supply connected and 
encourages their engagement. 
Payment plans that are less than ongoing usage should be reviewed at least once 
every 3 months. 
The customer and the retailer should work together to try to close the gap between the 
current repayment amount and the amount required to cover ongoing usage and 
reduce debt. This might include (but is not limited to): reviewing the customer’s tariff, 
checking that they are receiving available concessions, providing tailored energy 
efficiency advice, offering incentive payments, and referring the customer to a financial 
counsellor or government assistance schemes. 
It is difficult to not retain some scepticism though. The notion of a ‘shared responsibility’ 
between Energy Retailers, Governments and the Community Sector for customers at risk of 
disconnection has been promoted by the energy industry for a long time but has remained an 
unstructured arrangement. The Committee for Melbourne’s Utility Debt Spiral Project of 2004 
is one of the very first collaborations in the era of competitive energy markets: 
A joint community, government and business initiative designed to explore the 
relationship between utility debt and poverty, and to identify social and regulatory 
frameworks and policies to assist people at risk 
A triangular shared responsibility model between the Energy industry, governments and the 
community also underpinned the Energy Hardship Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
formed over a number of years in South Australia from 2004 between energy retailers, the 
South Australian Government and the Community Services Sector (represented by the South 
Australian Council of Social Service, SACOSS)16 (ECC, 2006). 
Engagement by industry is critically important to progress in this area. AGL Energy Ltd and 
Origin Energy Ltd are the only two publicly listed, vertically integrated energy businesses in 
Australia and have a combined NEM market share of around two-thirds of all retail 
customers. Origin Energy was a sponsor of, and contributor to, the Utility Debt Spiral Project 
and AGL has supported a significant proportion of the published research in this area in 
Australia.  
                                               
16 The MoU is not a public document, but references are available in the Annual Reports of the South Australian Energy 
Minister’s Energy Consumers Council. The 2005/6 Annual report (see Section 6.3 ‘Social Responsibility’ page 16-18) provides 
background and further details 
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The peak body for the Energy Retail Industry is now the Australian Energy Council. 
Historically, vulnerable consumer policy work was driven by the Energy Retailers Association 
of Australia (ERAA). The ERAA merged into the AEC on 1 January 2016. The ERAA published 
a hardship policy in 2013 that characterised the role seen by retailers in this space: 
At any one time there will be members of the community facing financial hardship. This 
can be either temporary hardship, where someone might be going through a difficult 
period, or chronic hardship, where people are indefinitely in a financially disadvantaged 
position. Energy retailers provide hardship programs for people who are having 
temporary difficulty paying for their energy consumption. 
As can be seen, emphasis was placed on differentiating temporary and chronic hardship. In 
relation to chronic hardship, the ERAA policy also stated: 
The role of an energy retailer is not to administer social welfare policy: this is a core 
function of Governments. Hardship is best addressed through comprehensive social 
welfare policies, because after all, if someone is having difficulty paying their energy 
bills, then they are also probably having trouble paying their other bills and debts. 
… Price regulation is not an effective mechanism to protect people facing hardship. 
The ERAA position was that social policy has a key role to play in ensuring access to 
affordable energy that market-focussed energy policy either cannot or should not play – 
especially for those considered to be in “chronic’ hardship.  
The Australian Energy Council recently published a factsheet on retail energy bills that also 
refers to the community sector (AEC, 2017a): 
Specialised assistance for vulnerable consumers  
Retailers provide specialised assistance to residential consumers who need support in 
paying their energy bills. This support comes in a number of forms, such as extensions 
of time to pay, and payment plans that allow a consumer to repay debt over a long 
period and remain on supply. Retailers have hardship programmes to support 
consumers in particular need, where payment plans may grant additional flexibility and 
in some cases even provide for some or all of the debt to be waived. Retailers also 
have connections with welfare agencies and financial counsellors, so that consumers 
may receive additional support and advice.  
The matter of how to best assist residential consumers who are struggling to pay 
energy bills has been at the heart of retailers’ policy and operational agendas for some 
years. However, bill affordability is a complex issue and about much more than energy 
bills …. Policy to assist consumers who are in financial hardship needs to be based on 
a system-wide approach that also accounts for consumers’ income and other sources 
of household debt. 
AGL Energy has long championed a shared responsibility model between industry, 
governments and the community sector. The first reference to the model appears to be AGL’s 
submission to the Australian Energy Regulator’s review of Hardship Indicators in June 2010: 
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AGL believes a ‘shared responsibility’ model (where energy retailers, energy appliance 
manufacturers and retailers, government and community groups all have responsibility 
for customers in financial hardship) is the most effective way to prevent the 
continuation and escalation of customer hardship and ensure access to essential 
energy services. Under this model, energy appliance manufacturers and retailers, 
energy retailers, the government, community groups and customers should all share 
responsibility for assisting customers in financial hardship … A shared responsibility 
model which seeks to prevent the continuation and escalation of customer hardship 
and ensure access to essential energy services is paramount. 
From the AGL Energy Ltd 2011 Sustainability Report: 
… AGL will continue to refine and review its approach to customer hardship and energy 
affordability, working with stakeholders to improve the service provided to hardship 
customers. AGL is concerned, however, that realistic expectations are set with respect 
to the extent to which retailers’ hardship programs can assist customers facing long-
term and chronic hardship. AGL will therefore continue to promote the ‘shared 
responsibility’ model in policy advocacy. 
This continues to the present day. The following extract is from a 2017 media release “AGL 
announces A Fairer Way package for vulnerable customers” that announced the removal of late 
fees for concession card holders and hardship program customers as well as other initiatives 
and community partnerships (AGL, 2017a): 
We believe this sort of collaborative engagement and awareness raising activity is a 
shared responsibility across industry, government and the community sector to 
ensure our most vulnerable customers are supported to engage and navigate the 
energy market…. We will continue to work with governments and the community sector 
during this significant time of market transformation to ensure we have a vibrant market 
that innovates for all Australians 
In what appears to be the first time Energy Consumers Australia had made written 
representation into what would be considered the social policy domain rather than energy 
policy ECA made a written submission to the Commonwealth Department of Social Services 
(DSS) in April 2017 (ECA, 2017a). The submission was in response to a DSS proposal for 
redesigning the Financial Wellbeing and Capability (FWC) funding activity. The 
Commonwealth Governments invests around $100m per annum under the FWC activity to 
fund services including Emergency Relief and Financial Counselling (DSS, 2017). The 
submission informed the DSS of ECA’s work on disconnections and that: 
In the course of this work, Energy Consumers Australia has encountered repeated 
evidence of the critical role which emergency relief organisations and financial 
counsellors play, and of the importance of early intervention.  
The DSS proposal attracted numerous other submissions, many of which were from 
community service organisations and peak bodies that are also active in energy policy 
debates. Another submission of direct relevance was from electricity retailer Momentum 
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Energy who acknowledged the importance to the energy market of financial counsellors and 
emergency relief providers (Momentum, 2017): 
While Momentum’s direct involvement in the FWC sector is limited, we are required as 
a term of our National Retail Authorisation and Victorian Retail Licence to develop and 
maintain hardship policies to assist financially vulnerable customers. We are also 
acutely aware that energy supply is one of the many factors leading to cost of living 
pressure and financial hardship. Because of this, we value the work undertaken in the 
FWC sector and have an interest in ensuring that this review delivers positive 
outcomes for organisations within sector and by extension, the individuals and 
communities who rely on them. 
… Momentum values the services provided by the FWC sector and while we recognise 
that appropriate steps must be taken to ensure that funding is used as effectively as 
possible, we consider that broader social policy reforms are required to ease cost of 
living pressures and to assist individuals and families in entrenched poverty. 
These examples illustrate the relevance of social policy to energy market outcomes but there 
is no evidence of a comprehensive or systematic approach. The following section considers 
two international examples: the UK and New Zealand. The UK pioneered the formal 
acknowledge of the phenomenon they call fuel poverty – perhaps the first ‘joined up’ 
approach to the energy policy / social policy nexus. 
 
2.7 Some International Perspectives 
This section considers social policy interactions with energy markets in the UK and New 
Zealand. These jurisdictions are considered relevant comparators to the Australian experience 
due to similarly ‘liberalised’ electricity markets as well as close historic and cultural ties. This 
is not a comprehensive review and is an area of prospective further research and application 
of the analytic model developed for this thesis. 
2.7.1 UK 
The concept of fuel poverty is well developed in public policy in the UK. The contemporary 
understanding of fuel poverty emerged over 20 years ago17 and distinguishes those households 
whose poverty is either due to, or made worse by, high required spending on energy to keep 
warm. The history of policy work on the concept of fuel poverty can be traced to the 1970s 
and the oil price shock (Hills, 2011, p. 25; Owen, 2001, p. 293). Brenda Boardman’s 1991 book 
Fuel Poverty: From Cold Homes to Affordable Warmth was the analytical basis that cemented the 
                                               
17 The Hills Fuel Poverty Review Interim Report acknowledges Dr Brenda Boardman’s 1991 book Fuel Poverty as the origin of the current 
conceptualisation of the issue. It also acknowledges earlier studies that contributed to the development of the concept from the 1970’s. 
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concept and lead to the original ‘10% of income being required to maintain a prescribed level 
of warmth’ that was the official definition for many years (Hills, 2011, p. 26). 
Dr Gill Owen summarised the role of social policy in energy regulation during the final 
decades of the 20th century (Owen, 2001): 
• Oil price increases in the mid-1970s lead to community organisations campaigning for 
controls on the (nationalised) electricity and gas industries to disconnect customers 
having payment difficulties. 
• The Labour Government of the time introduced an ‘Electricity Discount Scheme’ to 
reduce bills for low-income households and fuel bill subsidies were introduced for 
those in ‘hard to heat’ properties via the social security system 
• Grants for home insulation were introduced around the same time and then increased 
by the Conservative government in the early 1980s 
• Privatisation of gas in 1986 and electricity from 1990 led to concerns that without a 
specific mandate from the regulator profit motivated companies would be even less 
sympathetic to the plight of disadvantaged households then the public entities they 
replaced 
• Subsidies for ‘hard to heat’ homes via the social security system were abolished in 1988 
• Introduction of competition in the 1990s lead to price falls that benefited all customers 
• The introduction of ‘coin-less’ prepayment meters (for both electricity and gas) lead to 
large falls in ‘supplier initiated disconnections’ but introduced the problem of ‘self-
disconnection’ and suppliers charged more for energy via pre-payment meters than 
through traditional billing. 
• A specific responsibility was introduced to the Utilities Act and in 2000 the Energy 
regulators introduced a ‘Social Action Plan’ that contained a mix of immediate actions, 
further research and pilot programs in recognition of the diversity of characteristics 
and circumstances of disadvantaged households. 
The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (WHECA) was passed by parliament in 2000 to 
provide the legislative basis for responding to fuel poverty in England and Wales and the 
Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 did the same for Scotland (Hills, 2011, p. 26). The bi-partisan 
policy response from successive UK governments has seen a unique alignment of health, 
energy, climate change and economic development policies to focus on improving the energy 
efficiency of dwellings and avoiding excess winter deaths.  
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The UK Government released a new approach to tackling Fuel Poverty in England in July 
2013. ‘Fuel Poverty: A Framework for Future Action’. The framework built on policies that 
targeted the identified drivers of fuel poverty: energy efficiency, incomes and energy prices 
(DECC, 2013b, p. 31). Further, the new policy confirmed the need for bill subsidies to 
complement the extensive energy efficiency efforts (p33). The new policy followed the 
conclusion of the independent Review of Fuel Poverty Hills in 2012. The principal task of the 
Hills review was to provide a first principles examination of the way in which trends in fuel 
poverty, and identification of those at risk from it, have been measured. The Hills Review also 
confirmed the concept of fuel poverty as a distinct and serious problem. The new policy largely 
adopted the recommendation of Professor Hills for a new way of measuring the breadth and 
depth of fuel poverty: the Low Income, High Cost (LIHC) indicator. 
An annual report of Fuel Poverty Statistics is published to track progress and a Committee on 
Fuel Poverty (CFP) has been established to review the effectiveness of policies. Combined, 
this can be seen to keep the issue alive in the public domain, motivate ongoing action and 
allow for estimates of funding gaps (CFP, 2017, p. 5). Public policy in Australia has not 
embraced the concept in anything like the same way (Chester and Morris, 2011). The AER 
publishes ‘affordability’ indicators as a part of its annual reports of the retail energy markets 
but there is no ‘headline’ indicator that can hold policy measures to account. 
Policy responses include a strong focus on improving the energy performance of dwellings 
and Winter Fuel Payments and the Warm Home Discount are the key financial assistance 
measures. The CFP highlighted the challenge of targeting financial assistance (CFP, 2017, p. 
6): 
We continue to recommend significantly improving the focus of the circa £1.8 billion 
per year Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) budget and the circa £0.27 billion per year Warm 
Home Discount (WHD) budget on helping those in fuel poor households. Currently, 
less than 10% of this money is received by fuel poor households. The majority is 
received by pensioners who have a median equivalised after housing cost income of 
twice the level of those in fuel poverty. 
Another difference to Australia’s approach is the application of a lower rate of Value Added 
Tax (VAT, the equivalent tax of Australia’s GST) to energy bills for residential use (and ‘non-
business’ use by a charity) and to energy-saving materials (such as insulation and solar 
panels). For household electricity use, the standard rate of 20% is reduced to 5% for the first 
1000kWh per month (GOV.UK, 2016). Australia’s standard rate of 10% GST is applied to all 
energy bills as well as energy efficiency products and services. 
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2.7.2 Measuring Fuel Poverty: Translating to the Australian Context 
When considering how the UK approach might be applied to Australia it is important to 
acknowledge that there are very material contextual differences between the UK and 
Australia – in relation to drivers of consumption and the governance arrangements of a 
response - including the climate, the number and roles of the layers of government in the 
provision of housing. Yet there are of course important similarities in terms of the 
liberalisation of energy markets; from where Australia has sourced many of its reform cues 
over the years. The Hills review had measurement of fuel poverty as its prime object and there 
are some very relevant lessons for Australia in this regard – certainly in terms of approach if 
not results. A report for the Consumer Advocacy Panel (the predecessor of Energy Consumers 
Australia) on translating the measurement approach to the Australian context was delivered 
as part of the research for this thesis and is attached as Appendix A (Nance, 2013).  
The Hills review aimed to overcome a number of shortcomings in the original headline 
indicator derived from the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 (WHECA) of 10% of 
income being required to maintain a prescribed level of warmth. The review recommended 
that the Government change its approach to measuring fuel poverty (Hills, 2012, p. 8): 
…adopt a new approach based on directly measuring the overlap between low income 
and high costs … under which households are considered fuel poor if: 
• They have required fuel costs that are above the median level; and 
• Were they to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the 
official poverty line. 
The new indicator (Figure 17) finds a household to be fuel poor if: 
a. Their income is below the poverty line (taking into account energy costs); and 
b. Their energy costs are higher than is typical for their household type. 
It also reveals what is referred to as the “fuel poverty gap”. This is the difference between a 
household’s modelled bill and what their bill would need to be for them to no longer be fuel 
poor. In Figure 17, example fuel poverty gaps are depicted by the red arrows. The end result 
is twin indicators of the ‘extent’ and ‘depth’ of fuel poverty – how many households are 
considered fuel poor and how much they are spending in excess of the median bill for a 
household of their size. 
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Figure 17: The low income high costs definition (DECC, 2013a) 
The income threshold is set at the poverty line (after housing costs) plus an amount to cover 
the cost of the energy bills. That is, the income threshold captures all households who, after 
paying for their energy bills and housing costs, are left with an income at or below the poverty 
line. In turn, the poverty line is set as a percentage of the median income for a household of 
the same size. 
Historically, the main fuel poverty numbers reported have always used Before Housing Costs 
(BHC) income (DECC, 2013a, p. 14). This issue had been raised by stakeholders as a concern. 
Professor Hills recommended that housing costs could not be considered to be discretionary 
and so should not be included when calculating income. The new indicator is therefore based 
on After Housing Cost (AHC) income. 
The new indicator entails equivalising income and energy costs in order to be able to compare 
households of a different size on the same scale. Adjusting income thresholds to account for 
different household sizes is a widely used practice and the equivalence scale used by the UK 
government is the same as that utilised by the ABS to produce equivalised income estimates 
for Australian households: the modified OECD equivalence scale. Unlike income, there are no 
widely used factors for equivalising energy costs. In his review Professor Hills proposed a 
number of factors to be used as the basis of equivalising based on the different energy costs 
for different household types.  
Statistics on fuel poverty in England have been derived using information from the English 
Housing Survey, combined with the Building Research Establishment Domestic Energy 
Model (BREDEM) to calculate household energy costs. It is an important attribute of the UK 
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approach that cost thresholds are set based on “need to spend” – the cost of the energy 
required to deliver a warm home, as opposed to the actual costs incurred. In this way, the 
definition captures those who economise to the point of being detrimental to their health. 
When considering applying the LIHC indicator to Australia, no equivalent of the BREDEM is 
applied with the ABS Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) and Household Expenditure 
Survey (HES). As a result, the Australian application would necessarily be based on actual 
costs incurred rather than “need to spend”. This approach will therefore not capture those 
households who under-consume and would therefore be more likely to underestimate the 
extent and depth of the problem compared to the UK approach. 
Relative Energy Poverty in Australia analysed actual income and expenditure data from the ABS 
2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey and Survey of Income and Housing in order to 
identify those households that have the biggest energy bills and the least capacity to pay for 
them. Five alternative definitions of relative energy poverty were considered. The cohorts of 
households formed by these five alternative definitions were then compared across a range of 
attributes such as income, housing status, household size and family structure. The key 
findings were that: 
• Housing costs and the number of people in the household should be primary inputs 
in any measurement approach 
• There is no need to select a single definition of ‘energy poverty’ in order to inform 
policy: all five alternative definitions considered identify similar groups of 
households. 
• Significant proportions of those in relative energy poverty rely on wage and salary 
income and therefore fall outside of the traditional safety nets of the welfare system.  
• Other characteristics that increase the likelihood of being in energy poverty are:  
o Single parent households;  
o People living alone, particularly Aged and Disability pensioners living alone;  
o Low income renters, particularly those who rent privately;  
o Dual Fuel households – those reliant on mains or bottled gas.  
Other publications relevant to measurement are reviewed in section 7.4.1. 
2.7.3 New Zealand 
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Liberalisation of the New Zealand electricity market preceded Australia’s and contributed 
experience to the restructuring agenda being advanced in Victoria in the 1990s (Booth, 2003, 
pp. 49–50). Free-market think tanks The Tasman Institute and the Institute of Public Affairs have 
been attributed as the source of ideological and personal connections (Beder and Cahill, 2005; 
Booth, 2003, p. 49). 
From 93 electricity supply authorities in 1945, 61 remained in 1985 to become a target of micro-
economic reforms aimed at increasing New Zealand’s overall economic performance (MBIE, 
2015). Electricity supply authorities were corporatized from 1990 and energy sector reform 
legislation enacted in 1992. Competition for supply to all consumers (full retail contestability as 
it referred to in Australia) was implemented across 1993 and 1994 – several years before full 
retail contestability first appeared in the Australian market in 2002 in Victoria and NSW 
(ACCC, 2017, p. 96). Further unbundling of distribution from retail & generation was 
legislated in the late 1990s (the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998) and privatisation of state-
owned generator/retailer Contact Energy was completed in 1999 yielding $NZ2.3 billion 
(MBIE, 2015). 
The Electricity Authority (EA) is the overall regulator of the NZ electricity market. Energy 
Retailers are guided by a set of industry obligations that they must follow as well as voluntary 
guidelines in relation to medically dependant and vulnerable customers (EANZ, 2017). 
Compliance with the guidelines for medically dependent and vulnerable customers was last 
reviewed by the EA in 2012 and assessed as ‘satisfactory overall’ with no intention to mandate 
compliance (EANZ, 2012). This contrasts to Australia’s NEM where hardship and payment 
difficulty measures are mandated under the NECF and Victoria’s Energy Retail Code. 
NZ has around 1.7 million households (StatsNZ, 2017) and market data published by EA 
indicates residential electricity disconnections of around 22,500 pa in the two years to June 
2017 giving a rate of around 1.3% of households per annum disconnected from electricity. 
There was also an estimated 40,000 households using a pre-payment meter (Consumer NZ, 
2015), around 2.3% of households. This compares to around 117,000 electricity disconnections 
per annum in Australia (KPMG, 2016) or around 1.4% of Australia’s 8.2 million occupied 
dwellings (ABS, 2017d). Tasmania is the only Australian jurisdiction in the National Electricity 
Market to offer pre-payment meters and approximately 23,670 customers use this service 
(OTTER, 2017). This equates to approximately 10% of Tasmanian households or around 0.3% 
of households in Australia. 
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The NZ climate and concerns about winter morbidity and mortality are similar to the UK with 
policies targeting ‘hard to heat’ homes as has been the case in the UK. The NZ Government’s 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) estimates that, of NZ’z 1.8 million 
privately owned residential dwellings, over one-third are under-insulated or un-insulated 
and that these expose occupants to increased risk of illness related to cold, damp living 
conditions (EECA, 2016). As at the end of 2017, grants of 50% of the cost of insultation for 
home owners and landlords are available under the Warm Up New Zealand: Healthy Homes 
program. The program, managed by the EECA, has been around (in different incarnations) 
since 2009 and has assisted around 300,000 households in that time (EECA, 2016). 
The term fuel poverty has gained some traction in policy debates and research from a public 
health perspective (including in relation to pre-payment meters) has been published in a 
number of articles (Howden-Chapman et al., 2012; Howden-Chapman and Chapman, 2012, 
p. 415; Lawson et al., 2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2013). Unlike the UK, but as is the case in 
Australia, no agreed approach to measurement or targets exists in New Zealand. 
From 1 July 2018, a Winter Energy Payment is being made available to NZ households under 
an election commitment from the incoming Labour Government (MSD, 2017). The payment 
will be available to the aged, jobseekers, young parents, sole parents and those receiving 
emergency benefits. 
As is the case in Australia, the community sector forms part of the energy market safety net 
through the National Debt Helpline, Salvation Army, Community Action NZ, Sustainability 
Trust and others. Consumer, a not-for-profit consumer rights organisations, has also been 
active in policy debates. 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
Neoliberalism, or economic rationalism as it is often referred to in Australia (Pusey, 2003), not 
only radically changed the provision of electricity from the 1990s but recast the provision of 
welfare services at around the same time by transferring many services from provision by 
government to provision by ‘private welfare agencies’ (Jamrozik, 2009). Electricity Policy and 
Social Policy can therefore be seen to have been placed on similar paths towards a more 
market-based provision of service to households. Importantly this has shifted many frontline 
responsibilities away from governments to energy retailers and community sector 
organisations. 
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The UK and NZ examples reiterate that energy and poverty are important connected policy 
areas and that responses have gravitated towards efforts to improve the energy performance 
of housing as well as financial subsidies. With their long histories, both cases also highlight 
the persistent nature of the problem.  
A shared responsibility approach to the provision of a consumer safety net for the NEM has 
been acknowledged by many stakeholders but a gap clearly exists in the form of a structure 
for its analysis and development. The primary research question is therefore a valid one: 
• When considering a consumer safety net for consumers in a liberalised electricity market, 
what is an appropriate analytical framework for policy and practice that can be used by 
stakeholders to improve governance and consumer outcomes? 
Chapter 1 presented a model of the consumer safety net that represents a spectrum of 
responsibility between the traditional domains of energy policy and social policy. Along this 
spectrum, key categories of policy activity have been identified and framed in terms of their 
intended outcomes. The number of policy outcomes has been distilled down to five as listed 
below:  
Outcome 1: Stable and Efficient Pricing  
Outcome 2: Informed and engaged consumers 
Outcome 3: Energy consumed efficiently and productively 
Outcome 4: Robust consumer protections 
Outcome 5: All households have a capacity to pay their energy bills 
Each of the next five chapters is dedicated to the analysis of each of these five policy outcomes. 
In each case, the chapter is presented through four stages of a theoretical policy cycle in order 
to identify the key issues in each case. The final chapter concludes with a summary and 
presents recommendations for responses to these issues. 
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3 Policy outcome: Stable and Efficient Pricing 
3.1 Introduction 
This policy outcome contributes to access and affordability by ensuring consumers are paying 
no more than necessary for an electricity system that is viable in the short term and sustainable 
in the long term. Further, by including stability, this policy outcome seeks to ensure bill shocks 
are minimised.  
The overall aim of the national electricity market has been stated as “… to provide a reliable, 
secure energy supply at the best price for consumers” (AEMC, 2017b). This chapter analyses 
policies aimed at revealing this ‘best price’ in the context of energy affordability for vulnerable 
households. As is the case for each of the five policy outcomes in this and subsequent chapters, 
this chapter is presented as four key stages in a theoretical policy cycle. Section 3.2 presents 
the Policy Review stage of the policy cycle. Here, the prevailing approach to pricing is 
presented. This is reflected in the National Electricity Objective (NEO) and its three limbs of 
economic efficiency. This section also discusses potential implications for electricity pricing 
from Australia’s international commitments to reduce greenhouse emissions alongside a 
number of other policy issues that are placing pressure on energy prices. 
Section 3.3 presents the Identify Key Issues stage of the policy cycle. These are based on the 
potential impact on elements of typical electricity bills. 
Section 3.4 presents the Policy Analysis stage of the policy cycle. This section introduces the 
components of a typical electricity bill in order to analyse the impacts of climate policies on 
household expenditure.  
Section 3.5 presents the Policy Formulation stage of the policy cycle. Four policy priorities 
related to the interests of vulnerable consumers are identified and actions discussed. 
● Wholesale energy costs 
● Effectiveness of retail competition 
● Network charges and tariff reform 
● Other charges recovered from energy bills 
 
3.2 Policy Review 
3.2.1 Efficient pricing – the NEM approach 
The approach of the National Electricity Market has been to regulate the natural monopoly 
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elements (the network itself) and promote competition for the other elements of generation 
and customer interaction (wholesale and retail).  
As described in section 2.4, the NEM has explicitly pursued a separation of pricing and 
economic efficiency objectives from social policy objectives.  
The National Electricity Objective (NEO) is found at section 7 of the National Electricity Law 
(A schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996) and states: 
7—National electricity objective 
The objective of this Law is to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation 
and use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of electricity 
with respect to— 
(a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of electricity; and 
(b) the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
The NEO is an economic efficiency objective and the regulatory literature has expanded on 
this to discuss static (productive and allocative) as well as dynamic efficiencies in the context 
of electricity markets.  
The pursuit of productive efficiency in the network and generation / retail sectors should 
mean that consumers have their demands met at “least cost”. Productive efficiency of 
electricity supply has been advanced through competitive markets for wholesale and retail 
activity and pursued through national, incentive-based regulation of monopolies in the 
network sector. However, the effectiveness of wholesale and retail competition is being 
questioned as evidence of high margins emerges.  
The pursuit of allocative efficiency should ensure that consumers face prices that inform an 
efficient choice between ‘more supply’ and ‘managing demand’. The major reform program 
to advance allocative efficiencies is known as Power of Choice – giving consumers options in the 
way they use electricity. Network tariff reform is progressing on an opt-in basis until at least 
2020. The advanced metering required is to be deployed on a market-led basis. 
The pursuit of dynamic efficiency through incentive regulation and wholesale market settings 
should mean that this “least cost” also takes account of future needs. The need to replace or 
refurbish ageing coal-fired generation assets and / or increase generation from renewables or 
natural gas is providing a test for the market’s dynamic efficiency.  
There have been a number of calls to change the NEO to reflect climate policy objectives. A 
recent example is from the Senate Environment and Communications References Committee 
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inquiry into the Retirement of coal fired power stations (2017). The Committee’s interim report of 
November 2016 included the following recommendation: 
Recommendation 3  
The committee recommends that the Australian Government, through representation 
on the COAG Energy Council, put in place a pollution reduction objective consistent 
with Australia's obligations under the Paris Agreement in the National Electricity 
Objectives.  
Energy Consumers Australia on the other hand called for a ‘Statement of Policy Principles’ to 
be supplied by the COAG Energy Council to require that the AEMC ‘have regard to 
Australia’s national emissions reduction policy’. The ECA view is that this is a timelier way 
of embedding the emissions reduction task than seeking to amend the NEO (ECA, 2017b, p. 
16).  
There are no current proposals to incorporate social policy objectives in the NEO, however, 
on 1 January 2016, Victoria’s energy industry legislation was amended to include a new 
objective for the ESC: 
To promote protections for customers, including in relation to assisting customers who 
are facing payment difficulties. 
The ECA has articulated a vision for the energy market transition of (ECA, 2017b, p. 3): 
“… ensure consumers pay no more than is necessary for the energy services they 
need as we transition to a cleaner economy, with no one left behind, while maintaining 
a secure and reliable system.” 
The reference to ‘no one left behind’ aims to reflect the risk that increased costs will be passed 
through to already vulnerable households or that access to technology results in a ‘two-tier’ 
energy market. The four other policy outcomes discussed in this report – besides ‘stable and 
efficient pricing’ – should be considered as the policy outcomes required to achieve an 
objective of ‘no one left behind’.  
Decarbonisation commitments represent a substantial driver of future electricity prices but 
there are other strong drivers of higher prices. These include a range of energy market reform 
priorities, increases in the price of gas and the role of gas in the electricity market; the tighter 
supply resulting from the exit of coal-fired generators; and the impact on investment of 
climate policy uncertainty. Other price pressures that could increase or reduce prices include 
jurisdictional support schemes for renewable energy and energy efficiency; changes to 
utilisation of the grid; and ongoing energy market reform. These are discussed further in the 
following sections. 
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3.2.2 Ongoing Energy Market Reform 
COAG Energy Council operates an expansive work program that is categorised into a list of 
priorities: 
● Empowering Consumers (including through the operation of Energy Consumers 
Australia) 
● Energy Market Transformation including four key areas of: Enhanced Competition 
and Innovation; Consumer Protections for new products and services in the electricity 
market; Ongoing Power System Security, and; the Flexibility of Economic Regulation 
of Networks in a more decentralized system. 
● Australian Gas Markets Reform Package 
● Energy and Carbon Policy, including the National Energy Productivity Plan (NEPP) 
● Improving Institutional Performance, including numerous projects under the 
Governance Review Implementation Plan (GRIP) 
● Security, Sustainability and Stability of the National Energy Market, focused on the 
independent review led by Australia’s Chief Scientist Dr Alan Finkel. 
Relevant COAG Energy Council priorities for this policy outcome are: 
● Energy Market Transformation 
● Australian Gas Markets 
● Energy and Carbon Policy 
● Improving Institutional Performance 
● Security, Sustainability and Stability of the National Energy Market 
The AEMC Strategic Priorities for Energy Market Development 2015 outlined three strategic 
priorities: 
● Consumer priority – enabling consumers to make informed decisions in competitive 
retail markets. 
● Gas priority – promoting the development of efficient gas markets. 
● Markets and network priority – market and network arrangements that encourage 
efficient investment and flexibility. 
Each of these reform priorities is relevant to the efficiency of energy markets and, ultimately, 
the ability of these markets to contribute to national emissions reduction targets. Successful 
implementation can reasonably be expected to put downward pressure on costs for 
 - 88 - 
consumers. 
3.2.3 The price of natural gas 
The development of an export industry for Australia’s east coast natural gas resources as 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) has delivered a substantial shift in the price and availability of 
gas for electricity generation. The role of gas-fired generation as marginal producer and new 
entrant means that wholesale electricity prices are strongly impacted by wholesale gas prices. 
This result was foreseen (Simshauser and Nelson, 2015a, 2015b). 
Figure 18 illustrates data from AEMO’s 2016 National Gas Forecasting Report (NGFR). The 
relative scale of LNG development highlights why gas for electricity generation has become 
a price taker in the market. By 2018, gas for LNG exports are expected to be over 10 times the 
consumption of gas for electricity generation and over twice the entire domestic market: 
 
Figure 18: Annual Natural Gas Consumption by sector, actual from 2010-2015, projections from 2016 (Source: 
AEMO 2016) 
An Inquiry into East Coast Gas conducted by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission ACCC highlighted an “unprecedented change” in the ability of domestic gas 
users to contract gas supplies (ACCC, 2015). COAG Energy Council has recognised the major 
policy challenge but has articulated a vision of a more efficient market rather than any 
prescription for affordability(CoAG, 2015a, 2016). 
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Recent analysis by the Australian Industry Group found wholesale gas prices have increased 
steeply from historic levels of $3-4/gigajoule to $11-12/GJ by the end of 2016. This translates 
into a short-run cost for gas-fired electricity generation of about $120/MWh (roughly three 
times the average wholesale price of a few years ago). The electricity market’s design means 
that gas generators often set the price for the whole market, resulting in significant increases 
in average wholesale electricity prices (AIG, 2017). 
Significant debate exists around state-based moratoria on gas development and the need for 
more supply to be developed. The impact of this and international developments18 on gas 
prices and electricity generation is unclear, but in the near term it is likely that gas prices will 
remain high with consequential upward pressure on electricity prices (Bethune, 2017). 
3.2.4 Sudden closure of generation capacity 
The closure of South Australia’s Northern Power Station in May 2016 and the closure of 
Victoria’s Hazelwood Power Station in March 2017 have highlighted the impacts of 
withdrawing significant lumps of generation capacity from the NEM. Northern’s 546MW of 
capacity represents 16% of SA’s maximum demand of 3,397MW (Summer 2010/11). 
Hazelwood’s 1600MW capacity represents 15% of Victoria’s maximum demand of 10,490MW 
(Summer 2008/9).  
The AEMC projected that the impending retirement of Hazelwood power station would 
increase wholesale prices by 55 per cent in Victoria and Tasmania, and 40 per cent in South 
Australia (AEMC, 2016b). AEMO has projected that Victoria and South Australia may suffer 
energy shortages by summer 2017-18, unless NSW coal generators increase their output and 
withdrawn gas generation is returned to service. 
3.2.5 Jurisdictional Schemes 
A number of states and territories are implementing or planning to implement schemes to 
promote decarbonisation of their electricity sector. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has 
pioneered the Australian use of Feed-in tariffs with Contracts for Difference. A similar 
mechanism (the Victorian Renewable Energy Auction Scheme, VREAS) will drive Victoria’s 
renewable energy target of 25 per cent by 2020 and 40 per cent by 2050 and is being considered 
for Queensland’s 50% target (DEWS, 2017; DWELP, 2017). The costs of the ACT scheme are 
                                               
18 For example: the support given to US exports of LNG under the Trump Administration’s America First energy policy 
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recovered from consumers via the ACT electricity distributor (ActewAGL Distribution). The 
ACT Government states that total costs per household of achieving 100% renewables are 
expected to peak in 2020 at around $5.50 per household per week ($286 pa).  The AEMC 
projects the scheme will represent approximately 11% of a typical residential standing offer 
customers bill (inc GST) by 2018/19 (AEMC, 2016b). 
The impact of these schemes on electricity prices is dependent on the emergence or absence 
of a national scheme. To some extent, the entry of new renewable generation may reduce 
wholesale electricity prices in these jurisdictions by increasing supply and competition; 
however, the costs of the scheme if recovered through other bill components may outweigh 
this impact for some or all residential consumers. Moreover, these schemes may be integrated 
into future national climate policies and their contribution to national targets remains unclear.  
3.3 Key Issues 
This section distils key issues from stakeholder publications and the preceding Policy Review 
into four key issues. 
The following is a summary of recommendations from stakeholder literature relevant to 
vulnerable households and the efficiency of pricing. The recommendations for advancing this 
policy outcome can be categorised into those that: 
● Maximise downward pressure on energy prices; and those that 
● Influence the redistribution of costs by changing pricing structures 
Maximise downward pressure on energy prices 
● Minimise climate policy uncertainty. Stable climate policy is considered a precursor 
to stability in wholesale electricity markets 
● Reconsider the extent to which decarbonisation costs are taken ‘off market’ 
● Accelerate reform of Australia east coast gas markets 
● More aggressively pursue the efficiency of retail markets 
● Promote greater competition where possible 
● Encourage ashift of vulnerable households away from standing offer tariffs 
● Promote improved grid utilisation (productivity) to lower unit prices 
Influence the redistribution of costs by changing pricing  
● Encourage vulnerable consumers who would be better off to opt-in to smarter 
metering and more cost reflective tariffs 
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● Implement agreed Consumer Impact Principles for tariff reform – including a 
specific focus on fixed charges (see Section 1.4.11) 
● Consider incorporating broader policy objectives into the National Electricity 
Objective 
● Consider GST as a funding source for measures to support vulnerable consumers 
These can be grouped into four priority areas for further analysis by considering the electricity 
supply chain and the elements of the typical bill presented in Section 1.4.6: 
● Wholesale energy costs 
● Effectiveness of retail competition 
● Network charges and tariff reform 
● Other charges recovered from energy bills 
3.4 Policy Analysis 
The ongoing energy market reform and development agenda led by COAG Energy Council 
is expansive and complex. For consumers, this program has elements aimed at lowering costs 
for all consumers as well as elements that will redistribute costs. For vulnerable consumers, 
there are opportunities for costs to reduce but also risks that redistributions could exacerbate 
existing vulnerabilities. Advanced metering is recognised as a critical component of pricing 
changes and efficiency pursuits for all households but the impact on vulnerable households 
is still being revealed (SVDP, 2016b). 
The issues are described below with reference to the four main categories of the ‘cost stack’ 
illustrated in Chapter 1 and reproduced here as Figure 19: 
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Figure 19 Breakdown of average national residential electricity price, 2015-16 (Source: Based on Climate 
Change Authority Electricity Research Report 2016 Figure 8 (CCA, 2016), (AEMC, 2016b)) 
3.4.1 Retailer controlled costs 
Approximately 38% of the typical bill, this component refers to the competitive wholesale and 
retail electricity markets. More than 70% of electricity customers and 80% of gas customers 
are contracted to one of the ‘Big 3’ retailers: AGL, Origin and Energy Australia. These retailers 
and the majority of those with the balance of customers have significant interests in generation 
and are often referred to as gentailers. The dominance of the gentail model means it is difficult 
to separate the cost of wholesale purchases (often a combination of self-generation, forward 
contracting, other risk products and spot purchases) from the retail costs of marketing, 
customer acquisition and retention, billing etc.  
The most direct impact of many climate policies is on the wholesale cost component. As 
mentioned, electricity sector emissions are dominated by the combustion of coal (around 62% 
of electricity generated and around 88% of emissions) (CCA, 2016, p. 15). The closure of 
Northern Power Station (SA) in 2016 and Hazelwood (VIC) in 2017 with relatively short notice 
has already placed upward pressure on wholesale prices (AEMC 2016b). 
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The pressures on wholesale energy costs are discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 
below. Section 3.4.2 discusses the potential uplift in wholesale prices projected by a range of 
modelling studies of different climate policies including: carbon pricing; an emissions 
intensity scheme, an expanded renewable energy target mechanism, contracts for difference 
and others. Section 3.2 discussed some of the other pressures on prices including: the cost of 
gas; the cost of policy uncertainty, and; the potential for productivity measures and other 
initiatives targeting network costs, to put downward pressure on prices. 
The impact on wholesale prices is one thing. The bundling of wholesale costs with other 
components and turning theses into the bills of small customers is a job for retailers operating 
in the competitive market. Competition is the tool for keeping downward pressure on these 
costs, but respected analysts of the Victorian Retail market have identified signs of a market 
that is not operating efficiently (Ben-David 2012, 2015, 2016, Mountain 2015, 2016).  
Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) found price dispersion in Victoria’s deregulated retail 
market meant many vulnerable customers were being priced at above efficient costs if they 
were on a standing offer contract or on a market contract whose benefit period had lapsed 
(and hence paying standing offer rates). The authors recommend policies to help firms shift 
vulnerable households onto more competitive pricing. The Great Britain energy market 
investigation by the Competition & Markets Authority made similar findings in 2016 (CMA, 
2016). The Victorian Government announced a review of electricity and gas retail markets in 
Victoria that delivered a final report in August 2017 that found ‘consumers are not gaining 
the benefits of a competitive retail market’ (Thwaites et al., 2017). 
The Grattan Institute report Price Shock: is the retail electricity market failing consumers? also 
made well publicised findings (Wood et al., 2017): 
“… the evidence provided in this report and by other research over the past decade 
indicates that excessive profits are being made in the retail electricity market. This was 
not the result intended when competition was introduced.” (p20) 
The Turnbull Government direction to the ACCC to undertake an inquiry into retail electricity 
pricing came soon after (27 March 2017) and referenced the Grattan Institute report amongst 
others. The ACCC has been given a wide terms of reference and over a year to conclude the 
inquiry. It is expected to produce a final report due by 30 June 2018. 
The similar energy market investigation by the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) has lead to talk of re-introducing price caps in the UK electricity and gas markets. 
Ofgem introduced an energy price cap for the approximately 4 million households on pre-
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payment meters from April 2017 and there has been suggestion of extending that to other 
vulnerable customers (Citizen’s Advice, 2017). 
3.4.2 Inferences from recent modelling of Climate Policies from 2020 
In December 2015, 195 countries, including Australia, adopted the international climate deal 
to bind all countries to take action to reduce emissions, referred to as the Paris Agreement 
(UNFCCC, 2015). The core element of the agreement is to limit global warming to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. To achieve the 
aims of the agreement the 195 countries are required to submit comprehensive national 
climate action plans and agreed to review them every 5 years to enable more ambitious targets 
to be set as required. The Australian Government has a 2030 emissions reduction target of 26-
28% below 2005 levels. 
The electricity sector generates around one-third of the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
(refer to Section 1.4.2) and will inevitably be required to make a substantial contribution to 
Australia’s international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
A number of reports into the impact of different climate policy options on electricity markets 
were released in 2016 by CSIRO, Jacobs (for multiple clients) and Frontier Economics. A 
summary and brief discussion of each one is contained in Appendix C. These modelling 
reports contrast a range of possible climate and energy policies against a range of emissions 
reduction targets between now and 2030 and on to 2050. An assessment of indicative price 
impacts shows that most climate policy options would add around 5c/kWh to electricity 
prices over the period from 2020 to 2030 (approx. 20%), assuming no changes to any of the 
other cost drivers discussed herein. However, recent analysis suggests that the uncertainty 
created for investment in the electricity system from the absence of clear climate policy is 
already driving up electricity prices by a similar amount (refer to Section 3.4.3). 
The policy options modelled can be categorised broadly as: 
● market mechanisms (a price or limit is applied to carbon; the policy is technology 
neutral). Examples include a direct carbon price, an electricity sector specific emissions 
intensity scheme and variations on a ‘cap and trade’ mechanism; 
● technology support programs (subsidised investments in renewable or ‘low emissions’ 
technologies). Examples include an expansion of the existing Renewable Energy 
Target scheme, modifications to the existing scheme to include support for other 
technologies below a defined emissions intensity limit and feed-in tariffs with 
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contracts for difference (such as the ACT reverse auction mechanism), or; 
● coal regulation (high-carbon generation is forced out of the market). Examples include 
forced closure based on age or emissions intensity. 
Direct comparisons among the modelling reports are difficult. The studies have various 
purposes, use different assumptions and constraints and make different levels of data publicly 
available. However, it is possible to draw some conclusions relevant to the research topic: 
● The majority of electricity consumed in the NEM is delivered via transmission and 
distribution networks from the fleet of large scale generation technologies that power 
the entire NEM, still predominately coal and gas. Much of this existing coal generation 
fleet will need to be refurbished or replaced by 2030 (Climate Council, 2014; Senate 
Environment and Communications Reference Committee, 2017). The choices made 
about what will replace them will largely determine the sector’s greenhouse footprint 
and prices paid by consumers. 
● All options deliver a shift away from coal as the dominant energy source for electricity 
generation in Australia to various combinations of gas and renewable energy sources 
– particularly wind and solar. Assumptions about the future price of gas and the 
technology costs of renewables are therefore key variables in the forecasting of future 
prices. Given the uncertainty of these costs, all modelled price impacts should be 
treated with caution. 
● All options considered come at an economic cost but the likely impact on wholesale 
prices varies considerably depending on the mechanism used, the extent and rate of 
emissions reductions targeted as well as the input assumptions noted above. 
● Market mechanisms19 were consistently found to have lower overall economic costs. 
● Options that combined multiple mechanisms can achieve emissions reductions at a 
lower combined cost20. 
● Options that include the widest range of technology options have lower overall 
economic costs. 
● Options that involve costs to government in lieu of costs to consumers can have lower 
direct impact on prices depending on how the cost of the scheme is recovered21. See 
section 3.4.7 below for discussion of ‘around the market’ versus market mechanisms 
                                               
19 This was true for all three modellers 
20 Examples include the policy combinations modelled by Jacobs for the CCA 
21 An example is Feed-in tariffs with Contracts for Difference modelled by Jacobs for the Climate Change Authority 
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for cost recovery. 
● Investment expenditure is expected to rise while fuel costs fall under many scenarios. 
The ‘cost of capital’ is therefore another key variable in the forecasting of future prices. 
Policy uncertainty puts upward pressure on the cost of capital leading to higher costs 
for consumers22. 
● All options exist alongside other drivers of change in the average price of electricity as 
well as the structure of prices23. The assumptions made about these other drivers 
impact on the forecasts of future retail prices from each of the modelling exercises.  
● Scenarios that optimised network pricing showed lower residential retail prices than 
some scenarios with less ambitious climate policies.  
● Price structures are already on a path of higher fixed supply charges and charges that 
will increasingly reflect the cost of peak demand on the network. This will deliver a 
redistribution of grid-supply costs amongst households24. 
● Most future scenarios include an increasingly distributed energy system with solar, 
storage and electric vehicles. Uptake and use of distributed energy resources is also 
likely to deliver a redistribution of grid-supply expenditure amongst households25.  
● Besides higher prices for electricity generation, assumptions regarding productivity 
and efficiency of energy use are critical to how much consumers will need to spend on 
grid-supplied electricity over future years. The National Energy Productivity Plan 
(NEPP) is therefore a critical complementary measure to the climate policies modelled. 
3.4.3 Policy Uncertainty 
The impact of climate policy uncertainty on the electricity sector has been recently highlighted 
by a range of organisations. The Preliminary Report for the Independent Review into the 
Future Security of the National Electricity Market (the Finkel Review) noted that this 
uncertainty presents a risk to the security and reliability of the electricity system:  
Reducing emissions in the electricity sector and the need to replace the ageing coal 
and gas generation fleet will involve significant investment in long-lived assets. In order 
for businesses to invest in these assets with confidence, they need to be able to form 
long-term expectations from the investment signals they receive... If businesses do not 
invest when needed, this will impact on the security and reliability of electricity supply. 
                                               
22 The Finkel review preliminary report notes that “For businesses to take risks on the future and invest, they need to be 
confident that emissions reduction policies and the mechanisms to achieve them are consistent with Australia’s international 
commitments and will not change drastically in the future.” Page 22. 
23 The modelling by the CSIRO in particular demonstrates this 
24 Analsyed in the ENA CSIRO Network Transformation Roadmap 
25 Analsyed in the ENA CSIRO Network Transformation Roadmap 
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There is evidence that investment in the electricity sector has stalled and investors 
have become less responsive to investment signals. This is due to policy instability 
and uncertainty driven by numerous reviews into the RET and a lack of clarity about 
the policies to reduce emissions after 2020. 
A media release entitled ‘No room for Partisan Politics in Energy’ was issued on 13 February 
2017 by 18 organisations representing industry, energy, consumer, environmental and social 
stakeholders warned that ongoing policy uncertainty also increased costs which would be felt 
by all energy users: 
The status quo of policy uncertainty, lack of coordination and unreformed markets is 
increasing costs, undermining investment and worsening reliability risks. This impacts 
all Australians, including vulnerable low-income households, workers, regional 
communities and trade-exposed industries…More than a decade of this has made 
most energy investments impossibly risky. This has pushed prices higher while 
hindering transformational change of our energy system. The result is enduring 
dysfunction in the electricity sector. 
In March 2017, the Australian Energy Council released an estimate of the costs of past climate 
policy uncertainty on current and forward prices. Given the difference between forward 
average wholesale prices ($100-120/MWh) and what the underlying cost of supply should be 
($57MWh based on a 10 year weighted average between 2020-2030 from the Climate Change 
Authority modelling), the electricity cost of sustained national policy inaction is effectively 
equivalent to a carbon price in excess of $50 a tonne. This suggests that development of 
durable and efficient national energy and climate policies which return investment to the 
market are likely to reduce electricity prices (AEC, 2017b). 
3.4.4 Network costs  
Approximately 45% of the typical bill is for the electricity network that transports electricity 
to and between consumers. The economic regulation of the monopoly businesses that operate 
the transmission and distribution networks continues to evolve and implement outcomes 
from the Australian Energy Regulator’s Better Regulation program (2013-14). The 
decentralisation of electricity supply has triggered a review of the existing economic 
regulatory framework by the AEMC and a ‘Distribution Market Model’ project to explore how 
the operation and regulation of electricity distribution networks may need to adapt to 
increased uptake of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as rooftop solar, battery storage 
and electric vehicles. 
Elements of the AEMC’s Power of Choice program directly affect existing network costs: 
Network Pricing, Competition in Metering Rule changes and Ring fencing guidelines. 
Relevant COAG Energy Council priorities are: 
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● Energy Market Transformation 
● Improving Institutional Performance 
● Security, Sustainability and Stability of the National Energy Market 
Network pricing rule changes in particular will redistribute costs. These are currently 
proceeding on an opt-in basis, but research suggests that ‘Opt-out’ is more likely to achieve 
the potential economic benefits (CSIRO, 2017). The Network Transformation Roadmap developed 
by the CSIRO and Energy Networks Australia represents the most comprehensive vision of 
the future grid and outlines the potential to lower costs. Simshauser and Downer (2014) 
outline how tariff reform can benefit many customers in hardship. An immediate challenge 
lies in identifying and supporting vulnerable customers for whom this is an opportunity. 
The AER has stated that demand tariffs – as proposed by the vast majority on network 
businesses - are more cost reflective than consumption based tariffs and that (AER, 2017b): 
“In the next round of tariff reform we consider new customers across all networks 
should be assigned by default to cost reflective tariffs.”  
By ‘new customer’ the AER is referring to new dwellings that are connecting to the grid for 
the first time. New customer connections represent around 1 to 1.5% of the residential and 
small business market (depending on jurisdiction) so this still represents a relatively slow 
transition of the metering fleet. A key reason for pursuing tariff reform is to improve the 
utilisation of existing infrastructure. This is discussed further below. 
3.4.5 Utilisation of the Grid 
Energy infrastructure is built to meet peaks in demand, but this capacity is idle most of the 
time. The ratio of peak to average demand reflects the average utilisation of the infrastructure. 
The chart below from the Australian Energy Council shows that South Australia has the 
highest ratio of peak to average demand (and therefore the poorest utilisation) and that the 
ratio seems to be deteriorating (increasing) in each jurisdiction (AEC, 2017c). This places 
upward pressure on unit prices and supply charges as fixed costs are recovered from lower 
energy sales. 
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Figure 20: Ratio of peak to average demand in NEM jurisdictions (Source: AEC analysis of AER and NEM-
Review data (AEC, 2017c)) 
CSIRO highlights the impact of improving grid utilisation on average electricity unit prices in 
its Network Transformation Roadmap work for the ENA as well as in its 2015 National 
Outlook. Network Tariff reform also aims to incentivise greater utilisation of infrastructure 
away from peak times (AEMC, 2014, p. 8): 
Over the longer term, more efficient pricing of network services can minimise overall 
electricity network costs borne by consumers due to better utilisation of the network 
and deferral of peak demand driven network investment.  
Numerous studies from the transport sector have highlighted the potential for transport 
electrification to reduce emissions (ClimateWorks, 2016, 2014; CSIRO, 2015). Under the right 
incentives, this can also improve grid utilisation and hence place downward pressure on 
electricity unit prices for all end-uses (AEMC, 2014, 2012b; CSIRO, 2017) (CSIRO 2016, AEMC 
2012) 
This lowering of costs for consumers from better utilisation of infrastructure is an objective of 
the National Energy Productivity Plan (CoAG, 2015b) and the successful implementation of 
the plan is intended to place downward pressure on residential energy costs. The extent to 
which this might benefit vulnerable consumers is considered later in this thesis. 
3.4.6 RET and State-based energy schemes 
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As introduced in section 3.2.5, approximately 8% of the typical bill covers the funding of 
schemes such as the national Renewable Energy Target, state Energy Efficiency and Feed-in 
Tariff schemes as an uplift on retail prices. This is considered regressive by some (Nelson et 
al., 2011), as vulnerable households who cannot access the schemes’ benefits (such as renters) 
still pay the costs, while better-off households who were able to access the schemes also avoid 
some of the costs of the scheme by consuming less electricity from the grid. The Queensland 
Government managed to contain the retail impact of wholesale price increases from July 2017 
by changing the policy on cost recovery of the state’s feed-in tariff for solar: The cost of the 
state’s Solar Bonus Scheme was removed from electricity bills and incorporated into the state 
budget for three years from the 2017-18 financial year at a cost of $771m (Queensland 
Government, 2017, p. 45). The social tariff proposed by SA Power Networks (refer to section 
1.3.3) aimed to the recovery of that state’s solar feed-in tariff from the network charges of 
households participating in a retailer hardship program. 
Choices about mechanisms to implement climate policy – such as carbon prices or renewable 
energy targets – will influence this element of prices into the future. Section 3.4.7 discusses 
emerging interest in schemes that take costs ‘around the market’. 
3.4.7 Internalise the costs of climate policy or go ‘Around the Market’? 
From the perspective of electricity users, the choice between climate policies that are most 
efficient overall and those that produce lower electricity prices is not obvious. The modelling 
considered in Section 3.2.2 consistently showed that market mechanisms have lowest total 
economic costs, but subsidy schemes can deliver lower electricity prices. A caveat to this is 
that the costs of the subsidy need to be recovered from somewhere. Where incentives are 
provided out of government revenues rather than as a direct uplift in energy prices, consumer 
exposure to costs then aligns more with the progressive nature of Australia’s tax and transfer 
system rather than electricity prices. Examples of such schemes include Australia’s Emissions 
Reduction Fund and a trend in the US where ‘around the market’ payments are being used to 
keep base-load plants open for longer than the market would other sustain26. 
In a similar vein there are a number of other charges collected via electricity bills that 
                                               
26 See, for example: Illinois providing direct financial support for Nuclear Plants at risk of closing 
www.utilitydive.com/news/illinois-passes-sweeping-energy-bill-with-support-for-exelon-nuclear-plants/431521/ and Colorado 
www.utilitydive.com/news/re-regulation-vertically-integrated-utility/428639/ “One state is an anecdote; five or six states is a 
trend,” said Ray Gifford, former chair of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission and author of a recent white paper on around 
market reforms.” 
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undermine affordability for vulnerable low income households (AEMC, 2016b). 
These are fundamental choices for policy development and stakeholders should be reasonably 
expected to have developed a perspective related to their interests. 
3.4.8 GST 
Australia’s 10% Goods and Services Tax (GST) applies to the sale of electricity (and has done 
so since its introduction in 2000). Simshauser, Nelson and Doan (2011a) forecast residential 
electricity price rises over the five years from 2010 that proved to be quite accurate. Analysis 
for their policy prescriptions included a view that the increase in revenue from GST on 
electricity bills over the period would, if strategically spent, be more than adequate to 
‘eliminate fuel poverty’ (Simshauser et al., 2011b).  
The first section of this report estimated GST collections from household electricity bills in 
2015-16 of almost $1.6 billion - a sizeable revenue base that can be redistributed to alleviate 
the worst impacts on vulnerable households. Recent estimates of the costs of concessions from 
state and territory governments equate to 55% of this GST estimate. 
Hypothecating revenue generated to ‘fuel poverty’ is an alternate to the UK approach outlined 
in Section 2.7.1 where a reduced rate of Value Added Tax is applied to all residential electricity 
and gas and therefore conferring a benefit on all households rather than a focus on those in 
hardship.  
 
3.5 Policy Formulation 
This chapter has covered a wide range of issues relevant to the pursuit of stable and efficient 
pricing. In the context of vulnerable energy consumers, this policy outcome is the foundation 
upon which the other, complementary policy outcomes are based. Arguably, efficient, stable 
pricing gives these complementary policy areas the greatest potential for success.  
The incorporation of the costs of gas price increases and climate policy responses and changes 
to tariff structures being pursued under the Power of Choice reforms means higher costs and 
redistribution of costs, potentially exposing new vulnerabilities. Priority actions for each main 
element of the cost stack have been developed and are presented below. 
3.5.1 Priority issue 1.1: Effectiveness of retail competition 
Excess profits have been suggested and large price dispersion has been demonstrated in a 
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number of recent reports. The Turnbull Government’s March 2017 direction to the ACCC to 
undertake an inquiry into retail electricity pricing as well as a similar inquiry by the Victorian 
Government should ensure that this issue receives significant attention. Similarities to the UK 
experience are becoming obvious and should form part of each inquiry. The ACCC is expected 
to produce a final report by 30 June 2018. 
A number of policy options exist, and a rule change proposal is a likely consequence of the 
review. Since the issues relate to all consumers, not just those at risk of debt disconnection, it 
is appropriate that Energy Consumers Australia allocate resources to researching and 
preparing a rule change proposal that can be initiated soon after the release of the ACCC 
findings. 
3.5.2 Priority issue 1.2: Wholesale market volatility 
Wholesale prices higher than necessary erodes affordability for all consumers but vulnerable 
consumers, by definition, are especially sensitive to price volatility when translated to bill 
shock when passed on quickly by retailers. On this basis, policy choices that reduce uncertainty 
should benefit vulnerable consumers in particular. The dominance of the gentail vertically 
integrated business model in the NEM means that the ACCC retail pricing inquiry will 
necessarily look at wholesale markets. The Independent Review into the Future Security of 
the National Electricity Market (Finkel Review) and the Australian Government Review of 
climate change policies are also expected to contribute clarity over future directions in energy 
generation. Responsibility for responding to this issue rests with the Commonwealth, State 
and Territory  Governments and the CoAG Energy Council. 
3.5.3 Priority issue 1.3: Tariff reform 
The implementation of network tariff reform has significant potential to redistribute costs 
between households and is recommended as a vulnerable customer priority policy area. 
Implementation is proceeding on a voluntary basis, but the AER has signalled an expectation 
of mandatory assignment (with opt-out), for new connections at least, from 2020. Given the 
limited likelihood of mandating tariffs without an opt out provision, it is recommended that 
Energy Consumers Australia build on the Power Shift project and initiate a project to identify 
vulnerable households with load profiles that would make ‘opt-in’ to demand tariffs cost 
effective. Uptake and effectiveness can then be evaluated in anticipation of mandatory 
assignment beyond the next 5-year regulatory cycle. 
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3.5.4 Priority issue 1.4: Other costs recovered on energy bills 
The recovery of costs for a range of programs, as well as GST, increases the size of all electricity 
bills and exacerbates affordability challenges for vulnerable households. The consideration of 
new climate policies is an opportunity to contrast options that recover the cost of action on 
climate change from consolidated revenue rather than electricity bills. This way the 
progressive redistribution of the tax and transfer system applies rather than increases in the 
price of energy. This is recommended as a vulnerable customer priority policy area with links 
to concession reform. It is recommended that the Australian Council of Social Service 
(ACOSS) consult its membership to develop a position on this issue on behalf of vulnerable 
consumers. This position should be put to COAG Energy Council for consideration as part of 
designing the National Energy Guarantee and to State and Territory Governments in the 
context of jurisdictional schemes. 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has covered a wide range of issues relevant to the pursuit of stable and efficient 
energy pricing. 
The NEM has a single market objective of pursuing economic efficiency in the long-term 
interests of consumers. This is achieved by promoting competition in wholesale and retail 
markets and by applying incentive based regulation to the monopoly transmission and 
distribution businesses.  
The state of play in relation to pricing was presented in relation to the main components of a 
typical electricity bill. Retailer Controlled Costs – wholesale and retail market activity – is 
dominated by the ‘gentailer’ model of the ‘Big 3’ energy businesses: AGL, Origin and Energy 
Australia and represents around 38% of the typical bill. Wholesale markets refer to the 
compulsory spot market for the output of electricity generators and the financial instruments 
that manage risk and aggregate demand. This is where climate policies have the most direct 
impact.  
This chapter also discussed key upward and downward pressures on prices from a range of 
sources and considered the recommendations put forward by various stakeholders. Key 
factors include the cost of natural gas, policy uncertainty, sudden closures of generation 
capacity, jurisdictional renewable energy target schemes, declining utilisation of expensive 
network assets and a range of other priorities as part of the ongoing market reform agenda. 
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The efficacy of retail competition has been questioned and inquiries launched. The retail 
component of bills bundles up network charges and wholesale energy costs with other fees 
and charges. However, attention is increasingly being paid to the efficiency of these markets 
and on price dispersion within the residential customer group. 
Network costs are the largest component of most bills at around 45%. These are regulated 
charges and are being slowly reformed to be more ‘cost reflective’. This means that prices (in 
terms of levels and structures) should reflect the two key drivers of network costs: congestion 
from coincident peaks in demand and location. Most jurisdictions preclude small customer 
pricing based on location so most distributors will be introducing residential tariffs with a 
‘monthly peak demand component’ from 2017 on an ‘opt-in’ basis. 
Funding mechanisms for national and state/territory programs tend to be based on annual 
electricity consumption and comprise around 8% of the typical bill. GST adds 10% to all bills. 
An underlying policy question relates to choices over preferences for the cost of action on 
climate change being derived from energy bills or from consolidated revenue (i.e. 
contributions reflect the redistributive effects of the tax and transfer system) or in what 
balance of the two. 
The market’s consumer safety net is undermined by costs in excess of the minimum necessary 
to provide a reliable and secure electricity system and there are four priority areas identified 
where attention should be paid: 
● Wholesale energy costs 
● Effectiveness of retail competition 
● Network charges and tariff reform 
● Other charges recovered from energy bills 
Competitive electricity markets rely on consumers exercising choice over their electricity 
retailer. For a range of reasons this is a challenge for many households but for those on low 
incomes with relatively high expenditure this exacerbates vulnerability. Informed and 
engaged consumers is one of the five policy outcomes of the market’s safety net and is 
analysed further in the following chapter. 
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4 Policy outcome: Informed and engaged consumers 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers policies that seek to ensure consumers are informed and engaged in 
competitive energy markets. This policy outcome contributes to affordability by encouraging 
consumers to find the best priced energy supply. 
Residential electricity is supplied on a competitive basis in NSW, VIC, SA and SE QLD and 
households need to regularly engage with the market to ensure they are receiving a 
competitively priced supply. There is limited choice of retailer in the ACT and no effective 
choice in regional QLD, TAS, WA and NT. Whether or not there is a choice of retailer, 
homeowners in all regions often have choices to be made about: 
● Fuel switching to Gas (pipeline or bottled gas) 
● Solar for electricity or hot water 
● Battery Storage 
Supporting consumer choices in this regard is a range of measures including accreditation of 
Solar Installers, Solar Retailer Accreditation and a Code of Conduct by the Industry Peak body 
the Clean Energy Council (2017). 
Benefitting all consumers, not just homeowners, are minimum  energy performance standards 
and Appliance Energy Ratings (Mandatory energy rating labels on Air Conditioners, 
Televisions, Computer Monitors, Refrigerators; Freezers; Clothes Washers; Clothes Dryers; 
Dishwashers) through the Equipment Energy Efficiency (E3) program – an integrated 
program on energy efficiency standards and energy labelling for equipment and appliances 
auspiced by the Commonwealth’s Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards (GEMS) Act 2012 
and aligned with New Zealand Government. Consumer engagement on consumption choices 
is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
As is the case for each of the five chapters covering the key policy areas of the consumer safety 
net, this chapter presents four stages of a policy cycle. The Policy Review presents current 
initiatives seeking to engage consumers in competitive energy markets at national and 
jurisdictional levels. COAG Energy Council, AEMC and AER have strategic priorities aligned 
with this policy objective. Network Tariff reform is an important component of policies that 
seek to put downward pressure on prices by improving utilisation of the grid. However, 
success is predicated on consumer behaviour that is only beginning to be understood. A new 
market institution, Energy Consumers Australia has been formed to promote the consumer 
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interest in energy markets. 
Key Issues are distilled from stakeholder publications in the second stage. These include: 
● price dispersion and the cost of not being engaged in the competitive energy market; 
● obligations on retailers to review tariffs; 
● the impact of the digital divide on energy market engagement; 
● risks and opportunities for vulnerable consumers from tariff reform and smart meters. 
A Policy Analysis stage takes an empirical approach to the key issues. It is clear that 
vulnerability in competitive electricity markets is closely linked to barriers to this ongoing 
exercising of choice.  
The Policy Formulation stage considers the issues and the analysis and recommends balancing 
policy between promoting more engagement and protecting those who are unable or unlikely 
to engage.  
 
4.2 Policy Review  
This outcome is pursued at national and jurisdictional levels. The COAG Energy Council 
priority ‘Empowering Consumers’ is aligned with this policy outcome. A comprehensive reform 
package from the COAG Energy Council and Australian Energy Markets Commission 
(AEMC) known as Power of Choice is delivering a range of measures in order for consumers to 
“make informed choices” about electricity.  These include unwinding cross-subsidies through 
tariff reform, mandating smart meters for new connections from December 2017 and opening 
up competition for metering, energy storage and other customer-side aspects of energy 
markets. The final report of AEMC’s Power of Choice review – giving consumers options in the way 
they use electricity underlines the ongoing role of consumer choice that necessitates this policy 
outcome (AEMC, 2012a): 
The package of reforms will support the electricity market in meeting consumer needs 
over the next 15-20 years. It provides more opportunities for consumers to make 
informed choices about the way they use electricity based on the benefits that end use 
services provide. Ultimately, consumers will be in the best position to decide what 
works for them. 
The AEMC publishes a set of strategic priorities for energy markets every two years. The 
Strategic Priorities for Energy Market Development 2015 (AEMC, 2015a) included a strategic 
priority of: 
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Consumer priority – enabling consumers to make informed decisions in competitive 
retail markets 
This updated the previous consumer priority (AEMC, 2013) of: 
Consumer priority: Strengthening consumer participation and continuing to promote 
competitive retail markets.  
Both statements support the policy outcome of informed and engaged consumers but the 
subtle update reflects a change from encouraging participation to better informing those that 
have chosen to participate. This reflects the maturing of some retail markets over that time27, 
a rapid shift in technological possibilities – particularly battery storage - and the rise of the 
proactive energy consumer or prosumer. However, as will be outlined in this chapter, not 
everyone is willing or able to become a prosumer and this will need to continue to be 
recognised in the regulatory frameworks. 
The most recent version at the time of completing this thesis, split the consumer priority into 
two parts (AEMC, 2017c): 
A market that works for consumers, in terms of prices and participation options; 
Look after vulnerable consumers. 
The ‘delivery’ priorities were summarised for each of these as: 
Better information for better decisions. Empower consumers to participate; 
Get vulnerable consumers onto suitable market offers. Improve concessions. 
This 2017 update followed substantial price rises for the NSW market in particular (the home 
state of the AEMC offices) and the preliminary report of the ACCC retail electricity inquiry. 
The shift in language from ‘informed decisions in competitive retail markets’ to ‘a market that 
works’, and ‘empower consumers’ from ‘participation’ and ‘information’ in the earlier 
versions seem to reflect the lack of confidence that retail electricity markets are working in the 
consumer interest. This waning confidence is certainly consistent with the quite negative 
findings of the separate Victorian market review of 2017 (Thwaites et al., 2017) that ‘consumers 
are not gaining the benefits of a competitive retail market’. 
The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) also sees one of its core functions in retail energy 
markets as being relevant to this policy outcome (AER 2016b): 
Our functions, set out in the National Energy Retail Law, aim to help consumers 
                                               
27 NSW and South-East Queensland adopted the National Energy Customer Framework and de-regulated electricity prices 
over the period 2013-2015 
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engage confidently in the retail market and make well informed choices. 
The AER’s Energy Made Easy website is a key resource and is complemented by jurisdictional 
initiatives such as Victoria’s Energy Compare website, NSW’s Your Energy website and South 
Australian initiatives such as Utilities Literacy Program and ‘The Guide’ (a resource for 
community workers assisting households with utilities affordability)28. 
Energy Made Easy is the government’s energy contract comparison website however, 
according to research commissioned by AEMC, only 16% of households are aware of it 
(Newgate Research, 2016) 
The AEMC’s Energy Consumer Research 2016 also indicated that around 55% of all customers 
had not switched electricity retailer or plan in the last five years. Market segmentation analysis 
revealed similar results (approx. 50%) for the 20% of households considered vulnerable 
(Newgate Research 2016). This suggests that these households are likely to be paying standing 
offer rates and therefore significantly more – typically 10-20% more (as will be shown below) 
- than customers who actively pursue a better market offer29.  
Ultimately, for those unable or unwilling to exercise their power of choice there is a risk of being 
‘left behind’ and the emergence of a ‘two tier energy market’ (ECA, 2017b, p. 11). The high 
proportion of disengaged consumers was reported in AEMC’s 2016 Retail Competition 
Review (AEMC 2016a) with the comment: 
“… there is still a need for a strategic and coordinated approach to enhance customers’ 
awareness of energy use and costs, and the tools available to assist customers to 
access competitive retail market offers and investigate new products and services.” 
The Distribution Network Pricing Arrangements Rule Change is a key component of the Power of 
Choice reform package (AEMC, 2014). The rule change compels network pricing to better 
reflect network congestion (peak demand). As of early 2017, the AER has approved new 
‘monthly peak demand’ tariffs to be available from most Distributors on an ‘opt-in’ basis until 
2020. However, research into the likely voluntary uptake of different pricing structures by 
CSIRO Behavioural Economics team (Stenner et al., 2015) reinforced well-known cognitive 
biases away from “complexity, novelty and risk” and towards “simplicity, familiarity and 
certainty”. 
                                               
28 Guide to electricity, gas and SA Water services For South Australian community workers v2 2017 available from 
www.sa.gov.au/energy/resources  
29 Based on the differences between standing offers and market offers in each jurisdiction reported in AEMC 2016 Residential 
Price Trends Report.  
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The formation of a new energy market institution, Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) in 
January 2015 represents a key milestone in the pursuit of this outcome. ECA describes itself 
as (ECA, 2017b): 
“ … an independent organisation created by the Council of Australian Governments to 
give residential and small business energy consumers a national voice in the energy 
market. We conduct research and analysis, identify issues and work with other 
consumer organisations, ombudsmen, energy companies, regulators and 
governments to improve outcomes for consumers.” 
ECA has articulated a vision of a: 
“sophisticated market for energy services for households and small business” on the 
basis that “consumers are increasingly becoming interactive participants in the energy 
market and are investing in technology to generate, store and ultimately trade 
electricity to manage their consumption and bills.” 
The precise role of ECA in the pursuit of this policy outcome is not yet clear. However, such 
a vision implies the presence of informed and engaged consumers in order to participate and 
so it is likely to feature in strategic priorities as the organisation matures. 
In its options paper for Energy Networks Australia “Supporting Vulnerable Customers”, 
consultants at Houston Kemp  recommended energy network business consider leading in 
the provision of information for all customers on the basis that their regulated monopoly 
status meant they had a relationship with all customers in their region regardless of who each 
customer has as their retailer (Kemp et al., 2015). 
The National Energy Productivity Plan 2015-2030 (NEPP) includes ‘Make Choice Easier’ as a 
key measure owned by COAG Energy Council and Energy Consumers Australia. alongside 
‘support best practice services for vulnerable consumers’. 
So, it is clear from the above that informed and engaged (or even empowered) consumers is a 
priority for a range of stakeholders. However, encouraging participation in a market that, 
according to a number of recent reports outlined in the previous chapter, seems to be failing 
to deliver efficient prices is not a recipe for long term success. It is vitally important to ensure 
that choice is not seen as an outcome in itself. The following section distils key issues from 
stakeholder publications into four key issues. 
 
4.3 Key Issues 
AEMC’s 2016 Retail Competition Review made a number of recommendations relevant to this 
policy outcome (AEMC, 2016a). The AEMC offered to assist a Jurisdiction-lead initiative to 
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coordinate the development of NEM-wide awareness and engagement programs to make it 
easier for customers to access the best options for their circumstances and improve customer 
confidence in the energy markets. AEMC also supported the targeting of vulnerable 
consumers that are not engaged with government or community sector support services and, 
consistent with Chester (2013), to diversify the available information and engagement 
methodologies away from purely online options. 
Expanding on the governance issues considered above, past recommendations have reflected 
a desire to foster stronger relationships between community sector workers (Financial 
Counsellors, Housing Support Workers etc) and energy retailers (including their Hardship 
teams) (National Energy Affordability Roundtable, 2013; SACOSS, 2016b). 
Smart meters and network tariff reform are adding a new layer of distinction between 
customers but are also adding new ways of engaging with households and managing 
consumption.  
The stakeholder literature also includes recommendations for policy to focus on: 
● Jurisdictions coordinating the development of NEM-wide awareness and engagement 
programs to make it easier for customers to access the best options for their 
circumstances and improve customer confidence in the energy markets. (AEMC, 
2016a) 
● Targeting vulnerable customers who are not engaged with the energy market or 
support services (AEMC, 2016a; SACOSS, 2014a) 
● The relationship between vulnerable consumers, their advocates (e.g. community 
workers, financial counsellors) and energy retailers (National Energy Affordability 
Roundtable, 2013; SACOSS, 2016b) 
● The ability of advanced metering to provide more frequent billing and near real time 
consumption and cost information that can minimise bill shock. 
● Diversity in the provision of information and engagement away from purely online 
resources (Chester 2013, National Energy Affordability Roundtable 2013, AEMC 
2016a). 
● Incorporating Behavioural Economics into policy considerations (Stenner et al 2015)  
● Price & Product Information Statements and Bills that clearly separate market-based 
charges (retail and wholesale) from other charges, such as regulated network charges 
and policy costs that apply to all customers within a jurisdiction/network (SVDP, 
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2016c) 
These have been distilled into four priority issues: 
● Price dispersion and the cost of not being active in the competitive energy market 
● Obligations on retailers to review tariffs; 
● Internet access and the digital divide – barriers to accessing information 
● Risks and opportunities for vulnerable consumers from tariff reform and smart meters 
Each of these is analysed further in the following section. 
4.4 Policy Analysis 
4.4.1 Price dispersion and the cost of being disengaged 
Price dispersion is an economics term that refers to the situation where different sellers offer 
(and sustain) different prices for the same good. Recent studies have highlighted the scale of 
price dispersion for electricity and this is analysed further here in the context of vulnerable 
consumers. 
The National Energy Retail Law (NERL) defines the two types of retail energy contracts for 
households and small business: Standard retail contracts and Market retail contracts. The tariffs 
and charges that apply under each contract are referred to as standing offers and market offers 
respectively. The standing offer price will be the regulated price under jurisdictional 
legislation where this remains in force. The National Energy Retail Rules (NERR) sets out the 
minimum conditions of both contract types. 
The difference between standing and market offers is used as the measure of price dispersion 
for electricity. The AEMC 2016 Residential Price Trends Report (AEMC, 2016b) provides 
estimates of the number of households on the standing offer as well as costs of standing offers 
vs indicative market offers for typical levels of consumption in each jurisdiction. This is 
intended to represent the range of prices that the vast majority of households are likely to be 
paying and is summarised in Table 1: 












as % of 
Standing 
Offer 
NSW 5,936 $ 1,199 73% $ 1,403 27% $ 204 15% 
Vic. 4,026 $ 1,099 91% $ 1,358 9% $ 259 19% 
Qld 5,173 $ 1,329 70% $ 1,434 30% $ 105 7% 
SA 5,000 $ 1,487 85% $ 1,693 15% $ 206 12% 
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WA 5,198   $ 1,371 100% -  
Tas. 8,550   $ 1,856 100% -  
NT 6,790   $ 1,789 100% -  
ACT 7,312 $ 1,307 24% $ 1,348 76% $ 41 3% 
Table 1: Summary of Standing offers vs Indicative Market Offers, 2016 (Source AEMC 2016b) 
The Vinnies Tariff Tracking Project is a longitudinal study of retail electricity prices in each of 
the NEM jurisdictions by the Society of St Vincent De Paul and Alviss Consulting. The 
project’s 2016 Summary  illustrates the difference in bills between standing and market offers 
based on a standard 6000 kWh pa consumption in each distribution region (SVDP, 2016b). 






as % of 
Standing Offer 
Citipower $ 1,331 $ 1,671 $ 340 20% 
Powercor $ 1,495 $ 1,879 $ 384 20% 
Ausnet $ 1,604 $ 2,020 $ 416 21% 
Jemena $ 1,485 $ 1,881 $ 396 21% 
United Energy $ 1,399 $ 1,769 $ 370 21% 
ActewAGL $ 1,107 $ 1,264 $ 157 12% 
Aurora $ 1,728 $ 1,728 $ 0 0% 
Energex $ 1,683 $ 1,827 $ 144 8% 
Ausgrid $ 1,468 $ 1,725 $ 257 15% 
Endeavour $ 1,498 $ 1,679 $ 181 11% 
Essential $ 1,752 $ 1,939 187 10% 
SAPN $ 1,926 $ 2,220 294 13% 
Table 2: Summary of Standing offers vs Indicative Market Offers, 2016 (Source: Vinnies 2016a) 
Overall these estimates suggest that in Victoria, indicative price dispersion (i.e. the difference 
between standing and market offers) is around 20% of the standing offer; in NSW and SA it is 
around 10-15% and in QLD it is 5-10%.  
Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) found price dispersion in Victoria’s deregulated retail 
market meant many vulnerable customers were being priced at above efficient costs if they 
were paying standing offer rates. The authors examined customer records for AGL Energy 
(one of Australia’s largest vertically integrated energy retailers with about 30% market share) 
and found that around 5% of AGL’s 530,000 household customers in Victoria were both 
eligible for a concession and still on the standing contract. As can be seen in the preceding 
tables, this indicates that these customers are paying around 20% more than necessary. 
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Table 1 indicates that in the four most populous NEM states (QLD, NSW, VIC, SA include 
85% of Australian households), a majority of customers are on a market offer. However, it is 
also possible to be on a market offer and be paying standing offer rates. Many market offers 
include a ‘fixed benefits period’ – usually one or two years – after which discounts lapse and 
require active intervention from the customer to be reassigned to a competitive offer 
(SACOSS, 2014b; Wood et al., 2017). Evergreen contracts – where the level of discount remains 
ongoing – are rare. Recent research by Newgate for AEMC 2016 Retail Competition Review 
showed that around 55% of all customers have not switched electricity retailer or plan in the 
last five years (AEMC, 2016a; Newgate Research, 2016). This suggests that these households, 
if they have drifted back to standing offer pricing as is likely to be the case, are paying 
significantly more – typically 10-20% more - than customers who actively pursue a better 
offer30. Market segmentation analysis revealed similar results (approx. 50%) for the 20% of 
households considered vulnerable. 
In its review of retail electricity markets, the Grattan Institute (Wood et al., 2017, p. 20) 
concluded: 
The fact that there is a significant price gap between different offers suggests some 
households are paying more than necessary for their electricity, and therefore retailers 
are earning more revenue than necessary to supply those consumers with electricity. 
And finally, if retailers are earning more than necessary to supply consumers with 
electricity, how is that consistent with the legislated objective of directing policy to the 
long-term interest of consumers? 
Conclusions around the regressive impact of price dispersion have also been raised in other 
commentary around excessive profits in the Victorian retail sector (Mountain 2015, 2016; Ben-
David 2015, 2016). Overall, it can be concluded that customers who are not actively engaged 
in the competitive electricity market – around half of all households - are likely to be paying 
in the region of 10-20% more than necessary for their electricity. 
4.4.2 Obligations on retailers to review tariffs 
Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) recommend retailers move concession eligible customers 
off standing contracts and discussed the challenges of obtaining explicit informed consent to 
do so. This invites the question as to what obligations already exist for retailers to review the 
tariffs to which customers are assigned? 
The National Energy Retail Rules (NERR) only requires retailers to review a market contract 
                                               
30 Based on the differences between standing offers and market offers as reported in Table 1 and Table 2 
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if a hardship customer is on a contract that does not allow for Centrepay (automatic 
deductions from Centrelink welfare payments). This is covered by Rule 74(4). Rule 72 refers 
to Payment Plans offered to hardship customers but makes no reference to reviews of 
contracts or tariffs. 
The AER’s 2016 Sustainable Payment Plans Framework refers to the option of a tariff review for 
those customers who are unable to afford ongoing consumption (Option C) (AER, 2016a). In 
its guidance to retailers on hardship policies, the AER has stated, in approving a submitted 
hardship policy, it would consider whether the policy includes information on the 
circumstances under which a retailer will review the appropriateness of a hardship customer’s 
market contract, not just in relation to the Centrepay obligations of the NERR. 
In Victoria, the final report of the Essential Services Commission Hardship Inquiry noted that 
while all 9 retailers surveyed offered tariff reviews to hardship customers, only 5 of the 9 
retailers offered such a review to all payment plan customers (most of which are not part of a 
hardship program) (ESCV, 2016, p. 21). The subsequent Payment Difficulties Framework only 
mandates a tariff review in the case of those customers unable to afford their ongoing 
consumption (ESCV, 2017). 
Overall, it seems clear that, other than for some cases of households identified as in hardship 
or having payment difficulties, energy retailers are not obliged to review tariffs. Combined 
with the analysis above of price dispersion, it seems likely that many vulnerable households 
are paying more than necessary for their energy. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull twice 
summoned energy retailer executives to a meeting in response to these issues in August 2017 
(Turnbull, 2017a, 2017b). Dominant energy retailers AGL Energy, Origin Energy and Energy 
Australia responded with voluntary measures: 
• AGL agreed to write to concession customers on a standing offer to “assess their needs 
and move them to a better plan” (AGL, 2017a) 
• AGL announced a 10 per cent discount off current usage and supply charges for standing 
offer customers in Victoria who have been customers two years or more (AGL, 2017b) 
• Origin announced an automatic discount for Victorian residential concession customers 
on “Origin’s standing and non-discounted contracts” from 1 January 2018 (Origin Energy, 
2017) 
• EnergyAustralia announced “on-bill rebates” for standing offer customers in Victoria 
(EnergyAustralia, 2017) 
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Voluntary measures such as these do not address the structural issues regarding barriers to 
effective competition identified in the preliminary report of the ACCC retail electricity inquiry 
(ACCC, 2017). The AEMC received a rule change request in August 2017 from the 
Commonwealth Government regarding mandatory notification of the end of a fixed benefit 
period in retail contracts. The change was made via the expedited rule change process and 
hence little consultation occurred on the broader issues (AEMC, 2017d). It seems highly likely 
that consumers will want and need further protections and the final report of the ACCC retail 
electricity inquiry may well be the trigger for further rule changes. 
4.4.3 Internet Access and the Digital Divide 
It has been observed in the stakeholder literature that internet access can be a significant 
barrier to engaging with the retail energy market. The key instruments of this policy outcome 
are comparison websites and information portals that are not readily accessible to many in 
the community. 
A number of studies into what is often referred to as the ‘digital divide’ and ‘digital inclusion’ 
have been conducted in recent years (Ogle and Musolino, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016) and an 
Australian Digital Inclusion Index has been published online. 2016 was declared the National 
Year of Digital Inclusion by AustraliaPost and the GoDigi national digital literacy program 
was launched. It is clearly not just an issue relevant to energy but there is potential for overlap 
between digital literacy, utilities literacy and vulnerability as an energy consumer. 
A primary source of data regarding internet access is the ABS product 8146.0 Household Use 
of Information Technology, Australia 2014-15. The report shows that 14% of households in 
Australia were without internet access in 2014-15. The results by state indicate SA and 
Tasmania have higher than average proportions of households without access (17.7% and 
18.4% respectively). A strong indicator is equivalised household income. 33% of households 
in the lowest income quintile are without internet access, 25% of the second. This is shown in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Proportion of households without internet access 2014-15 (Source: ABS 8146.0) 
In terms of persons rather than households, ABS 8146.0 also shows that not using the internet 
is strongly tied to age (Figure 22), lower levels of education and coming from a non-english 
speaking background.  
 
Figure 22: Proportion of individuals who do not use the internet 2014-15 (Source: ABS 8146.0) 
In summary, there is clearly potential for an overlap between the digital divide and 
vulnerability as an energy consumer. Recommendations from stakeholders to go beyond 
purely online resources clearly have merit (Chester, 2013). 
4.4.4 Risks and Opportunities from tariff reform 
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The need to accompany tariff structure changes with information and education has been 
recognized by the COAG Energy Council in their Reform Agenda Implementation Plan (July 
2015): 
Key Action: Support effective communication on the benefits of tariff reform to support 
faster transition and take up of new tariffs 
Further, the COAG Energy Council workplan for the implementation of the National Energy 
Productivity Plan states: 
The Council considers that it is important that reform is introduced in a way that 
supports consumers to make decisions that are best suited to their needs. This 
includes being able to understand new tariffs, how tariffs affect their own 
circumstances and being in a position to respond. This support must include a range 
of supporting tools and targeted communication (Measure 3: Make Choice Easier). 
and; 
The Council recognises that the current market transition with increasing choice in 
energy services, tariffs and technologies can provide strong consumer benefits by 
allowing consumers to choose services which most suit them and providing more 
options in managing energy costs.   
However, this greater choice also increases complexity and could increase risks of bill 
shock for some consumers. Choice needs to be supported by the right tools and 
customer information to avoid adverse impacts. 
The Network Transformation Roadmap work by the CSIRO and Energy Networks Australia 
(2015, 2016) paints a picture of a future grid that reduces emissions, improves security and 
lower costs. It also considers distributional impacts and has provided a useful conception of 
the vulnerable consumer in their vision of the future grid. In this work, vulnerability is used 
to describe customers who are unable to take up opportunities that would enable them to save 
on electricity bills (2016, p11). Vulnerability is further characterised as being ‘service 
dependent’ and being at the opposite end of an empowerment spectrum to the autonomous, 
independent, tech-focussed and empowered customers sometimes referred to the ‘prosumers’ 
(see Figure 23). 
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Figure 23: Example of market segmentation curve for residential customers in 2027 (Source: CSIRO and ENA 
Network Transformation Roadmap 2015, 2016) 
In the context of a policy outcome of informed and engaged consumers, the CSIRO spectrum 
also serves to highlight that being disengaged and disempowered can be strong contributors 
to ‘vulnerability’.  
Also relevant is the CSIRO contribution to network tariff reform. A nation-wide survey 
experiment was conducted in order to better understand how consumers will respond to 
future electricity tariffs. This was one of the first injections of the science of human decision 
making – Behavioural Economics – into the national electricity policy debate. The research 
was clear that relying on a behavioural response to new pricing signals was unlikely to yield 
success in the underlying objective of reducing peak demand. The report states (Stenner et al., 
2015, p. 47): 
… cost-reflective pricing will be more successful the less it relies on consumers, 
themselves, responding to changing price signals. 
The implication being home energy management systems (HEMS) and/or other supportive 
mechanisms would be required to lower peak demand and hence lower costs. In a 2016 speech 
the AEMC clarified that the price signals being sent were intended to be received by retailers 
as the consumer’s agent rather than by consumers directly (AEMC, 2016c, p. 4): 
The role of the networks is to provide cost-reflective pricing. The retailers’ role is to 
take wholesale costs, network charges and other potential energy services such as 
distributed generation or energy management systems, and package these up for 
consumers. In many ways, their job is to be the consumers’ agent for dealing with the 
rest of the system. 
By contrast, an earlier 2015 speech was much clearer that consumer themselves would receive 
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the signal (AEMC, 2015b, p. 4): 
The first piece of the puzzle is getting effective price signals to the consumer. That’s 
where the distribution network pricing rule change comes in – which will come into 
effect from 1 July 2017. 
The AER has also adopted a similar position in their final decisions on the first round of Tariff 
Structure Statements (AER, 2017b, p. 7): 
We consider the main objective of network tariff reform is that retailers are exposed to 
the costs of network congestion. 
Overall, the reality of consumer behaviours and the propensity of the market to profiteer from 
inactive consumers creates a risk of vulnerability for a significant number of households. 
4.5 Policy Formulation 
Key issues can be summarised as: 
● Over half of all households have not switched retailer, or switched plan with their 
existing retailer for at least five years. It is likely that these households are paying 10-
20% more for electricity than necessary. 
● Energy retailers have a critical role in ensuring vulnerable households are on the most 
appropriate tariff but there is presently no explicit obligation to do so. 
● The digital divide – barriers to accessing information technology – is a challenge for 
this policy outcome. The majority of information and tools are online resources but 
complementary measures are needed for the 15% of households (mainly low income 
and or elderly) who do not have internet access (2014-15). 
● The move to advanced metering provides new opportunities for information and 
engagement however, coupled with tariff reform, for some households this could 
exacerbate vulnerability. Behavioural economics acknowledges that price alone is 
unlikely to change consumption patterns. 
The analysis herein shows that vulnerability of consumers is often determined by their ability 
to engage with energy markets – to pursue lower prices or to respond to price signals and 
lower costs. In terms of policy, a pivotal question relates to the extent that the vulnerable are 
encouraged to be more engaged and empowered and the extent to which these households 
may need protection from the cost penalty of being disengaged.  
4.5.1 Priority Issue 2.1: Engagement of vulnerable consumers with energy markets 
The AEMC 2017 Retail Competition review and the ACCC retail electricity pricing inquiry are 
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very important opportunities to advance the interests of vulnerable consumers. Both reviews 
must consider the vulnerable consumer and insights into behavioural economics from the 
CSIRO. The need to engage households on tariff reform is an opportunity to recast 
engagement with consumers but no obvious leader has emerged to date. It is recommended 
that Energy Consumers Australia seek to be the champion of this policy outcome as part of 
the Power Shift project. Priorities include activities and resources that complement the online 
information presence with material suitable for the elderly and those with low levels of 
English literacy and numeracy. 
4.5.2 Priority Issue 2.2: Vulnerable consumers unable to engage with energy markets 
Surveys indicate that half of all customers have not switched retailer or plan in at least five 
years (Newgate Research, 2016). In most cases these customers would have drifted to standing 
offer pricing that is potentially well above the cost to supply. Encouragement to engage and 
switch on a regular basis is not a viable response for many. Similar concerns in the UK energy 
market have led to the reintroduction of price caps for pre-payment meters and calls to extend 
this re-regulation to all vulnerable customers. The ACCC retail inquiry is expected to form 
recommendations in this regard and, following meetings called by the Prime Minister, major 
energy retailers are initiating voluntary actions. A Rule Change would be required in order to 
place a mandatory obligation on retailers to initiate tariff reviews in more cases.  
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered policies that seek to ensure consumers are informed and engaged 
in competitive energy markets. Residential electricity is supplied on a competitive basis in 
NSW, VIC, SA and SE QLD and households need to regularly engage with the market to 
ensure they are receiving a competitively priced supply. This policy outcome therefore 
contributes to affordability by encouraging consumers to find the best priced electricity and 
gas supply available to them. 
Recent research indicates that most households are quite disengaged with the energy market 
and are therefore likely to be paying more than necessary for electricity and gas. Initiatives in 
this category generally focus on online price comparator sites but many low-income 
households and the elderly do not have internet access at home. Behavioural economics is 
providing new insights into consumer decision making that are relevant to responding to 
these issues. Stakeholders have recommended a more coordinated and resourced awareness 
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and engagement effort nationally.  
The Policy Formulation stage recommends balancing policy between promoting more 
engagement and protecting those who are unable or unlikely to engage. The primary 
recommendation in this regard is to protect the vulnerable with a mandatory obligation on 
retailers to ensure households are not paying standing offer rates unnecessarily. 
It is critical to acknowledge that choice is not an outcome in itself. Electricity policy should be 
focussed on delivering efficient prices and consumers making informed decisions around 
consumption. The need to protect consumers from prices above efficient levels exposes a key 
limitation of reliance on competition to deliver these efficient prices. 
The safety net policy outcomes of Stable and Efficient Pricing and Informed and Engaged 
consumers in this and the preceding chapter focus on the cost of energy supply. The following 
chapter shifts the focus to how electricity is consumed and the potential this has to enhance 
affordability and contribute to the strength of the safety net. 
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5 Policy outcome: Energy consumed efficiently and productively 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter considers policies that affect the energy consumption of households. 
Consumption is influenced by a range of factors including the size, age and health of both the 
dwelling and the people in it, the equipment and appliances in use, the knowledge and 
information available to the household and their behaviours. 
The overall aim of the national electricity market has been stated as “… to provide a reliable, 
secure energy supply at the best price for consumers” (AEMC, 2017b). This policy outcome 
contributes to affordability by encouraging and supporting consumers to get the best ‘value’ 
from their energy expenditure. For a long time this has been largely referred to as energy 
efficiency but is now framed as energy productivity. It is not the same as encouraging consumers 
to use less energy (energy conservation, although this may be the outcome) but to aim for 
consuming as little energy as possible to achieve the ‘energy services’ they need or want. An 
example that illustrates this would be the installation of an efficient air-conditioner and 
insulation in the home of someone whose health is compromised by hot weather even if this 
increases consumption31. The shift in focus from purely efficiency to productivity also reflects 
nascent changes in electricity tariff structure that ensure electricity savings have different 
‘value’ depending when they occur. Savings at peak times will increasingly have greater value 
than off-peak times. 
As is the case for each of the five chapters covering the key policy areas of the consumer safety 
net, this chapter presents four stages of a policy cycle. The Policy Review presents current 
initiatives seeking to influence consumption choices by households. This policy outcome has 
the COAG Energy Council’s ‘National Energy Productivity Plan 2015–2030’ (NEPP) as the 
centrepiece national policy initiative. Related policy initiatives include consumer protection 
measures such as Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) for appliances and new 
housing as well as a number of state and territory programs that seek to engage households 
and change consumption decisions and behaviours. Recent national data illustrates how 
households are consuming less energy from the grid through a combination of rooftop solar 
PV and energy efficiency improvements in appliances and the housing stock. 
There is a long history of energy policy and program activity in this area and the state and 
                                               
31 This was trialled by Uniting Communities in private rental properties in Adelaide a project called Beat the Heat! as part of 
the Low Income Energy Efficiency Program (LIEEP) - www.unitingcommunities.org/find-a-service/services/beat-heat-project/  
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national level and many have had some focus on low-income households32. However, the 
short-term and discontinuous nature of government funding has frustrated many 
stakeholders. 
Key Issues are distilled from stakeholder publications in the next stage. These include: 
● Understanding Load profiles and dynamic pricing 
● Minimum energy performance standards of housing and appliances 
● Best practice policies and programs (including access to efficient appliances) 
● Distributed Energy Resources (DER) 
The Policy Analysis stage takes the form of a case study of three households and an analysis of 
consumption patterns and tariff outcomes under newly published ‘cost reflective’ network 
tariffs. This case study also considers the impacts of solar power on each household 
consumption pattern and confirms that the financial return on solar is diminished under these 
new tariff structures. 
The Policy Formulation stage considers the issues and the analysis and then makes 
recommendations in each of four priority areas: 
5.2 Policy Review 
Relevant COAG Energy Council priorities are: 
● Empowering Consumers 
● Energy and Carbon Policy 
The COAG Energy Council’s ‘National Energy Productivity Plan 2015–2030’ (NEPP) was 
released in December 2015 and is the centrepiece of national policy on energy consumption. 
The plan also has a headline target of a 40% improvement in Australia’s energy productivity 
by 2030. This economy-wide measure is expressed as the ratio of economic output (measured 
as GDP) to primary energy used. The NEPP states two main intended outcomes:  
Energy consumers that are able to effectively manage their energy costs and are 
engaged in improving the productivity of their energy use; and  
An energy system (including electricity, gas and transport fuels) that delivers least cost 
                                               
32 For example: The Australian Greenhouse Office’s Cool Communities program ran from 2001 to 2004 and facilitated 
numerous community scale energy and greenhouse projects; the Green Start program was axed after seeking proposals but 
before implementation in 2010; The Low Income Energy Efficiency Program (LIEEP) was announced in July 2011 and finally 
closed on 30 June 2016 http://www.environment.gov.au/energy/programs The Home Energy Saver Scheme (HESS) ran from 
2012 to 2014. 
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energy in the long term interests of consumers  
The engaged consumer is a policy outcome discussed in the previous chapter in relation to 
competitive energy markets. Here, the overlap of scope means that engagement extends to 
how energy is used.  
The idea of a least cost energy system can be scaled down to the household level and 
interpreted as the equipment and appliances that receive, produce, store and use energy in 
the home. In relation to major appliances, the Equipment Energy Efficiency (E3) Program is 
the principal initiative. The E3 program is underpinned by the Greenhouse and Energy 
Minimum Standards (GEMS) Act 2012 and implements iterative improvements to minimum 
energy performance of products sold in Australia and New Zealand but also requires labelling 
of the energy (and water) performance of products. 
Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) are intended to protect consumers from 
purchasing highly inefficient products. The Energy Rating Label (ERL) is intended to inform 
consumers at the point of sale about the likely energy consumption of Air Conditioners, 
Televisions, Computer Monitors, Refrigerators; Freezers; Clothes Washers; Clothes Dryers; 
Dishwashers. MEPS apply to most of these items as well as the ERL. A number of product 
categories have MEPS without an ERL requirement including: 3-phase electric motors, Gas 
and Electric Storage Water Heaters, incandescent and fluorescent lamps and ballasts. 
The NEPP refers to measures such as MEPS, the E3 program and the energy provisions of the 
National Construction Code as consumer protection measures (CoA, 2016, p. 14): 
Where the market does not provide efficient minimum services and adequate 
protections for consumers, there is a role for government measures, such as standards 
for equipment, appliances and buildings and service requirements for consumers. 
In relation to vulnerable consumers, the NEPP includes a measure ‘Support best practice 
services for vulnerable consumers’: 
Vulnerable consumers (indigenous, low income earners, remote, elderly) need 
additional assistance beyond those in Measure 3 [“Make choice easier”]. Based on 
recent research, a best practice voluntary guideline for service providers will be 
developed with Energy Consumers Australia and stakeholders, which will seek to 
reduce the barriers to vulnerable consumers effectively engaging with energy 
productivity measures and services. 
The accompanying Work Plan provided further detail: 
The Commonwealth is currently supporting a wide range of valuable research-based 
pilots on delivering better energy productivity services to support different vulnerable 
consumer groups. These include pilots with indigenous communities, refugees, remote 
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and regional groups, the elderly and young consumers, and low income groups. 
Building on these pilots, the Commonwealth commits to working with Energy 
Consumers Australia and stakeholders to develop a best practice voluntary guideline 
for service providers aimed at reducing the barriers to vulnerable consumers effectively 
engaging with energy productivity measures and services. 
The pilots referred to are the projects of the Low Income Efficiency Program (LIEEP). LIEEP 
provided grants to 20 different consortia of government, business and community 
organisations to trial approaches to improve the energy efficiency of low income households 
and enable them to better manage their energy use. The review and complementary research 
by ECA is known as Power Shift. Intended outcomes include: 
● Improved, evidence-based understanding of what really works in supporting 
vulnerable consumers to manage their energy bills. 
● Identification of opportunities for market-led solutions and other initiatives to support 
vulnerable consumers to manage their energy bills.  
Community sector support for the ECA’s Power Shift initiative would build on practical 
experience in delivering energy programs (such as LIEEP and the Home Energy Savings 
Scheme, HESS). Overall though, a focus for leadership is missing. For example, there is no 
Australian equivalent of UK fuel poverty charity National Energy Action. 
A number of jurisdictions have energy efficiency programs in place that include low-income 
households as a target audience such the NSW Home Energy Action Program and the SA 
Retailer Energy Efficiency Scheme. Victoria has flagged an Energy Efficiency and Productivity 
Strategy and held an Energy Efficiency and Productivity Summit in 2015.  
The Energy Efficiency Council (EEC) is Australia’s peak body for energy efficiency, 
cogeneration and demand management. The EEC released a comprehensive Policy Handbook 
in support of the NEPP in mid-2016 and has called for a National Energy Efficiency and 
Productivity Agency (EEC, 2016). In relation to vulnerable household consumers, the 
handbook includes the following policy recommendations: 
● Develop a national residential energy efficiency disclosure scheme 
● Introduce minimum standards for rental properties 
● Upgrade public and community housing 
● Expand and review partnership programs to support vulnerable households 
● Research and trial programs to encourage energy efficient building renovations 
● Research and trial programs to improve the efficiency of multi-dwelling buildings 
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Following the introduction of mandatory standards for rental properties in the UK and New 
Zealand, resurgent interest in minimum energy performance standards for rental properties 
in particular is becoming evident in Australia (BSL et al, 2016). The NSW Government 
consulted on options to improve energy performance of tenanted homes, including minimum 
standards and incentives for landlords (OEH, 2016). The current review of the Victorian 
Residential Tenancies Act has also seen support for minimum standards of energy and water 
efficiency (Victoria State Government, 2016, p. 4). 
Community Energy initiatives provide opportunities for households to engage more 
personally in meeting their energy needs and are continuing to test and evolve governance 
models33. A national Community Energy Strategy was released in 2015 to develop a shared 
agenda to grow the Community Energy Sector in Australia. The Renewables 4 All advocacy 
project was funded by ECA and developed policy briefings on a range of topics that extend 
access to renewables to low-income and vulnerable households (CPA, 2016). The Queensland 
Disability Network Bright Sparks program is an example of peer education to engage a 
community of interest on energy market issues. 
5.2.1 Recent modelling of future electricity consumption 
The AEMO National Electricity Forecasting Report 2016 was released in June 2016 to provide 
electricity consumption forecasts over the 20 years to 2036. The projections incorporate a 
directive from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Energy Council that the 
contribution of the electricity sector should be consistent with national emission reduction 
targets: a 28% reduction from 2005 levels by 2030. For the 2016 NEFR, AEMO assumed the 
achievement of this target will be supported by energy efficiency trends (driven by the 40% 
improvement in energy productivity between 2016 and 2030 targeted by the National Energy 
Productivity Plan (NEPP)), rising electricity prices and retirements of coal-fired generators.  
The 2016 NEFR is the first to project residential demand as a separate category and reveal a 
period of unprecedented reduction in per capita consumption. The forecasts assume 27% 
more residential connections over the 20 year forecast period. However, overall residential 
consumption from the grid is forecast to reduce by 16% in the 20-year forecast period (0.9% 
average annual change). Population growth and appliance uptake continue to drive increased 
consumption but their effect is more than offset by the forecasts for continuing investment in 
                                               
33 See for example the Coalition for Community Energy (C4CE)  
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rooftop PV and energy efficient appliances (See Figure 24, below).  
 
Figure 24: Residential operational consumption 2016-36, all NEM regions (Source: AEMO NEFR 2016 Figure 3) 
 
5.3 Key Issues 
This section distils key issues from stakeholder publications into four priority issues. 
Consumption is influenced by a range of factors including the size, age and health of both the 
dwelling and the people in it, the equipment and appliances in use, the knowledge and 
information available to the household and their behaviours. The Australian Energy 
Regulator’s Energy Bill Benchmarking program commissioned research into the drivers of 
consumption from ACIL Allen Consulting in 2014 and 2017. The results of a nationwide 
survey and matching billing data confirmed the findings of regression analyses by others that 
the strongest indicator of annual consumption is the number of people in the household (Cao 
et al., 2014). 
Looking forward, the timing of consumption is expected to become increasingly reflected in 
prices and hence costs. In this respect, consumption patterns – not just total consumption – 
will drive energy bills.  
Dwelling energy performance has been the focus of a number of policy recommendations in 
recent times. This includes disclosure for all residential buildings and the setting of minimum 
standards for rental properties (ACF et al., 2007; EEC, 2016; SVDP, 2016a). A focus on 
overcoming the landlord-tenant split incentive in rental properties (public and private) has 
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been a recurring theme (ACF et al., 2007; KPMG et al., 2016; National Energy Affordability 
Roundtable, 2013). The 2010 report of the (then) Prime Minister’s Task Group on Energy 
Efficiency stated (p 35): 
In other sectors improvements will be difficult unless several barriers are removed 
simultaneously. For example, a low-income family in a rented home will need access 
to finance, removal of the split incentive, and information about what their options are 
before they can make changes to their energy use. Providing only one of these will not 
be enough. Faced with this combination, they may well decide that making any change 
is too hard…This range of experiences of the barriers to improving energy efficiency 
calls for an integrated strategy to remove multiple barriers so that measures to target 
specific barriers also work together effectively.  
The landlord-tenant split incentive is a well-known principal-agent problem. The policy logic 
of minimum energy performance standards as a consumer protection measure could extend 
to the rental market. The policy challenge lies in developing a cost-effective response that 
doesn’t put upward pressure on rents. 
The following is a summary of recommendations from stakeholder literature relevant to 
vulnerable households and energy consumption: 
● Overcoming landlord-tenant split incentives in rental properties (public and private). 
● Regulation of dwelling energy performance - minimum standards for rental properties 
● Regulation of dwelling energy performance - disclosure for all residential buildings at 
point of sale. 
● Regulation of dwelling energy performance – tougher minimum standards for all new 
properties. 
● Supporting access to Distributed Energy Resources for vulnerable households. 
● Jurisdictions coordinating the development of NEM-wide awareness and engagement 
programs to make it easier for customers to access the best options for their 
circumstances and improve customer confidence in the energy markets (AEMC, 
2016a).  
● Coordination of state-based programs, incorporation of the implications of tariff 
reform and the pursuit of best practice 
● Increased support for vulnerable households to access more efficient capital items 
● Pursuing best practice in energy efficiency and productivity programs for vulnerable 
customers (including supporting ECA’s Power Shift project) 
● On-going funding for effective energy programs that target vulnerable consumers. 
● A National Energy Efficiency and Productivity Agency 
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● The coordination of state-based programs, incorporation of the implications of tariff 
reform and the pursuit of best practice has been recommended by a number of 
stakeholders (EEC, 2016; National Energy Affordability Roundtable, 2013; Owen, 2013; 
SVDP, 2016a). 
Recommendations have also been made to increase the support for vulnerable households to 
be able to access more efficient capital items such as large appliances (Chester, 2013; National 
Energy Affordability Roundtable, 2013; Simshauser et al., 2011b). 
Energy Innovation thinktank the Rocky Mountain Institute cited Distributed Energy 
Resources for Low Income households as one of eight key electricity innovations to watch in 
2017. 
“In 2017, with the decrease in the costs of DERs coupled with smartphone-enabled engagement 
pathways (including pay-by-phone, electronic billing, and pre-pay), utilities, regulators, and 
others are revisiting whether they can serve these customers better with DERs than with 
subsidies.” 
Locally, the STUCCO Student Cooperative provides an example of a consumer-led solar plus 
storage embedded network that lowers the electricity bills of 40 student residents. Public 
housing providers in NSW, QLD and SA have announced solar programs for public housing. 
These recommendations have been distilled into four key issues. 
● Understanding Load profiles and dynamic pricing 
● Minimum energy performance standards of housing and appliances 
● Best practice policies and programs (including access to efficient appliances) 
● Distributed Energy Resources (DER) 
Load profiles are analysed further in a case study of the impacts of cost reflective tariffs on 
three different households in order to illustrate the opportunities, and risks, of a redistribution 
of costs from the introduction of tariffs tied to peak demands. 
5.4 Case Study: A tale of three households and a changing electricity market 
The changes to the rules around network pricing and the ongoing introduction of smarter 
metering will redistribute the costs of electricity networks (around half of the typical 
household electricity bill) on a more ‘user pays’ basis. The AER has approved the first set of 
‘cost reflective tariffs’ proposed by the NEM distribution businesses and they are largely 
similar: a monthly ‘peak demand’ charge has been added that applies to the maximum 
demand recorded in a half hour period. 
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This case study contrasts the implications of new ‘cost-reflective’ network tariff structures for 
three households – referred to A, B & C and shows quite different outcomes in each case. It 
also considers the network cost implications of adding solar power. 
 Household A Household B Household C 
Annual Consumption (kWh) 4,806 4,806 9,612 
MD (kW) 5.7 3.6 5.5 
Load Factor 10% 15% 20% 
RSR tariff $ 833 $ 833 $ 1,621 
MRD tariff $ 1,038 $ 824 $ 1,336 
Change (RSR to MRD) 
+ $ 205 - $ 9 -$ 285 
25% -1% -18% 
Table 3: Comparison of Network Charges between three example households under two tariff structures 
The case study households are located in Adelaide, South Australia and are connected to the 
SA Power Networks distribution network. This example is therefore based on SA Power 
Networks new ‘MRD’ residential monthly demand tariff that will be available from July 2017. 
The analysis is based on half-hourly interval data for these households made available by SA 
Power Networks during consultation on their 2017-20 Tariff Structures Statement. 
The new SA Power Networks tariff introduces a charge based on the household’s peak 
demand in each month. Peak demand is measured during the hours of 4-9PM local time every 
day. A seasonal component is based on Nov-Mar being the peak period and attracts a higher 
charge per kW of maximum demand per month than for the ‘shoulder’ period of April to 
October. 
This case study is intended to be illustrative rather than predictive or comprehensive – a range 
of consumption patterns exist and will result in a diversity of outcomes. It is however a valid 
example using actual consumption patterns in context. 
To the extent that the new network tariffs are more ‘cost reflective’ than the historic 
consumption-based tariffs, the different cost outcomes for these two households must also 
reflect a ‘cross subsidy’ currently in existence in the present consumption-based charging for 
use of the network. In terms of electricity network charges (approximately 50% of the typical 
bill), a ‘cross subsidy’ exists when the revenue collected from a customer or group of 
customers is insufficient to cover the cost to serve these same customers. A cross-subsidy is 
then paid by other customers to cover this shortfall by charging these other customers more 
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than their cost to serve. 
There are two principal customer attributes that are drivers of network costs and hence two 
principal sources of cross subsidies in residential electricity pricing – Location and Peak 
Demand. These are discussed further in a section on cross subsidies. 
5.4.1 Understanding load profiles 
Household energy consumption is influenced by a range of factors including the size, age and 
health of both the dwelling and the people in it, the equipment and appliances in use, the 
knowledge and information available to the household and their behaviours.  
As stated above, the timing of consumption is expected to become increasingly reflected in 
prices and hence costs. In this respect, consumption patterns – not just total consumption – 
will drive energy bills.  
Simshauser & Downer (2014) analysed consumption patterns for households on AGL 
Energy’s hardship program and observed higher than average total consumption 
(approximately one-third more) but with consumption patterns that were less ‘peaky’ than 
the average (an increase in average maximum demand of approximately 20%) and lower cost 
to supply under some cost reflective tariffs. This is illustrated in Figure 25: 
 
Figure 25: Annual average weekday load curve: Household in Hardship (Source: Simshauser & Downer 2014 
Figure 6) 
Recent analysis by ESC Victoria confirms that hardship customers tend to consume around 
twice the average volume of electricity (ESCV, 2016). Customers on retailer hardship 
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programs represent less than 1% of residential customers (AER, 2017a) and are not necessarily 
representative of all customers considered vulnerable. It is also not possible to conclude 
whether higher than average consumption is due to poor efficiency, poor quality housing or 
simply from having a large number of people in the household.  
The research by Simshauser & Downer (2014) also developed indicative load profiles for a 
number of household types. These are reproduced below. Of particular interest is the similar 
shape in each case. The profile of Figure 26 shows the consumption of a household that is 
rarely occupied during the day – clearly consuming less during school and business hours but 
not necessarily having lower peaks in the morning or evening. 
 
Figure 26: Annual average weekday load curve: Working couple NO kids (Source: Simshauser & Downer 2014 
Figure 3) 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the impact of adding children to the profile. Here, the intensity of 
consumption around mealtimes becomes quite pronounced. 
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Figure 27: Annual average weekday load curve: Working parents with kids (Source: Simshauser & Downer 2014 
Figure 4) 
Figure 28 illustrates the impact of having the home occupied during the day: a similar shape 
but with more of a bridge between the morning and evening peaks. 
 
Figure 28: Annual average weekday load curve: Family, parent at home (Source: Simshauser & Downer 2014 
Figure 5) 
Figure 29 illustrates an average profile for concession and pensioner households that has 
obvious similarities to the others but with less pronounced peaks in the morning and evening. 
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Figure 29: Annual average weekday load curve: Concession & Pensioner Households (Source: Simshauser & 
Downer 2014 Figure 7) 
These average profiles are of interest but will inevitably hide a level of detail. The following 
section takes the actual consumption profiles of three households and examines the impact of 
different load profiles on the energy bills under new, cost reflective network tariffs.  
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5.4.2 The case-study households 
Household A is understood to be a ‘working family’ that uses reverse-
cycle air-conditioning for cooling and heating. This results in a relatively 
peaky consumption pattern at the end of each day as illustrated in the 
average load profiles of Figure 30 for the peak demand charging months 
of November to March and, even more so in the average load profiles for 
what SA Power Networks refer to as the Shoulder demand months of 
April to October. Household A has a relatively low ‘load factor’ – the ratio 
of average to peak demand –of 10%. 
 
Summary Household A 
Annual Consumption (kWh) 4,806 
MD (kW) 5.7 
Load Factor 10% 
Network Charges 17/18 RSR $ 833 
 
Table 4: Network cost summary, Household A 
 
Figure 30: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals Nov to Mar vs Apr-Oct – Household A 
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Household B is understood to be occupied during the day and uses an 
evaporative cooler and gas for heating. This results in a relatively flat 
consumption pattern with an, on average, increase in electricity use 
around the early evening. Household B has a relatively average ‘load 
factor’ – the ratio of average to peak demand –of 15%. 
Summary Household B 
Annual Consumption (kWh) 4,806 
MD (kW) 3.6 
Load Factor 15% 
Network Charges 17/18 RSR $ 833 
Table 5: Network cost summary, Household B 
 
 
Figure 31: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals Nov to Mar vs Apr-Oct – Household B 
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Household C is understood to be an all-electric home with ducted reverse 
cycle air conditioning. This results in an average load that is higher 
overnight than during the day during the winter months. Household C 
has a relatively high ‘load factor’ of 20%. 
 
Summary Household C 
Annual Consumption (kWh) 9,612 
MD (kW) 5.5 
Load Factor 20% 
Network Charges 17/18 RSR $ 1,621 
Table 6: Network cost summary, Household C 
 
 
Figure 32: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals Nov to Mar vs Apr-Oct – Household C 
 
Combined, these diverse seasonal profiles for the three households are shown below: 
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Figure 33: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals: Summer months of Nov to Mar – Households 
A, B and C 
 
Figure 34: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals: Winter months of April-October – Households 
A, B and C 
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5.4.3 Methodology overview 
A full year’s consumption data for these three households has been used to determine the 
network charges payable under SA Power Networks standard residential tariff and their new 
cost reflective monthly demand tariff. The consumption data has been provided as a time 
series of half-hourly consumption (expressed as kW over the half hour) from 2013-14. 
The impact of solar on each load profile and the network charges payable is evaluated by 
adding a synthetic annual time-series of solar PV production for Adelaide using the 
PVWatts® calculator from the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). A simple 
spreadsheet tool is then used to combine the consumption and solar time series and develop 
the net load presented to the grid.  
In order to allow for like-for-like comparisons of outcomes, the consumption profile of 
Household A has been scaled up from its original 4,100 kWh pa to the 4,806 kWh of Household 
B (approx. the mean consumption of households in SA). Importantly this preserves the 
relationship between kW and kWh. Household C has been scaled from the original 11,271 
kWh pa to 9,612 kWh – exactly double that of Households A and B. 
5.4.4 The new tariffs 
The first round of Tariff Structure Statements have been approved by the AER and a summary 
of the initial residential pricing structures is included in Table 7. 
The basic tariff structure is similar in most cases. A simplified representation of the tariff is: 
NUoS = S + P1 * kW + P2 * kWh 
Where: 
NUoS = the aggregate network charge payable by the customer per month ($ per 
month) 
S = a fixed supply charge ($ per day) 
P1 = a price charged per kW of the maximum demand recorded during a specified 
charging window on specified days of the week during the month in question ($/kW) 
P2 = a price charged per kWh of consumption during the month in question ($/kWh) 
As will be demonstrated for the households of the case study, the difference in outcomes 
pivots on the relationship between ‘kW’ and ‘kWh’: the lower the ‘kW’ for a given ‘kWh’, the 
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lower the costs under these new tariff structures. This is a central concept when developing 
public policy on energy consumption and energy affordability for vulnerable households in 
the future electricity market. 
 
Table 7: New residential tariffs being offered in 2017 in each NEM jurisdiction 
5.4.5 Tariff outcomes 
The network tariffs used for the comparison are those proposed by SA Power Networks and 
approved by the AER for South Australian residential customers in 2017-18. These are: 
RSR – Residential Single Rate. This is the default tariff option and is a two-part inclining block 
tariff with a fixed supply charge of $0.4268 per day or $155.78 pa (including GST). The first 
4000 kWh per annum is priced at $0.1364 per kWh, consumption in excess of 4000 kWh per 
annum is priced at $0.1639 per kWh 
MRD – Monthly actual kW Demand. This is an opt-in tariff that charges the same fixed supply 
charge as RSR but includes a monthly peak demand charge (measured as the highest half-
hourly demand between 4pm and 9pm local time) priced at $0.429 per kW per day for 
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November to March and approximately half that rate, $0.2123/kW per day, for the seven 
months from April to October each year. A volume charge of $0.0671/kWh also applies. 
The interval data for the two households was interrogated to determine the charging 
parameters for each tariff. In both cases, since their annual consumption is scaled to be 
identical, their network charges under RSR is $833 ea.  
On the MRD tariff, Household A sees quite an increase in network charges: up 25% to $1038 
while Household B experiences a small 1% decrease to $824. This is due to the higher monthly 
maximum demand for Household A of close to 5 kW compared to Household B’s 3 kW. 
 Household A Household B Household C 
Annual Consumption (kWh) 4,806 4,806 9,612 
MD (kW) 5.7 3.6 5.5 
Load Factor 10% 15% 20% 
RSR tariff $ 833 $ 833 $ 1,621 
MRD tariff $ 1,038 $ 824 $ 1,336 
Change (RSR to MRD) 
+ $ 205 - $ 9 -$ 285 
25% -1% -18% 
Table 8: Comparison of Network Charges between four example households under two tariff structures 
It is also worth noting that the combined network charges under the two tariff options yield 
quite similar totals for these examples ($ 3,288 on RSR vs. $ 3,198 on MRD) but the reallocation 
of costs away from Household C to Household A is obvious in Figure 35: 
 
Figure 35: Network Charges incurred under two tariff structures by four example consumption patterns 
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The outcome of transferring households A and B to the new MRD tariff and without any 
changes to consumption patterns is to go from paying identical network charges to a 
difference in costs of $214 per annum – 26% of the $833 payable under the consumption based 
tariff RSR.  
The only different parameter for these two households is the measure of monthly maximum 
demand. The billable demand quantities for each household are shown in Figure 36, where 
the seasonal peaks of Household A and C suggest a strong influence from heating and cooling 
equipment in both cases.  
 
Figure 36: Maximum monthly half-hourly demand measured 4-9PM 2013-14 – Households A, B & C 
Household A and C have very similar monthly peak demand but C has twice the annual 
consumption of A. Under the RSR tariff, C pays almost double that of Household A (+ 95%) 
but under the MRD demand tariff, C pays only 29% more than A. The effective ‘average price’ 
per kWh for Household A is nearly 22c/kWh whereas for D the effective average price is 
around two-thirds that at 14c/kWh.  
For our two households with identical consumption A & B, B has a peak demand34 of around 
64% of A and ends up paying 80% of the network charges of A.  
This represents a significant redistribution of costs and, if these tariffs are indeed ‘cost 
reflective’, must represent an unwinding of a cross subsidy. However, both customers now 
                                               
34 Represented by the energy consumed across a half-hour measurement interval and expressed in kW 
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also face the same ‘cost of capacity’ for future investments in the form of the $/kW per month 
demand charge. This is intended to reflect the long run marginal cost of expanding the 
electricity network and ensure that consumers see the true cost of expanding the network to 
meet any new demand (such as a new airconditioner). A more ‘user pays’ approach as 
intended. 
The following chart shows that by annualising the demand charges (seasonal charges are 
averaged over the year), the tariffs signal a year-round average ‘cost of capacity’ in the 
residential market of between $50 and $120 per kW per annum depending on which 
distribution network you connect to. Note that TasNetworks sends the strongest signal in that 
regard but does so with without any consumption charges. All of the other businesses also 
charge a c/kWh component. 
 
Figure 37: Annualised demand charges 2017-18 NEM Distribution Network Service Providers ($/kW) 
The AER has approved these tariffs and uptake will be on an opt-in basis until 2020 at least. 
The uptake of tariffs over this time-frame will provide insights as to the appetite of households 
and retailers to embrace their potential.  
Next, the impact of each of these households adding solar is investigated. 
5.4.6 The impact of solar on bills under a demand tariff 
In this section, the impact on consumption patterns of adding a 2kW solar array to each 
dwelling is investigated. An annual time-series of solar PV production for Adelaide has been 
generated from PVWatts® and netted off the load profiles to simulate the effect of adding 
2kW of solar PV to each case. The PVWatts® time series includes the hour by hour, day to day 
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and seasonal variations in output that would be expected in a real installation. 
The average annual daily electricity profile for the two households and a 2kW solar system 
(facing North inclined at 30o) are shown below in Figure 38 for the peak demand charging 
months of November to March and for the shoulder months of April to October in Figure 39: 
 
Figure 38: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals: Nov to Mar – A, B and C 
 
Figure 39: Average daily load profile across 48 half-hour intervals: April-October –A, B and C 
Household A and B consume 4,806 kWh per annum. Household C consumes twice as much. 
With the same 2kW solar array, analysis of load profile interaction shows that for the data 
analysed: 
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• Household A: grid consumption reduces by 18% and ‘self-consumption’ is 36% of the 
solar output, 
• Household B: grid consumption reduces by 31% and ‘self-consumption’ is 62% 
• Household C: grid consumption reduces by 11% and ‘self-consumption’ is 46% 
Clearly, Household B is best able to make use of this solar power system – even more so than 
Household C since even though C has twice the consumption, this is largely overnight and 
unable to utilise the solar production without energy storage. The impact on network charges 
under each tariff (RSR and MRD) is then compared in Table 9. The impact of solar under the 
demand tariff in each case is less than half that under the exiting tariff structure. 
 
No Solar 2kW solar Impact of 2kW 
RSR MRD RSR MRD RSR MRD 
Household A $ 833 $ 1,038 $ 694 $ 977 -$ 140 +$ 61 
Household B $ 833 $ 824 $ 609 $ 723 -$ 224 -$ 101 
Household C $ 1,621 $ 1,336 $ 1,441 $ 1,260 -$ 180 -$ 76 
Table 9: Comparison of Network Charges under two tariff structures and with 2kW solar 
The misalignment of the solar profile and Household A’s profile evident in Figure 38 and the 
poor ‘self-consumption’ of 36% is reflected in the impact on network charges for Household 
A: 
• A 2kW solar array on Household A would see a 20% reduction in Network Charges 
on the RSR tariff to $ 694. 
• A 2kW solar array on Household A would see a 6% reduction in Network Charges on 
the MRD tariff to $ 977 
• Adding 2kW of solar and changing to the demand tariff would increase network 
charges by 17% for Household A – approximately $144 
The relatively better alignment of the solar profile and Household B’s profile evident in Figure 
38 and Figure 39 is reflected in the relative impact on network charges for Household B: 
• A 2kW solar array on Household B would see a 37% reduction in Network Charges on 
the RSR tariff to $609. 
• A 2kW solar array on Household B would see a 13% reduction in Network Charges on 
the MRD tariff to $723 
• Adding solar and changing to the demand tariff would decrease network charges by 
13% for Household B – approximately $110 per annum. 
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The alignment of the average solar profile and Household C’s average profile in Figure 38 
appears to be quite good but detailed analysis shows relatively modest impacts on network 
charges: 
• A 2kW solar array on Household C would see a 12% reduction in Network Charges 
on the RSR tariff to $1441. 
• A 2kW solar array on Household C would see a 6% reduction in Network Charges on 
the MRD tariff to $ 1260 
• Adding 2kW solar and changing to the demand tariff would decrease network charges 
by 22% for Household C – approximately $ 362 per annum. 
Interestingly, doubling the size of the solar PV system does not double the reduction in 
network charges: 
• A 4kW solar array on Household C would see a 20% reduction in Network Charges 
on the RSR tariff to $1348. 
• A 4kW solar array on Household C would see a 9% reduction in Network Charges on 
the MRD tariff to $ 1260 
• Adding 4kW solar and changing to the demand tariff would decrease network charges 
by 25% for Household C – approximately $ 401 per annum. 
In terms of network charges, the same solar system delivers a better financial return to 
Household B than either A or C. It is also clear that solar does little to improve the 
consumption profile of Household A. 
5.4.7 Implications 
The AER has approved these tariffs and uptake will be on an opt-in basis until 2020 at least. 
The uptake of tariffs over this time-frame will provide insights as to the appetite of households 
and retailers to embrace their potential.  
Simshauser & Downer (2014) argue that many customers on retailer hardship programs 
would in fact see a reduction in costs under cost reflective network pricing. Our Household C 
is an example of that. However, as demonstrated, our Household A is an example of a 
household with only median consumption that is likely to see significant increases. If 
Household A was already vulnerable and unable to afford any further increase in energy bills, 
what could be done to change their consumption patterns to be more like B or C and lower 
their bills? Are these measures cost effective? Do they require access to capital? These and 
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other questions will need to be answered in order to inform future policies geared towards 
the consumption patterns of vulnerable households. 
Given the variation in cost impacts from the case studies, the establishment of a set of 
‘benchmark’ load profiles would be a useful addition to the tools available to policymakers 
and consumers seeking to understand the distributional impacts of tariff reforms. It is 
understood that the CSIRO selected sample customer load profiles for the Network 
Transformation Roadmap (CSIRO, 2017) from the Solar Cities program and this may be a 
reliable place to start. 
Cross subsidies 
In terms of electricity network charges (approximately 45% of the typical bill), a cross subsidy 
exists when the revenue collected from a customer or group of customers is insufficient to 
cover the cost to serve these same customers. A subsidy is then paid by other customers to 
cover this shortfall by charging these other customers more than their cost to serve. To the 
extent that the new network tariffs are more ‘cost reflective’ than the historic consumption-
based tariffs, the different cost outcomes for these two households must also reflect the cross 
subsidy in existing consumption-based charges. 
There are two principal customer attributes that are drivers of network costs and hence two 
principal sources of cross subsidies in residential electricity pricing – Location and Peak 
Demand: 
• Location: Customer density underpins the average ‘cost to serve’ of any given customer. 
Terrain and climate also contribute to location specific costs. Regional and remote 
customers are inherently costlier to serve than metropolitan customers due to the lower 
density of customers and the distances involved. ‘Statewide’, ‘postage stamp’ or ‘country 
equalisation’ pricing policies aim to limit the differences in pricing within network regions 
and are a common policy measure in Australia. However, there is often a trade-off in terms 
of reliability for regional and remote customers which should be considered in any 
evaluation of policies. 
• Peak Demand: Capital expenditure on network capacity is a key driver of network charges 
and is driven by coincident demand from customers. Some customers contribute to 
coincident demand more than others yet pay via tariffs based on accumulated 
consumption regardless of when it was consumed. In the residential context, differences 
in peak demand are often attributable to choices around heating and cooling (most regions 
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are summer peaking and hence driven by cooling demand) and, more recently, solar PV. 
The changes to the rules around network pricing and the ongoing introduction of the metering 
that enables tariff reform will enable the unbundling of these cross subsidies over time. The 
first round of tariffs developed under the rule changes are shown in Table 7 and have focused 
on maximum demand. No explicit targeting of locational cost differences within distribution 
areas has been proposed so far. 
Solar 
These example profiles also demonstrate the difference in impacts on consumption patterns 
and network costs from solar. The impact on costs of solar under the demand tariff in each 
case is less than half that under the exiting tariff structure. The limited impact of solar on the 
level of maximum demand recorded for each month results in reduced savings compared to 
the impact where reduced overall consumption is rewarded. The extent to which this is 
considered more cost reflective is likely to be controversial. The AER has proposed further 
work in relation to the charging windows and the 30-minute measurement interval (AER, 
2017b, p. 67) and this may moderate concerns. 
 
5.5 Policy Formulation 
Priority issues can be summarised as: 
● Energy performance standards of housing and appliances 
● Best practice policies and programs (including access to efficient appliances) 
● Understanding Load profiles and dynamic pricing 
● Distributed Energy Resources (DER) 
Policy formulation for this outcome must reflect these key issues and the analysis herein.  
5.5.1 Priority issue 3.1: Split incentives in rental housing 
The pursuit of mandatory disclosure of energy performance at point of sale or lease is not as 
important to many vulnerable households as ensuring a minimum standard is met. For many 
households, the affordability of rent, urgency of need and other priorities are likely to override 
the decision making benefits of mandatory disclosure. It is recommended that MEPS for rental 
housing become a priority measure of the National Energy Productivity Plan. An independent 
review of the Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards Act 2012 (GEMS Act) was announced 
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in January 2018 and this is a key opportunity to advance this issue (CoA, 2018). 
5.5.2 Priority issue 3.2: Energy productivity programs 
Community scale energy efficiency programs have been part of the Australian energy policy 
landscape since the early days of energy market reform. An opportunity exists to embrace the 
context of change in the market – including tariff reform - to recast these programs as energy 
productivity and learn from past projects. Smart meters and battery storage are providing 
options for programs not previously feasible. Alignment with jurisdictional energy efficiency 
schemes should be a policy priority alongside creating opportunities for low income 
households to access more efficient capital items such as major appliances.  
It is recommended that ECA be assigned responsibility for curating and interpreting all 
energy consumption programs from around Australia. The ECA Power Shift project is an 
important current initiative in this regard building an evidence base of what works. 
Expanding the scope to state-based initiatives would enhance the value of the research. 
Stability of funding for future programs is an issue that needs national consideration and the 
ECA role will provide evidence for an informed debate.  
5.5.3 Priority issue 3.3: Consumption patterns 
The finalisation of the first round of cost reflective network tariffs provides an opportunity to 
test for risks and opportunities from tariff reform. However, the lack of a reliable set of 
consumption profiles is a barrier to comparative analysis and policy formulation. CSIRO have 
initiated work in this area as part of the Network Transformation Roadmap and this 
information would complement the consumption benchmarks already produced by the AER.  
It is recommended that AER’s bill benchmarking work be expanded to develop benchmark 
consumption profiles. 
5.5.4 Priority issue 3.4: Distributed Energy Resources  
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) have the potential to be the distinction in a two-tier 
energy market. Without careful pricing, DER can exacerbate cross subsidies and shift costs 
onto already struggling households. Comprehensive policy in this regard needs to balance 
twin objectives of encouraging access to DERs for vulnerable households while minimising 
the shifting of costs on to those unable to afford it. This is a vulnerable customer priority policy 
area with links to tariff reform and concession reform.  
Recommendation 6.6 of the Finkel Review was for CoAG Energy Council to (Finkel et al., 
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2017, p. 25): 
… engage with relevant portfolio areas including housing, and with state, territory and 
local governments, to identify: 
• Opportunities to accelerate the roll out of programs that improve access by low 
income households to distributed energy resources and improvements in 
energy efficiency. 
• Options for subsidised funding mechanisms for the supply of energy efficient 
appliances, rooftop solar photovoltaic and battery storage systems for low 
income consumers.  
It is recommended that Energy Consumers Australia commission further research into the 
risks and opportunities for vulnerable consumers from DER and keep this issue on the CoAG 
Energy Council agenda. 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered policies that affect the energy consumption of households. 
Australia’s National Energy Productivity Plan is the centrepiece but activities occur at state 
and local government levels as well. Governance of activities in this space tends to fall on state 
and territory energy or environment departments. Concerted policy leadership is missing: 
there is no obvious champion of energy productivity programs for low income and vulnerable 
households. Energy Consumers Australia is well placed to coordinate this work. 
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) are technologies such as solar power, batteries, electric 
vehicles, smart meters and home energy management systems that can be ‘orchestrated’ to 
shift demand and lower costs. These DERs and dynamic pricing are emerging as the potential 
drivers of a ‘two tier’ electricity market and the implications for vulnerable households 
warrants further research and policy development. 
Energy consumption policies also have a consumer protection aspect in the form of minimum 
energy performance standards for new housing, equipment and appliances. Analysis 
supports the extension of this approach to rental housing to protect many vulnerable 
households. Consumer protection more broadly is the subject of the next chapter, Chapter 6.  
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6 Policy outcome: Robust Consumer Protection 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the essential service nature of electricity and presents the rationale for 
why robust consumer protections are a critical policy outcome. Disconnection of electricity 
or gas due to unpaid bills is a reality for an increasing number of households despite concerted 
efforts to make this a measure of ‘last resort’. New technologies and financial products are 
challenging existing frameworks. Current policies and programs aimed at vulnerable 
households have not been designed with the current and future energy markets in mind 
(Kemp et al., 2015). This creates a need for a policy refresh and an opportunity to make 
progress toward a coordinated national framework. 
As is the case for each of the five chapters covering the key policy areas of the consumer safety 
net, this chapter presents four stages of a policy cycle. A Policy Review presents current 
initiatives seeking to provide consumer protection in energy markets at national and 
jurisdictional levels. COAG Energy Council, AEMC and AER have strategic priorities aligned 
with this policy objective. This policy outcome also interacts with Australia’s Consumer Policy 
framework and Law (also see Section 2.3.3). In summary, policy settings are in a review phase 
as they seek to remain effective and efficient in a changing market. 
Key Issues are distilled from the analysis and stakeholder publications in the second stage. 
These include: 
● Levels of energy debt and disconnection are growing, and a growing number of 
households are being observed with levels of ongoing energy costs plus arrears that 
are unaffordable. For these households disconnection is inevitable without policy 
intervention. 
● New products and services are blurring the lines between energy consumer 
protections and the general protections of Australian Consumer Law. Reviews are 
underway but policy direction is not yet clear.  
● Some customers are reliant on electricity to operate life sustaining equipment. The 
energy market rules include specific provisions regarding registration and notice of 
planned outages but these may not be adequate to protect those vulnerable to 
unplanned outages. New technologies such as batteries and smart meters may provide 
new policy opportunities to support these households. 
● Monitoring and reporting of consumer protection issues is inconsistent and does not 
comprehensively cover the energy consumer experience. Policy formulation would be 
 - 152 - 
enhanced by improvements in this area. 
The Policy Analysis stage takes an empirical approach to the key issues and reveals estimates 
of the scale of debt and disconnection. 
The Policy Formulation stage considers the issues and the analysis and then makes 
recommendations in relation to each of four key priority areas. 
 
6.2 Policy Review  
The relevant COAG Energy Council priorities are: 
● Empowering Consumers 
● Energy Market Transformation 
Since the retail market rules of Australia’s National Energy Market make specific provision 
for the process by which disconnection can occur, it seems reasonable to claim that the practice 
of electricity disconnections represents a conscious choice of government and a legitimate area 
of public policy. Energy retailers are responsible for the direct contact with energy customers 
and have obligations under The National Energy Retail Law (NERL) Clause 47 to ensure that 
disconnection for unpaid bills is a ‘last resort’: 
47—General principle regarding de-energisation (or disconnection) of premises of 
hardship customers  
A retailer must give effect to the general principle that de-energisation (or disconnection) of 
premises of a hardship customer due to inability to pay energy bills should be a last resort 
option. 
Public policy in Australia recognises energy as an essential service. This is evidenced by the 
‘industry-specific’ approach to energy consumer protection in Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework. To explain why energy consumers warrant explicit protection beyond the generic 
provisions of the broader consumer policy framework, the Productivity Commission Review 
of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework stated (PC, 2008, p. 108): 
There are good reasons to supplement the generic consumer law with specific 
measures to protect and empower energy consumers. They are essential services, 
with disconnection having potential harmful effects; billing is lumpy increasing the risk 
of financial stress for low income households; price menus and product bundling can 
be complex; and some areas of supply are not yet fully competitive. 
Reference was also made to the different pace of reform amongst the states and territories as 
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being further reasons why national Consumer Law would not be appropriate for energy 
markets. Energy markets therefore featured in the Productivity Commission’s considerations 
of Industry specific consumer regulation. The PC recommended: (Recommendation 5.3): 
… Australian Governments should agree to the longer term goal of a national 
consumer protection regime for energy services, with a single set of requirements to 
apply in all jurisdictions participating in the national energy market. Those 
requirements should be enforced by the Australian Energy Regulator. 
This recommendation precipitated the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF). The 
NECF complements the generic consumer protections provided by Australian Consumer 
Law. The NECF is a package of legal instruments centred on the National Energy Retail Law 
(NERL) and includes a set of Rules that complement the National Electricity Rules and 
National Gas Rules. Rather than the NECF, Consumer Law is supplemented by state-specific 
provisions in Victoria, Western Australia and the NT. 
The NECF currently applies in: 
● Australian Capital Territory (commenced 1 July 2012); 
● Tasmania (commenced 1 July 2012); 
● South Australia (commenced 1 February 2013); 
● New South Wales (commenced 1 July 2013); 
● Queensland (commenced 1 July 2015); and 
● Victoria - Chapter 5A35 of the National Electricity Rules only (commenced 1 July 2016). 
The National Energy Customer Framework does not currently apply in Western Australia or 
the Northern Territory and, as above, only applies in a limited manner in Victoria. 
The NECF is regulated by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). The equivalent activity in 
Victoria is regulated by the Victorian Essential Services Commission (ESC) where the 
universal use of advanced metering provides a different context. On 1 January 2016, Victoria’s 
energy industry legislation was amended to include a new objective for the regulator (ESCV, 
2016): 
To promote protections for customers, including in relation to assisting customers who 
are facing payment difficulties. 
The Hardship Review conducted by the Victorian Essential Services Commission in 2016 and 
the subsequent development Payment Difficulties Safety Net project can be regarded as the 
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frontier of policy development related to this policy outcome (robust consumer protection) as 
at 2017 (ESCV, 2017). This sits alongside recent work by the Australian Energy Regulator 
under the NECF on a Sustainable Payment Plans Framework (AER, 2016a). Both initiatives 
are aiming for ‘best practice’ in the way customers are treated and both acknowledge a cohort 
of customers who are unable to afford ongoing consumption let alone being able to repay 
existing debt. This group is considered particularly vulnerable. 
Disconnection for unpaid bills is the ‘last resort’ of both frameworks and numerous studies 
have been conducted over many years on the impacts of disconnections on households, 
especially those with children. ECA is also pursuing a focus on disconnections. A study 
commissioned by ECA stated that there has been a large increase in the number of 
disconnections in recent years and that around 160,000 households were disconnected from 
electricity or gas each year (KPMG, 2016). 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the National Energy Productivity Plan (NEPP) and the 
E3 program consider the minimum energy performance of appliances and buildings as 
consumer protection measures. This illustrates a logical overlap between these two policy 
outcomes and an example of a major policy initiative that can contribute to multiple policy 
outcomes. 
In terms of policy governance, this outcome sits between energy law and consumer law and 
roles and responsibilities are not always clear. Alongside Australian Consumer Law (ACL), 
the primary instrument is the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) except for 
Victoria, and in WA and the NT where local arrangements apply. To illustrate the division of 
scope, two examples of penalties imposed on retailers are: 
● $325,000 by the ACCC on Origin Energy for contravening the Australian Consumer Law 
with misleading claims about price discounts.  
● $80,000 in 2015 and $60,000 in 2017 by the AER on Simply Energy for contravening the 
National Energy Retail Law by failing to obtain the explicit informed consent of 
customers before switching them to Simply Energy contracts. 
Reflecting the complex governance arrangements over this policy outcome, the 2016 Retail 
Competition Review (AEMC 2016a) recommended:  
● The AEMC and Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) work alongside the COAG Energy 
Council to determine how the energy consumer protections framework needs to 
evolve.  
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● COAG Energy Council successfully complete its current review of the National Energy 
Customer Framework (NECF) in light of the changing business models facilitated by 
technological change and existing Australian Consumer Law protections. 
In terms of the consumer protection issues raised by the changing electricity market, the 
Consumer Action Law Centre outlined a dozen areas of potential consumer detriment in the 
new energy markets that will need to be addressed in an updated framework (CALC, 2016). 
A recent study by the St Vincent de Paul Society in Victoria revealed the impact that advanced 
metering is having on disconnection patterns: raising concerns about the remote 
disconnection capability they provide and links to an increase in households being 
disconnected multiple times over a three year period (SVDP, 2016a, p. 4). The Ombudsman 
schemes in each jurisdiction are also investigating options for providing dispute resolution 
services to customers in the transforming energy markets (ANZEWON, 2016). COAG Energy 
Council is also inquiring into consumer protection issues as part of the Energy Market 
Transformation priority. In mid-2017, COAG Energy Council announced that while current 
consumer protections provided by the National Energy Customer Framework and Australian 
Consumer Law are generally sufficient for behind the meter products, they considered an 
industry-led Code of Conduct would support consumer protections for customers acquiring 
new energy products and services (CoAG, 2017). This would complement existing Clean 
Energy Council initiatives for solar (Clean Energy Council, 2017) but it is not yet clear how 
such an approach will be monitored and evaluated over time. 
In summary, policy settings are in a review phase as they seek to remain effective and efficient 
in a changing market. 
6.3 Key Issues 
This section distils key issues from the analysis and stakeholder publications. The following 
is a summary of recommendations from the stakeholder literature relevant to consumer 
protections and vulnerable households: 
● The relationship between vulnerable consumers, their advocates (e.g. community 
workers, financial counsellors) and energy retailers (National Energy Affordability 
Roundtable, 2013; SACOSS, 2016b) 
● Expanded monitoring and consistent reporting of key indicators (National Energy 
Affordability Roundtable, 2013; SVDP, 2016a) 
● Nationally consistent approach to life support equipment (National Energy 
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Affordability Roundtable 2013) 
● Provide meaningful information and choices which take into account real consumer 
decision making biases (CALC, 2016) 
● Ensure the adequacy of consumer protections across all products and services (CALC 
2016) 
● Share the benefits of energy market innovation across the whole community, including 
the vulnerable demographics who may face barriers to accessing new products and 
services (CALC 2016) 
● Pursuit of best practice customer interactions at a national level (National Energy 
Affordability Roundtable, 2013; SACOSS, 2016b; SVDP, 2016a). 
● Policy focus on those customers identified through Payment Difficulties or Hardship 
initiatives that are unable to pay for ongoing consumption. 
Based on the above and the preceding Policy Review, the four key issue categories are: 
● Monitoring and reporting 
● Debt and Disconnection 
● New Products and Services 
● Life Support Equipment and other medical energy needs 
The main issues can be summarised as: 
● Monitoring and reporting of consumer protection issues is inconsistent and does not 
comprehensively cover the energy consumer experience (including NECF, ACL and 
Victoria’s Energy Retail Code). Policy formulation would be enhanced by 
improvements in this area. 
● As prices rise faster than incomes, levels of energy debt and disconnection are 
growing. A growing number of households are being observed with levels of ongoing 
energy costs plus arrears that are unaffordable. For these households disconnection is 
inevitable without policy intervention. 
● New products and services are blurring the lines between energy consumer 
protections and the general protections of Australian Consumer Law. Reviews are 
underway but policy direction is not yet clear. Pre-payment meters have always been 
contentious in Australia. New metering technology enables features that may 
overcome many of the consumer protection issues associated with ‘self disconnection’ 
from pre-payment meters. ‘Pay as you go’ on a fortnightly basis via a smart meter has 
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been proposed for some customer situations in Victoria but not necessarily well 
received (ESCV, 2017). 
● Some customers are reliant on electricity to operate life sustaining equipment. The 
energy market rules include specific provisions regarding registration and notice of 
planned outages but these may not be adequate to protect those vulnerable to 
unplanned outages. Most jurisdictions provide specific subsidies for these customers 
but there is no coordinated perspective. New technologies such as batteries and smart 
meters may provide new opportunities to support these households. 
Each of these is discussed further in the following Policy Analysis section. 
6.4 Policy Analysis 
6.4.1 Monitoring and reporting 
A regular, consolidated national picture of energy consumer experiences is absent. The 
Australian Energy Regulator publishes data for NECF participant jurisdictions that covers 
complaints, payment plans, hardship programs, debt and disconnections. Equivalent 
Victorian data is published by the Essential Services Commission in their annual Energy Retail 
Performance Reports and often includes further levels of detail not present in the AER data. 
The Economic Regulation Authority in WA publishes similar data in their annual 
performance reports. Equivalent data for the NT is published by the Utilities Commission in 
their annual Power System Review reports. 
State and Territory Ombudsman schemes report complementary data relating to complaints 
and disputes. However, the equivalent data for the ‘energy services’ or ‘behind the meter’ 
market (such as solar PV and batteries) is less readily available. These are usually pursued 
under the ACL and mechanisms such as local Fair Trading offices. As the market expands it 
is relevant to consider the monitoring and reporting of consumer protection issues and the 
role of this information in policy development. 
6.4.2 Debt and Disconnection 
ECA is pursuing a focus on disconnections called ‘Keeping people connected’. A study 
commissioned by ECA stated that there has been a large increase in the number of 
disconnections in recent years and that around 160,000 households were disconnected from 
electricity or gas each year (KPMG, 2016). 
In Australia’s NEM households can be disconnected from supply (also referred to as de-
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energised or cut-off) for falling behind on their electricity account. While allowed under the 
rules only as a measure of last resort, policy implementation has not yet coalesced a strategy to 
minimise disconnections. The NECF requirement for “last resort” provides little guidance on 
the practical challenges embodied in the notion of “capacity to pay” in the management of 
customer debt. The Australian Energy Regulator has determined that a retailer cannot 
disconnect a customer for non-payment when the amount owing is less than $300. 
Market data show that over 1 in 100 households in the NEM have their electricity supply 
disconnected (cut-off) each year for unpaid bills. Retailers are seeking to contain an estimated 
$240m in overdue accounts (approx 1.9% of market turnover). Table 10 consolidates data 
reported by AER, AMEC, ESCV, QCA and Treasury Budget Papers in each state and territory. 
2014-15 NEM QLD NSW ACT VIC SA TAS 
Residential Customers 8,500,000 1,886,000 3,053,000 164,000 2,457,000 751,000 237,000 
Residential Customers 
with Debt (non hardship) 
240,000 39,000 83,000 4,500 79,000 30,000 4,000 
Participated in Hardship 
Program (ave) 
79,000 15,000 22,000 1,700 29,000 11,000 1,000 
Total Customers with Debt 319,000 54,000 105,000 6,200 108,000 41,000 5,000 
Total Customers with Debt 3.8% 2.9% 3.4% 3.8% 4.4% 5.5% 2.1% 
estimated Total Debt ($m) $ 240       
est Residential Electricity 
market annual Turnover, 
$m) inc GST 
$ 12,500       
Debt to Turnover 1.9%       
Disconnection 1.27% 1.57% 1.06% 0.67% 1.45% 1.34% 0.14% 
Reconnection (same name 
and address) 
0.75% 0.75% 0.65% 0.42% 0.96% 0.77% 0.08% 
Proportion that reconnect 59% 48% 61% 62% 66% 57% 54% 
Proportion of households 
receiving concession 
31% 25% 29% 19% 38% 29% 38% 
Total expenditure on 
concessions ($m) 
$ 641       
Total expenditure on 
emergency payments ($m) 
$ 33       
Total government 
contribution to residential 
electricity bills ($m) 
$ 674       
Government contribution 
as % of Turnover 
4.2%       
Table 10: Summary of Residential Debt and Disconnection in the National Electricity Market 2014-15 
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Understanding the scale of the ‘hardship’ end of the National Electricity Market requires an 
understanding of levels of debt and disconnection. In 2014-15 the total number of customers 
with a debt of more than 90 days was around 4% (and over 5% in South Australia). On average 
25% of these customers participate in a retailer’s hardship program.  
Disconnection rates and reconnection rates differ between jurisdictions. The overall 
disconnection rate (1.26%) will include those who vacated premises so will overstate the 
number of households living with power disconnected. The reconnection rate (same name, 
same address, 0.75%) is a more likely proxy for those living with power disconnected even 
though this would miss those who remain disconnected for long periods of time. The 
literature does not reveal a preferred approach to distinguishing the ‘willing to pay but 
unable’ from the ‘able to pay but unwilling’. For the purpose of this policy analysis though, 
there is no need for great precision. It is sufficient to indicate that around 1% of households 
are disconnected for unpaid bills each year. Figure 40 illustrates a NEM wide trend of 
increasing levels of disconnection but a mixed result in jurisdictions: 
 
Figure 40: Disconnection for unpaid bills in the National Electricity Market (Source: AER, ESC-V) 
One example of local issues is the situation in Tasmania, where over 10% of households use a 
pre-payment meter. This needs to be considered alongside what otherwise look like relatively 
low levels of debt and disconnection. This is discussed further below. Another example is the 
ACT approach to disconnections. Here cases are heard by the ACT Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (ACAT) prior to a disconnection being permitted. The Tribunal approach contributes 
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to the lowest disconnection rates in the NEM. 
The Victorian Essential Services Commission Payment Difficulties Framework project and the 
Australian Energy Regulator’s voluntary Sustainable Payment Plans Framework 
acknowledge a cohort of customers who are unable to afford ongoing consumption let alone 
being able to repay existing debt. The AER framework suggests: 
The customer and retailer should try to agree on an affordable repayment amount that 
is as close as possible to the amount required to cover the customer’s ongoing usage. 
This limits the growth of the customer’s debt, keeps their energy supply connected and 
encourages their engagement. 
Payment plans that are less than ongoing usage should be reviewed at least once 
every 3 months. 
The customer and the retailer should work together to try to close the gap between the 
current repayment amount and the amount required to cover ongoing usage and 
reduce debt. This might include (but is not limited to): reviewing the customer’s tariff, 
checking that they are receiving available concessions, providing tailored energy 
efficiency advice, offering incentive payments, and referring the customer to a financial 
counsellor or government assistance schemes. 
The ESC Draft Payment Difficulties Safety Net included a Draft Customer Advice Manual that 
suggested an approach where the customer pays what they can while an ‘energy management 
plan’ is developed with the energy retailer. Similar to the AER framework, the ESC guide 
encouraged referral to other support services to assist with household finances. In both cases, 
the guidance is somewhat open ended. 
The debt and disconnection data indicates that those at risk represent around 5% of residential 
customers. There is clear potential, given the scales involved, for some realignment of 
concession funding to those with debt. This could involve a rebalancing from the broad-brush 
concession programs to the more reactive and targeted emergency funding programs in place 
in most jurisdictions (currently estimated to be 95% to 5%). 
Case Study: South Australia 
In terms of state-by-state differences in indicators, as at December 2015, South Australia had 
the highest rates of electricity and gas customers on hardship programs, the highest rate of 
electricity disconnections and the second highest rate of gas disconnections (behind ACT). 
The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) and the Essential Services Commission of SA 
(ESCOSA) publish a number of ‘hardship’ indicators for the South Australian energy markets. 
The following charts are for the period to the end of Calendar Year 2015. 
The number of residential customers with a debt (>90 days) can be seen to be trending 
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downward since the commencement of the NECF (data was not collected for this indicator 
prior to the NECF) and currently sits at around 30,000 electricity customers (approx. 4% of all 
households) and 15,000 gas customers (approx. 3% of gas customers): 
 
Figure 41: South Australian customers with an energy debt36 
However, the average debt per customer is rising and the total value of debt is relatively stable 
at $30 million as shown in Figure 42. 
 
                                               
36 Source: ESCOSA 2016, NERL: Review of operation in SA, p. 29.  
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Figure 42: Average South Australian energy debt37 
Figure 43 shows that the number of customers participating in a retailer’s hardship program 
has risen sharply since such programs were mandated with the introduction of the NECF 
(indicated by the dashed red line). This does not necessarily imply a growth in demand and 
could represent a growth in awareness: 
 
Figure 43: South Australian consumers participating in energy hardship programs38 
The number of electricity disconnections for non-payment have been relatively stable at 
around 2,500 per quarter for a number of years. Gas disconnections can be seen to exhibit an 
upwards trend in recent years to now exceed 1200 per quarter. 
                                               
37 Source: AER, Retail statistics, South Australia – customer energy debt  
38 Source: ESCOSA 2016, NERL Review Final Report – Time Series Data – Quarterly 
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Figure 44: Energy disconnections in South Australia39 
6.4.3 Pre-payment meters as an alternative to debt 
When households fail to pay their electricity account, the debt they accrue is with an energy 
retailer. These retailers have the role of collecting payment from customers and re-distributing 
it to the entire electricity value chain. Most retailers are privately-owned businesses, and all 
are run on a commercial basis, so it is not surprising that monitoring and managing cash flow 
is an important activity. The commercial basis for disconnecting supply appears sound and it 
would be difficult to justify a role for government on the basis of market failure. It is however 
the essential nature of supply and the persuasive influence of even the threat of being cut-off 
that allows for the undermining of social policy.  
Prepayment meters in the NEM are restricted to those of Tasmania’s Aurora Energy and its 
Aurora Pay As You Go (APAYG) program. APAYG is under review and Aurora have 
announced plans to launch the next generation prepayment product in late 2017. 
As at 30 June 2015, there were 29,612 APAYG customers. This is 12.5 per cent of the total 
number of Tasmanian residential customers. Of this total around 54 per cent are concession 
customers, compared to 38% of all residential customers. There is no daily fixed charge for 
concession card holders (the concession is applied daily and covers the fixed charge applied 
to other APAYG customers of $1.34 per day (as at July 2015)). 93,000 households (38%) receive 
                                               
39 Source: ESCOSA 2016, NERL Review Final Report – Time Series Data – Quarterly 
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the concession. This scale contrasts that of the Aurora NECF data from the AER showing 4,229 
residential electricity customers with debt and 1,663 on the hardship program (0.7% and 0.2% 
respectively). Disconnections in Tasmania also occur at much lower rates than other 
jurisdictions (0.14% compared to 1.26%) and the presence of prepayment meters at such a 
scale is likely an influence on this.  
Prepayment comes at a price premium in Tasmania. This is consistent with the UK experience 
where the energy regulator Ofgem introduced an energy price cap for the approximately 4 
million households on pre-payment meters from April 2017 and there has been suggestion of 
extending that to other vulnerable customers (Citizen’s Advice, 2017). The Tasmanian 
Electricity Supply Industry Act 1995, requires the Office of the Tasmanian Economic 
Regulator to prepare, and table in each House of Parliament, an annual prepayment price 
comparison report. The comparisons in the 2015 report show that over the course of a year, 
customers generally pay more on APAYG than on Standing Offer tariffs irrespective of 
whether or not they receive a concession (OTTER, 2015). The ‘premium’ was more 
pronounced for smaller consumers (ave 3475 kWh pa) at 11% than medium consumers 
(average 6405 kWh) at 5%. 
The report noted that APAYG customers with the ability to modify their usage can take 
advantage of time of use prices and bring their annual costs into line with the costs facing 
customers on Standing Offer tariffs. However, as advanced metering is deployed elsewhere 
in the NEM, similar price structures are becoming available in other jurisdictions without the 
need for pre-payment. 
6.4.4 Life Support Equipment and other medical energy needs 
There is also an overlap with Health Policy in relation to the electricity needed to operate life 
sustaining equipment in patient’s homes. Policy in this area includes provisions in the 
National Energy Retail Law and Retail Rules (NERL and NERR which apply in New South 
Wales, the Australia Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania) for 
protection from planned outages and restrictions on the ability to disconnect for unpaid bills. 
Life support equipment is generally defined as (AER, 2016b):  
● Oxygen concentrator; 
● Intermittent peritoneal dialysis machine; 
● Kidney dialysis machine; 
● Chronic positive airways pressure respirator (CPAP); 
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● Crigler najjar syndrome phototherapy equipment; 
● Life support ventilator; or  
● Any other equipment that a doctor certifies is required by a resident for life support. 
In all cases, customers are required to produce evidence of their equipment needs from a 
registered Medical Practitioner. The Retail Rules require that when a connection is registered 
as having life support equipment (via the associated retailer or direct with the distributor), 
customers are required to be given: 
● general advice that there may be a planned or unplanned interruption to the supply, 
● information to assist them prepare a plan of action in the case of an unplanned 
interruption, 
● an emergency telephone number for the distributor at no more than the cost of a local 
call, and 
● at least four business days’ written notice of any planned interruption. 
According to KPMG (2016) in their review of the costs of disconnection for Energy Consumers 
Australia, most jurisdictions provide financial support to energy customers with specific 
medical conditions. In some cases a lump sum is offered, in others specific amounts are 
available depending on the equipment in question: 
● Tasmania – Life Support Concession40 
● Queensland - Electricity Life Support41 and Medical Cooling and Heating Electricity 
Concession Scheme42 costed in the 16-17 QLD State Budget at $2.4m and $1.3m 
respectively. The Medical Cooling and Heating Electricity Concession Scheme pays 
$320.97 to eligible applicants, implying around 4,000 in total number. 
● Victoria – Medical cooling concession43 and Life Support Concession44  
● New South Wales – Medical Energy Rebate45 and Life Support Rebate46 costed in the 
16-17 NSW state Budget at $9m and paying $235 - $258.50 in each case implies 35,000 
– 40,000 recipients per annum. Networks NSW47: Ausgrid 21,413 or 1.28% of customer 
                                               
40 www.concessions.tas.gov.au/concessions/electricity_and_heating  
41 www.qld.gov.au/community/cost-of-living-support/electricity-life-support/index.html  
42 www.qld.gov.au/community/cost-of-living-support/medical-cooling-heating-electricity-concession-scheme/  
43 www.dhs.vic.gov.au/for-individuals/financial-support/concessions/energy/medical-cooling-concession  
44 www.dhs.vic.gov.au/for-individuals/financial-support/concessions/energy/life-support-machine-electricity-concession  
45 www.resourcesandenergy.nsw.gov.au/energy-consumers/financial-assistance/rebates/medical-energy-rebate  
46 www.resourcesandenergy.nsw.gov.au/energy-consumers/financial-assistance/rebates/life-support-rebates  
47 Networks NSW: ENA and Networks NSW Roundtable – Supporting Vulnerable Energy Customers and Network Tariff 
Strategy 24 September 2015  
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base at end of June 2015; Endeavour 19,530 or 2.1% of customer base; Essential 16,450 
or 1.96% of customer base at end June 2015 – a total of over 57,000 across NSW.  
● South Australia – Medical heating and cooling concession48.  
● Western Australia – Life Support Equipment Electricity Subsidy49 allocated $1.14m in 
the WA State Budget 2016-17 and Thermoregulatory Dysfunction Energy Subsidy50 
allocated $2.3m in the 16-17 budget. 
The energy needs of the disabled have been the subject of limited study (PIAC, 2012)(PIAC 
2012) and there is limited stakeholder literature on the scale of this customer group. The PIAC 
study highlighted two particular dimensions of disadvantage specific to energy: disability 
brings additional energy costs; and disability can inhibit people realising benefits from 
traditional energy efficiency measures.  
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is being introduced progressively around 
Australia from 1 July 2016. The Australian Government is projecting that by 2019, the NDIS 
will support about 460,000 people with disability. As an insurance scheme, the NDIS takes a 
‘lifetime’ or ‘investment’ approach’ to supporting people with disability early to improve their 
outcomes later in life. The scheme also provides for self-management of budgets by recipients 
of support and has specific provisions for Assistive Technology (AT) needs. The interaction 
between the new funding model and energy costs and other energy consumer issues has not 
been studied and is recommended for further inquiry. The Queensland Disability Network 
Bright Sparks program is an example of peer education to engage a community of interest on 
energy market issues. 
The AER takes the obligations under the rules very seriously. In July 2016, the AER alleged 
three distributors across QLD, NSW and SA breached life support obligations under the 
National Energy Retail Rules.  These businesses did not comply with the communication 
obligations for a planned interruption and were consequently fined a combined total of 
$120,000 (AER, 2016c). An example of why the obligations are taken seriously can be found in 
a case study from South Australia. In December 2015, an unplanned power outage in 
suburban Adelaide resulted in the death of a 53 year-old man – reportedly with muscular 
dystrophy - registered as a person on life support with local distributor SA Power Networks. 
                                               
48 Medical Cooling and Heating Electricity Concession Scheme www.sa.gov.au/topics/care-and-support/financial-
support/concessions/medical-heating-and-cooling-concession  
49 www.finance.wa.gov.au/cms/State_Revenue/ECES/Energy_Subsidy_Schemes.aspx  
50 www.finance.wa.gov.au/cms/State_Revenue/ECES/Energy_Subsidy_Schemes.aspx  
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The care provider had been placed in liquidation in November 2015 (ASIC, 2015) and 
reporting of the incident highlighted gaps in the roles and responsibilities for ensuring a back-
up plan was in place (Cook, 2016; Nicholson, 2015). 
Life-support customers would likely benefit from battery storage technology that could 
provide continuity of supply during unplanned outages. However, relying on providers of 
‘behind the meter’ services raises other consumer protection issues may pose new risks. This 
is recommended for inclusion as a key vulnerable consumer issue. 
 
6.5 Policy Formulation 
Key issues can be summarised as: 
• Monitoring and reporting of consumer protection issues is inconsistent and does not 
comprehensively cover the energy consumer experience. Policy formulation would be 
enhanced by improvements in this area. 
• As prices rise faster than incomes levels of energy debt and disconnection are growing. A 
growing number of households are being observed with levels of ongoing energy costs 
plus arrears that are unaffordable. For these households disconnection is inevitable 
without policy intervention. 
• New products and services are blurring the lines between energy consumer protections 
and the general protections of Australian Consumer Law. Reviews are underway but 
policy direction is not yet clear. 
• Pre-payment meters have always been contentious in Australia. New metering technology 
enables features that may overcome many of the consumer protection issues associated 
with ‘self disconnection’ from pre-payment meters. ‘Pay as you go’ on a fortnightly basis 
via a smart meter has been proposed for some customer situations in Victoria  but not 
necessarily well received. 
• Some customers are reliant on electricity to operate life sustaining equipment. The energy 
market rules include specific provisions regarding registration and notice of planned 
outages but these may not be adequate to protect those vulnerable to unplanned outages. 
Most jurisdictions provide specific subsidies for these customers but there is no 
coordinated perspective. New technologies such as batteries and smart meters may 
provide new policy opportunities to support these households. 
This outcome represents the overlap between energy policy, social policy and consumer 
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policy. The transformation of energy markets is providing a challenging context for consumer 
protection policy. Four policy priorities to advance the interests of vulnerable consumers have 
been identified 
6.5.1 Priority issue 4.1: Debt and Disconnection of those unable to pay 
The cohort of customers unable to afford ongoing consumption let alone repay debt are the 
most vulnerable to disconnection under current arrangements. This must be a priority policy 
area. It is recommended that ECA actively support partnership opportunities between energy 
retailers, community sector agencies, particularly financial counsellors and governments. 
Leadership will be needed from the Australian Energy Council (AEC) and, for consumers, 
from ACOSS and/or Financial Counsellors Australia (FCA). 
6.5.2 Priority issue 4.2: New Products and Services  
The rapid changes in the energy market and growth of ‘behind the meter’ energy services is 
challenging existing consumer protection frameworks. New technologies also have some 
potential to improve the level of protection provided to vulnerable consumers. Reviews are 
underway and balancing risks and opportunities provides important context for policy 
formulation. The opportunities identified in Chapter 5 and the recommendation that Energy 
Consumers Australia commission further research into the risks and opportunities for 
vulnerable consumers from DER will keep this issue on the CoAG Energy Council agenda. 
6.5.3 Priority issue 4.3: Life Support Equipment 
The need for very high reliability by these customers and the opportunities from cost effective 
storage, smart meters and energy management are a logical match that would benefit from 
policy coordination. Reliability obligations on electricity distributors could create 
opportunities otherwise precluded by ring-fencing. Alignment with NDIS funding and 
alignment with concession reform should be policy priorities. It is recommended that ECA 
commission research into the opportunities and barriers to these consumers having their 
needs met by the energy markets. 
6.5.4 Priority issue 4.4: Monitoring and Reporting  
The evidence base for vulnerable consumer policy advocacy would be enhanced by the 
capability to provide a consolidated, national picture of energy consumer protection issues. 
This would consolidate information published by energy regulators, energy Ombudsman 
schemes and ACL agencies.  
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It is recommended that ECA consolidate, curate and publish a national picture of energy 
consumer protection data on its website. Similar to the Energy Security Board’s Health of the 
National Electricity Market report (Energy Security Board, 2017), this could be a Health of the 
NEM’s Safety Net report. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered the consumer protection issues relevant to vulnerable 
households and energy markets. The existing frameworks are under strain from rising prices 
and technology – particularly smart meters. Household disconnection rates have grown and 
stakeholders have identified a cohort of households at risk of disconnection but that do not 
have the resources to pay for ongoing consumption let alone repay debt. Relationships 
between community sector, government and energy industry stakeholders are critical to 
policy progress. 
Developments in Victoria – where virtually all households have a smart meter – represent the 
policy frontier for this one of the five policy outcomes: a new regulatory objective, a Hardship 
Review and a draft Payments Difficulty Framework. However, a harmonised national scheme 
seems as far off as ever. 
A growing market ‘behind the meter’ for solar and storage as a service, embedded networks 
and so on is also testing the boundaries between Australian Consumer Law and Energy Retail 
Law. Recommendations from the literature include expanded monitoring and consistent 
reporting of key indicators; pursuit of best practice and continuous improvement at the 
customer interface. Collaboration between government, retailers, ombudsmen and 
community sector workers could be strengthened. 
Underpinning all four policy outcomes to this point is the need for households to have a 
capacity to pay for the energy services they need. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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7 Policy outcome: All households have a capacity to pay 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the social welfare policy objective of ensuring households have a 
capacity to pay for essential goods and services. This involves a combination of income 
measures from the tax and transfer system as well as jurisdiction-based measures that provide 
concessions and emergency assistance tied to energy bills. This discussion overlaps with 
broader issues of poverty and housing affordability and represents a very complex area of 
public policy. 
As is the case for each of the five chapters covering the key policy areas of the consumer safety 
net, this chapter presents four stages of a policy cycle. The Policy Review presents current 
initiatives seeking to support this policy outcome at national and jurisdictional levels. This 
policy outcome is largely ‘owned’ by Australia’s social welfare policy frameworks. The policy 
review includes a focus on each of Income Support, Concessions and Housing Affordability. 
Key Issues are distilled from stakeholder publications in the second stage. These include: 
• Concessions have not been developed in the context of the changing energy markets and 
are due for a refresh. This provides an opportunity for better targeting of expenditure and 
for the inclusion of customer groups known to be vulnerable but not currently eligible for 
support. 
• Some households have such low incomes that essential services such as energy can easily 
become unaffordable. The divergence between energy costs and incomes over time is 
exacerbating this issue. 
• Housing energy performance is a key driver of energy costs and housing tenure is a key 
determinant of the options available to respond. Links to housing policy are inescapable 
yet there is limited coordination. 
• Research into poverty and research into energy affordability and energy market 
vulnerability are rarely aligned. Policy development is constrained by the lack of context 
provided by such perspectives on the entire household budget. 
A Policy Analysis stage takes an empirical approach to the key issues and reveals estimates of 
the scale of poverty in Australia. 
The Policy Formulation stage considers the issues and the analysis and then makes 
recommendations in each of four priority issues. 
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7.2 Policy Review 
With its strong focus on competitive markets, energy policy in Australia is explicitly reliant 
on the general social safety net to complement electricity market outcomes in order to preserve 
affordability. To quote the Australian Government’s 2012 Energy White Paper (CoA, 2012): 
“Ensuring that consumers, particularly those who are most vulnerable, are able to 
manage energy costs effectively is also increasingly important. The continued 
provision of adequate assistance to vulnerable consumers through a sound general 
safety net, well-targeted jurisdictional concession regimes and appropriate community 
service obligations remains critical.” (emphasis added) 
Responsibility for this outcome is very much spread across different levels of government. 
The Australian Government is responsible for income adequacy while the states are assigned 
responsibility for concessions under the Australian Energy Market Agreement (AEMA). 
Housing affordability is a shared responsibility also managed under an intergovernmental 
agreement (National Affordable Housing Agreement). 
7.2.1 Income support 
According to Poverty in Australia 2016 (ACOSS 2016), 13.3% of the Population (3 million 
people) lived below the poverty line in 2013-14 (ACOSS, 2016)51. Of those people, 57.3% relied 
on income support payments from Government as their main source of income.  
While the situation of poverty is in part due to the fact that most income support payments 
are set below the poverty line, the impact of indexation also contributes to this situation. In 
the main, income support payments are now indexed to price inflation rather than wage 
inflation, for example the Newstart allowance has not increased in real terms since 1994. 
Comparing the value of income support payments to the Average Weekly Ordinary Time 
Earnings (AWOTE) reveals quite startling gaps, not only in terms of the amounts but also in 
terms of the trajectory over time. The ongoing erosion of the adequacy of income support 
payments is having a compounding impact on the situation of poverty. 
The graph below is taken from Poverty in Australia 2016 (their Figure 18). It can be seen that 
changes to the Aged Pension in 2009 had a significant and positive effect on this particular 
payment type compared to other income support payments. This increase of $32.50 per week 
can be seen across the data to have improved the circumstance of this group over time, 
highlighting the core role that governments can play in preventing situations of poverty. 
                                               
51 The poverty line is drawn at 50% of median after-tax income  
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Figure 45: Trends in payment rates compared with average wages (Source: ACOSS 2016 Poverty in Australia 
Figure 18) 
7.2.2 Concessions 
As outlined in Section 2.3.1, in the Australian context, distinction has been made between 
‘tied’ and ‘untied’ supports. The final report of the 2009-10 Review of Australia’s Taxation 
System (Henry Tax Review) covers the Transfer System and explains ‘tied’ vs ‘untied’ 
transfers (Henry, 2010): 
“While transfers are usually thought of as cash payments, governments also provide 
transfers such as concessions and payments that are 'tied' to the purchase, or supply, 
of a particular good or service.” 
The economic argument for ‘tied’ transfers lies in the concept of a merit good that is, a good 
that people should consume regardless of their preferences for other things(Ver Eecke, 1998). 
Dilnot and Helm concluded that energy for households was both an absolute and a 
participation merit good (Dilnot and Helm, 1987): that there is both an absolute requirement 
for survival and a relative requirement for ongoing participation and inclusion in society52. 
                                               
52 In this context, the relevant attribute of merit goods is that households tend to under-consume even though there is a private 
or public benefit in them doing so. The most obvious case for energy is that of avoiding the negative health impacts of cold 
homes. In Australia this would translate to both cold winters and summer heat waves. 
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The Henry Tax Review made a number of wide-ranging observations about the eligibility for 
and distribution of the various concessions at the different levels of government. State and 
Territory Governments are responsible for energy specific concessions and rebates. Henry’s 
Recommendation 107 called for a review by the Productivity Commission for report to COAG. 
As at January 2018, this has not occurred. The 2014 Review of Australia’s Welfare System “A 
new System for Better Employment and Social outcomes” Final Report continued to support 
concession cards and pointed to the Federation White Paper for implications on how 
concessions might be funded and delivered in the future (DSS, 2015, p. 16). The Federation 
White Paper process was terminated in April 2016 and  the state-federal funding issues remain 
unresolved 
A comprehensive report by KPMG for Energy Consumers Australia (KPMG 2016) estimates 
that the total cost to governments of energy concession schemes (electricity and gas) is forecast 
to be $875m in the 2016/17 Financial Year. Total GST receipts from residential electricity and 
gas expenditure is estimated at approx. $1,600m. Concession schemes can therefore be 
considered to return around 55% of the GST revenue raised. However, significant differences 
exist in concession payments between jurisdictions and hence the proportion of GST receipts 
returned will vary (KPMG, 2016; SVDP, 2013). 
Calls for concession reform appear frequently and the Victorian regime is usually held up as 
the most equitable and comprehensive. The shift towards monthly billing, promotion of 
payment plans and bill smoothing products all contribute towards the capacity to pay an 
electricity bill.  AEMC’s 2016 and 2017 Retail Competition Review recommends that 
jurisdictions review concession policies to assess opportunities to better target them to 
customers most in need and to harmonise their structure across jurisdictions, where 
substantive differences exist. (AEMC, 2017a, 2016a) 
In its options paper for Energy Networks Australia “Supporting Vulnerable Customers”, 
consultants at Houston Kemp recommended three options for concession reform (Kemp et 
al., 2015): 
● Harmonisation of value and scope across jurisdictions 
● Targeting of eligibility and accounting for household size 
● Addressing the needs of long-term concession recipients through household or 
community scale investments in energy efficiency measures such as insulation 
7.2.3 Housing Affordability 
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As the most significant fixed cost to the household budget, housing has a direct impact on the 
affordability of all other costs. While various issues impact on housing costs, the core 
challenges include housing tenure, quality of residence, number of people in the home. 
Anglicare’s 2016 Rental Affordability Snapshot stated (Anglicare, 2016): 
Over the first weekend in April, the Anglicare member network surveyed 75,410 rental 
properties across Australia and found just 21 properties were affordable for single 
adults living on Newstart, and only one was suitable for young people living on Youth 
Allowance. And despite the higher level of pensions compared to allowances, 
affordable rentals were extremely limited for a single person living on any government 
payment. 
780 properties were affordable for those on a parenting payment and 389 for those on 
Disability Support Payment. Once the level of income reaches two people on the minimum 
wage in a household, they can access 26.2% or over 19,000 properties. This highlights the stark 
situation people on income support payments face even when compared to those on the 
lowest wages in the country. A recent research report by Choice for National Shelter and the 
National Association of Tenant Organisations (NATO) called Unsettled: Life in Australia’s 
private rental market provided numerous examples of the tenuous housing arrangements many 
households are in (Choice et al., 2017).  
The Australian, state and territory governments have a range of measures in place targeting 
housing affordability for low income and vulnerable households. Beyond the provision of 
public housing, the principal source of financial assistance for households is Commonwealth 
Rent Assistance.  
Rent Assistance is an income supplement payable to those renting privately or in the 
community housing sector. Importantly, eligibility extends beyond those receiving pensions 
and other social security payments to those eligible for Family Tax Benefit Part A. Family Tax 
Benefit Part A is income-tested and paid based on the number and age of children in the 
household. Rent Assistance eligibility therefore seems to capture low-income families in 
private rental – a cohort that would be included in most definitions of vulnerable energy 
consumer. Consideration should be given to the use of Rent Assistance eligibility as a way of 
improving the targeting of energy concessions. Family Tax Benefit – Part A has previously 
been recommended as a ‘trigger’ for energy bill support (Simshauser et al., 2011b). 
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7.3 Key Issues 
This section distils key issues from the analysis of stakeholder publications into four key 
issues. 
The following is a summary of recommendations from the stakeholder literature relevant to 
consumer protections and vulnerable households: 
● A national review of energy concessions (National Energy Affordability Roundtable 
2013, AEMC 2016a, Chester 2013, Owen 2013) to assess opportunities to better target 
them to customers most in need (including extending supports to the working poor) 
and to harmonise their structure across jurisdictions, where substantive differences 
exist. 
● A review of emergency payments (National Energy Affordability Roundtable 2013) 
● Improving adequacy of some income payments such as Newstart and Youth 
Allowance (ACOSS, 2016; SVDP, 2016a) 
● Forging stronger links between concession payments and energy 
efficiency/productivity schemes (Chester 2013) and/or funding for DER. 
● Aligning research into energy affordability and vulnerability with the methodologies 
and publication of the ACOSS Poverty in Australia series: using the 2017 release of the 
2014-15 Household Expenditure Survey for initial work. 
● Align policy, advocacy and research initiatives with corresponding housing 
affordability initiatives. Expand scope to include stronger integration with 
understanding of transport costs (Burke and Ralston, 2015). 
The four key issue categories are: 
● Concession targeting 
● Income adequacy 
● Alignment with Housing Policy 
● Research and analysis 
These main issues can be summarised as: 
● Concessions have not been developed in the context of the changing energy markets 
and are due for a refresh. This provides an opportunity for better targeting of 
expenditure and for the inclusion of customer groups known to be vulnerable but not 
currently eligible for support. 
● Some households have such low incomes that essential services such as energy can 
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easily become unaffordable. The divergence between energy costs and incomes over 
time is exacerbating this issue. 
● Housing energy performance is a key driver of energy costs and housing tenure is a 
key determinant of the options available to respond. Links to housing policy are 
inescapable yet there is limited coordination. 
● Research into poverty and research into energy affordability and energy market 
vulnerability are rarely aligned. Policy development is constrained by the lack of 
context provided by maintaining perspectives on the entire household budget. 
7.4 Policy Analysis 
7.4.1 Literature review of energy poverty studies in Australia 
This section provides a summary of Australian studies seeking to identify demographic 
attributes of households considered most vulnerable to rising energy costs. Overall, these 
various studies paint a complex picture of measurement from which one can conclude that 
there is no universally accepted measure or indicator of household energy affordability in 
Australia. However, close relationships to the costs of other essentials – such as housing and 
transport – regularly recur.  
Chester and Morris produced an early study of energy poverty in the Australian context 
(Chester and Morris, 2011) and concluded that Australia was yet to explicitly recognise energy 
poverty as a distinct social problem and was without a substantive evidence base to inform 
policy making of the consequences of rising prices on low income and vulnerable households. 
A number of studies have subsequently sought to identify demographic attributes of 
households considered most vulnerable to rising energy costs. 
The Brotherhood of St Laurence study Fuel poverty, household income and energy spending: an 
empirical analysis for Australia using HILDA data uses unit record data from the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey (Azpitarte et al., 2015). This study 
tests alternative conceptions of fuel poverty based on analysing income and expenditure (such 
as low income - high energy expenditure) and self-reported financial stress indicators (such 
as couldn’t pay their energy bills and couldn’t afford to heat their home). Those who couldn't 
pay their bills tended to be renters and have children, consistent with the findings of others 
(Simshauser et al., 2011a, 2011b; SVDP, 2016a). On the other hand those with low income and 
high expenditure tended to be pensioners. Those who couldn't heat their home were different 
again. The following groups came through as particularly vulnerable - people living with a 
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disability, who were over-represented in the 'fuel poor' across all definitions, single parents 
and renters.  
Relative Energy Poverty in Australia (Nance 2013, produced as part of this PhD and attached as 
Appendix A) applied lessons from the UK’s approach to measuring fuel poverty to the 
Australian context. Unit record data from the 2009-10 HES was analysed in order to identify 
those with the biggest energy bills and least capacity to pay for them. This study considered 
five different definitions of ‘relative energy poverty’ and identified similar household 
characteristics in each case. The analysis considered after housing cost disposable income and 
identified significant proportions of those at risk relied on wage and salary incomes (often 
referred to as the working poor) and therefore generally ineligible for energy concessions and 
outside of the traditional safety nets of the welfare system. Other characteristics identified 
were single parent households, people living alone (particularly Aged and Disability 
pensioners), low-income renters and ‘dual fuel’ households – those reliant on mains or bottled 
gas. 
The Cooperative Research Centre for Low Carbon Living report Household energy use – 
Consumption and Expenditure Patterns 1993-2012 argues that an understanding of the impacts 
of motor fuel prices on household budgets is required to better understand the distributional 
impacts of carbon policies on affordability (Burke and Ralston, 2015). The study also 
considered income and expenditure measures to self-reported indicators of financial stress 
and, similar to Azpitarte et al (2015), found a rather poor correlation. The study also confirmed 
that families with large numbers of children and renters were more likely to experience an 
inability to pay bills. Further, a majority of households who reported an inability to pay had 
a housing affordability problem, similar to the findings of the St Vincent de Paul Society’s 
analysis of AGL Energy disconnected customers (SVDP, 2016a). 
Chester (2013) provides a substantial evidence base of the lived experience of low-income 
households as a result of rising energy bills and describes the trade-offs some households are 
forced to make between paying their energy bills and using the money to purchase food, pay 
the rent or meet the costs of raising children. Chester is critical of the common policy measures 
of concessions and temporary financial assistance as treating the symptoms and not the causes 
of energy costs and affordability. 
Energy Poverty in Western Australia (BCEC, 2016) draws on data gathered through face to face 
interviews and an online survey of over 4000 individuals. The report finds that single parent 
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families and renters had the highest burden of energy spending. The WA context is relevant 
to consideration of the interaction with housing costs: 
The economic boom in WA has meant rising wages, but those in the lowest income 
brackets have seen the least benefit from the boom and have had to contend with 
rapidly increasing house prices and rents. 
… Rising housing and utility costs are increasing the energy poverty challenge 
The report also states that low income households have often failed to benefit from 
improvements to energy efficiency or from solar power and highlights the relationship to 
income inequality: 
This has the potential to push low income households deeper into energy poverty if 
fuel prices rise and the income gap between the wealthiest and the poorest continues 
to grow. 
In The Energy Market Death Spiral – Rethinking Customer Hardship the authors draw on the 
customer records of AGL Energy and from the 2009-10 HES and conclude that (Simshauser 
and Nelson, 2012): 
… dominant thought on the primacy of customer hardship, aged pensioners, pales into 
insignificance by comparison to those of in the family formation cohort, and in 
particular, those known as Australia’s ‘working poor’. 
Simshauser & Downer conducted analysis of consumption patterns for households on AGL 
Energy’s hardship program and observed higher than average total consumption and 
consumption patterns that were less ‘peaky’ than the average (2014, p. 10). AS discussed in 
section 5.4.1, recent analysis by ESC Victoria confirms that hardship customers tend to 
consume around twice the average volume of electricity (ESCV, 2016). However, customers 
on retailer hardship programs represent less than 1% of residential customers and are not 
necessarily representative of all customers considered vulnerable. It is also not possible to 
conclude whether higher than average consumption is due to poor efficiency, poor quality 
housing or simply from having a large number of people in the household. 
Newgate Research were commissioned to prepare a report for the AEMC’s 2016 annual 
review of retail competition in order to recommend how vulnerable consumers could be 
supported to benefit more from the retail energy market (Newgate Research, 2016). This 
report summarised its market segmentation approach by stating: 
While there is diversity of demographics and circumstances within all segments, 
consumers with certain characteristics are more likely to be vulnerable. These include 
being female (especially single mothers), renting, not being in full-time employment, 
experiencing recent household stress (e.g. arrival of a baby or a death), living in 
regional areas, being Indigenous, being a recent immigrant, having special payment 
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arrangements with one’s energy provider, and having savings that would last less than 
three months. 
Overall, these various studies paint a complex picture of measurement from which one can 
conclude that there is no universally accepted measure or indicator of household energy 
affordability in Australia. However, close relationships to the costs of other essentials – such 
as housing and transport – regularly recur. These analyses of historic income and expenditure 
suggest that a diverse range of household types are represented in the vulnerable household 
cohort although some are at much higher rates than their proportion of the wider community. 
Housing circumstances are clearly a key indicator of vulnerability – the cost of housing 
determines how much room exists in the household budget to pay energy bills and tenure 
determines the scope of actions available to change consumption. 
7.4.2 Future research and analysis needs 
An open policy question is whether there is merit in seeking to align understanding of the 
incidence of energy related hardship with the approach taken to measuring and reporting on 
Poverty in Australia more generally. The 2017 release of the results of the most recent 
Household Expenditure Survey may be an opportunity to align with the methodological 
approach of the ACOSS Poverty and Inequality in Australia series of reports. 
ACOSS in association with the Social Policy and research Centre (SPRC) has produced a ten 
year series of research reports charting the path of poverty in Australia. The analysis is based 
on the ABS Survey of Income and Housing. The survey is conducted every two years but 
various elements are only surveyed in four or six year cycles – including the Household 
Expenditure Survey in 2009-10 and 2013-14.  
The Poverty and Inequality in Australia series aims to provide a stable and independent 
evidence based picture of the situation of poverty and inequality. The data used is consistent, 
giving a longitudinal picture by which to chart the situation of those most vulnerable to 
poverty. Over time various aspects of data capture improve giving rise to more detailed 
analysis. For example housing tenure was included in the reporting for the first time in 2016.  
The issue of energy affordability has been topical for some time but the available data is still 
not consistent and does not currently provide the same rich picture that we can see for other 
sub sets such as income, gender, age and family composition. It is felt that a more consistent 
and regular data capture for energy (as well as for disability and Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples) would significantly enrich the research reports and our understanding of 
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the impact of energy on poverty in Australia. 
 
7.5 Policy Formulation 
Key issues can be summarised as: 
● Concessions have not been developed in the context of the changing energy markets 
and are due for a refresh. This provides an opportunity for better targeting of 
expenditure and for the inclusion of customer groups known to be vulnerable but not 
currently eligible for support. 
● Some households have such low incomes that essential services such as energy can 
easily become unaffordable. The divergence between energy costs and incomes over 
time is exacerbating this issue. 
● Housing energy performance is a key driver of energy costs and housing tenure is a 
key determinant of the options available to respond. Links to housing policy are 
inescapable yet there is limited coordination. 
● Research into poverty and research into energy affordability and energy market 
vulnerability are rarely aligned. Policy development is constrained by the lack of 
context provided by such perspectives on the entire household budget. 
This outcome represents the overlap between the national tax and transfer system and 
jurisdictional energy concessions and emergency payments. Four policy priorities to advance 
the interests of vulnerable consumers have been identified: 
7.5.1 Priority issue 5.1: Targeting of Concessions  
There does not appear to be an appetite from governments to harmonise concessions and the 
sensitivity of state budgets to concession settings is a key reason why. However, the issues are 
raised regularly and there is a demonstrated need to recalibrate eligibility to capture more of 
the ‘working poor’. Potential exists for some rebalancing from concession programs to the 
more reactive and targeted emergency funding programs in place in most jurisdictions 
(currently estimated to be funded 95% to 5%) in order to target those in demonstrated need 
and with existing debt. 
A first order need for policy formulation is to identify a champion or sponsor of a reform 
project that can influence the COAG Energy Council agenda.  
7.5.2 Priority issue 5.2: Housing affordability 
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Strong links between housing affordability and capacity to pay energy bills are evident from 
the results of ABS household expenditure surveys. Opportunities to align energy concession 
eligibility with that for housing affordability measures – such as Commonwealth Rent 
Assistance – are examples of what is possible.  
Given the immaturity of the policy interaction, recommendations for this policy cycle are 
restricted to further research and analysis in order to build a case for change (see issue 5.4 
below). 
7.5.3 Priority issue 5.3: Income Adequacy 
There is no specific energy dimension to this issue but the link between incomes and essential 
expenditure (such as energy, housing and food) should be maintained in the policy 
framework to preserve an important feedback path. The benefits to affordability of an increase 
to the aged pension in 2009 should appear in the results of the 2015-16 HES. This uplift and 
indexation is yet to appear in other payments.  
7.5.4 Priority issue 5.4: Research and analysis 
In 2014, 3 million people (13.3% of the population) including over 730,000 children (17.4% of 
all children under the age of 15) were living below the poverty line after taking account of 
housing costs (ACOSS 2016). Having such low incomes risks vulnerability in the energy 
market. Income inequality is magnified when the context is an essential service such as 
electricity. It is recommended that ECA commission research from ACOSS that reviews 
existing energy affordability research and, when the ABS publish data from the most recent 
Household Expenditure Survey later in 2017, contrast energy consumption and affordability 
with housing and poverty research in the Poverty in Australia series. 
 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered the social welfare policy objective of ensuring households have a 
capacity to pay for essential goods and services. In the energy context, this refers to income 
measures and energy-specific concessions applied at the jurisdictional level.  
This policy outcome has roles and responsibilities spread between Australian, State and 
Territory Governments and between Treasury/Finance, Human Services and Housing 
Portfolios. Policy links to housing access and affordability are evident yet there is little 
evidence of institutional interaction with energy policy.  
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Income comparisons from ACOSS’ Poverty in Australia 2016 illustrated the relative 
performance of salaries and wages compared to pensions and benefits over the last decade. In 
2014, 3 million people (13.3% of the population) including over 730,000 children (17.4% of all 
children under the age of 15) were living below the poverty line after taking account of 
housing costs (ACOSS 2016). Having such low incomes risks vulnerability in the energy 
market. Income inequality is magnified when the context is an essential service such as 
electricity.  
A number of studies have sought to identify demographic attributes of households considered 
most vulnerable to rising energy costs. Overall, these studies have painted a complex picture 
of measurement from which there is no universally accepted measure or indicator of 
household energy affordability in Australia. Opportunities exist to align energy affordability 
research with housing and poverty research when the ABS release data from the most recent 
Household Expenditure Survey later in 2017. 
Energy concessions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and repeated calls have been made 
to improve and align these measures nationally and to improve targeting. While concession 
reform is widely supported, no policy champion has been identified. Estimates of concession 
expenditure and GST revenue have been compared to illustrate that around 55% of GST 
revenue from energy bills is redistributed to eligible households. 
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8 Consequences and Implications 
Restating, the research questions that this thesis sought to answer are:  
• When considering a consumer safety net for consumers in a liberalised electricity market, 
what is an appropriate analytical framework for policy and practice that can be used by 
stakeholders to improve governance and consumer outcomes? 
• Subsequently, what priorities emerge from this framework that could be advanced 
through the policy cycle? 
As described in Chapter 2, the analytical framework developed is based on the notion that a 
liberalised electricity market needs a consumer safety net and that the responsibility for 
providing this net is shared between the electricity industry, governments and the community 
sector. Consequently, the safety net has been distilled to five distinct policy outcomes, all of 
which require attention from those that share these responsibilities in order to minimise the 
number of households that fall through the net: 
Outcome 1: Stable and Efficient Pricing  
Outcome 2: Informed and engaged consumers 
Outcome 3: Energy consumed efficiently and productively 
Outcome 4: Robust consumer protections 
Outcome 5: All households have a capacity to pay their energy bills 
A chapter has been dedicated to analysing each of these outcomes and, following the second 
part of the research question, priority issues have been identified. These are summarised in 
Table 11. 
This chapter considers these issues and the policy formulation section of each chapter to 
develop a summary of recommendations for the actions considered necessary to strengthen 
the market’s consumer safety net.  
Following this a section is dedicated to governance aspects by consolidating the 
recommendations allocated to each stakeholder. 
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Policy Outcome No. Priority Issues 
1. Stable and Efficient Pricing 
1.1 Effectiveness of retail competition 
1.2 Wholesale market volatility 
1.3 Tariff reform 
1.4 Other costs recovered on energy bills (including GST) 
2. Informed and engaged 
consumers 
2.1 Engagement of vulnerable consumers with energy markets 
2.2 Vulnerable consumers unable to engage with energy markets 
3. Energy Consumed Efficiently 
and Productively  
3.1 Split incentives in rental housing 
3.2 Energy productivity programs 
3.3 Consumption patterns 
3.4 Distributed Energy Resources 
4. Robust consumer protection 
4.1 Debt and Disconnection of those unable to pay 
4.2 New Products and Services 
4.3 Life Support Equipment 
4.4 Monitoring and Reporting 
5. Capacity to pay 
5.1 Targeting of Concessions 
5.2 Housing Affordability 
5.3 Income adequacy 
5.4 Research and analysis 
Table 11: Summary of Priority Issues 
 
8.1 Strengthening the safety net 
In relation to pricing, excess profits have been suggested and large price dispersion has been 
demonstrated in a number of recent reports. The Turnbull Government’s March 2017 direction 
to the ACCC to undertake an inquiry into retail electricity pricing as well as a similar inquiry 
by the Victorian Government should ensure that this issue receives significant attention. The 
ACCC is expected to produce a final report by 30 June 2018. 
Similarities to the UK experience are becoming obvious as competition fails to reduce prices 
to efficient levels and substantial price dispersion is evident. Several policy options exist, 
including the re-regulation of pricing. The major retailers have taken voluntary measures but 
it is likely that a rule change proposal will be needed to ensure ongoing protection of 
vulnerable households from standing offer prices.  
Wholesale prices higher than necessary erodes affordability for all consumers but vulnerable 
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consumers, by definition, are especially sensitive to price volatility if translated to bill shock 
when passed on quickly by retailers. On this basis, policy choices that reduce uncertainty 
should benefit vulnerable consumers in particular. The dominance of the gentail vertically 
integrated business model in the NEM means that the ACCC retail pricing inquiry will 
necessarily look at wholesale markets. The Independent Review into the Future Security of 
the National Electricity Market (Finkel Review) and the Australian Government Review of 
climate change policies are also expected to contribute clarity over future directions in energy 
generation. Responsibility for responding to this issue rests with the Commonwealth, State 
and Territory Governments and the CoAG Energy Council. 
Since many of the issues relate to all consumers, not just those at risk of debt disconnection, it 
is appropriate that Energy Consumers Australia allocate resources to researching and 
preparing a rule change proposal that could be initiated soon after the release of the ACCC 
findings. 
Network tariff reform is moving slowly but, as emphasised in the case studies of Chapter 5, 
there is potential for some households to pay less and become less vulnerable to debt and 
disconnection while other are at risk of paying more if they are unable to change consumption 
patterns. The limited likelihood of mandating tariffs without an opt out provision in the near 
term provides some protection for those at risk of paying more. It is therefore recommended 
that Energy Consumers Australia build on the Power Shift project and initiate a project to 
identify vulnerable households with load profiles that would make ‘opt-in’ to demand tariffs 
cost effective. Support from the Australian Energy Council would be critical for effective 
implementation since the framework relies on retailers to translate network prices to small 
customers. Uptake and effectiveness can then be evaluated in anticipation of mandatory 
assignment beyond the next 5-year regulatory cycle. 
The recovery of costs for a range of programs, as well as GST, increases the size of all electricity 
bills and exacerbates affordability challenges for vulnerable households. The consideration of 
new climate policies is an opportunity to contrast options that recover the cost of action on 
climate change from consolidated revenue rather than electricity bills. This way the 
progressive redistribution of the tax and transfer system applies rather than increases in the 
price of energy. This is recommended as a vulnerable customer priority policy area with links 
to concession reform. It is recommended that the Australian Council of Social Service 
(ACOSS), as the peak body for the community sector, consult its membership to develop a 
position on this issue on behalf of vulnerable consumers. This position should be put to COAG 
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Energy Council for consideration as part of designing the National Energy Guarantee and to 
State and Territory Governments in the context of jurisdictional schemes. 
In relation to the ability of vulnerable households to effectively engage with energy markets 
and exercise choice, it is recommended that Energy Consumers Australia seek to be the 
champion of this policy outcome as part of the Power Shift project. Priorities include activities 
and resources that complement the online information presence with material suitable for the 
elderly and those with low levels of English literacy and numeracy. However, for those 
households that are unable to engage effectively, protection from drifting to high priced 
standing offer or market contracts is necessary. It is recommended that this be reflected in the 
response of Energy Consumers Australia to the ACCC pricing inquiry, building on the 
response to priority issues 1.1 and 1.2. 
In relation to the role of energy consumption in the safety net, the perennial issue of split 
incentives in rental housing must be addressed. The pursuit of mandatory disclosure of 
energy performance at point of sale or lease is not as important to many vulnerable 
households as ensuring a minimum standard is met. For many households, the affordability 
of rent, urgency of need and other priorities are likely to override the decision making benefits 
of mandatory disclosure. It is recommended that MEPS for rental housing become a priority 
measure of the National Energy Productivity Plan. This responsibility rests with CoAG 
Energy Council. The first 5-yearly independent review of the Greenhouse and Energy Minimum 
Standards Act 2012 (GEMS Act) was announced in January 2018 and this may represent a key 
opportunity to advance this issue (CoA, 2018). In terms of governance, it is recommended that 
a lead role be taken by National Shelter, as the non-government peak organisation that aims 
to improve housing access, affordability, appropriateness, safety and security for people on 
low incomes. Energy Consumers Australia is well placed to support this work and build the 
policy connections between housing affordability and energy affordability. 
Community scale energy efficiency programs have been part of the Australian energy policy 
landscape since the early days of energy market reform. An opportunity exists to embrace the 
context of change in the market – including tariff reform - to recast these programs as energy 
productivity and learn from past projects. Smart meters and battery storage are providing 
options for programs not previously feasible. Alignment with jurisdictional energy efficiency 
schemes should be a policy priority alongside creating opportunities for low income 
households to access more efficient capital items such as major appliances. It is recommended 
that ECA be assigned responsibility for curating and interpreting all energy consumption 
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programs from around Australia. The ECA Power Shift project is an important current 
initiative in this regard building an evidence base of what works. Expanding the scope to 
state-based initiatives would enhance the value of the research. Stability of funding for future 
programs is an issue that needs national consideration and the ECA role will provide evidence 
for an informed debate.  
The finalisation of the first round of cost reflective network tariffs provides an opportunity to 
test for risks and opportunities from tariff reform. However, the lack of a reliable set of 
consumption profiles is a barrier to comparative analysis and policy formulation. CSIRO have 
initiated work in this area as part of the Network Transformation Roadmap and this 
information would complement the consumption benchmarks already produced by the AER. 
It is recommended that AER’s bill benchmarking work be expanded to develop benchmark 
consumption profiles. 
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) have the potential to be the distinction in a two-tier 
energy market. Without careful pricing, DER can exacerbate cross subsidies and shift costs 
onto already struggling households. Comprehensive policy in this regard needs to balance 
twin objectives of encouraging access to DERs for vulnerable households while minimising 
the shifting of costs on to those unable to afford it. Recommendation 6.6 of the Finkel Review 
was for CoAG Energy Council to (Finkel et al., 2017, p. 25): 
… engage with relevant portfolio areas including housing, and with state, territory and 
local governments, to identify: 
• Opportunities to accelerate the roll out of programs that improve access by low 
income households to distributed energy resources and improvements in 
energy efficiency. 
• Options for subsidised funding mechanisms for the supply of energy efficient 
appliances, rooftop solar photovoltaic and battery storage systems for low 
income consumers.  
It is recommended that Energy Consumers Australia commission further research into the 
risks and opportunities for vulnerable consumers from DER and keep this issue on the CoAG 
Energy Council agenda. 
In relation to the priority consumer protection issues, the most pressing is the increasing 
evidence of a cohort of customers unable to afford ongoing consumption let alone repay debt. 
It is recommended that ECA actively support partnership opportunities between energy 
retailers, community sector agencies, particularly financial counsellors and governments. 
Leadership will be needed from the Australian Energy Council (AEC) and, for consumers, 
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from ACOSS and/or Financial Counsellors Australia (FCA). 
Households registered with life support equipment have a need for very high reliability and 
the opportunities from cost effective storage, smart meters and energy management are a 
logical match that would benefit from policy coordination. Alignment with NDIS funding and 
alignment with concession reform should be policy priorities. It is recommended that ECA 
commission research into the opportunities and barriers to these consumers having their 
needs met by the energy markets. 
The evidence base for vulnerable consumer policy advocacy would be enhanced by the 
capability to provide a consolidated, national picture of energy consumer protection issues. 
This would consolidate information published by energy regulators, energy Ombudsman 
schemes and ACL agencies. It is recommended that ECA consolidate, curate and publish a 
national picture of energy consumer protection data on its website. Similar to the Energy 
Security Board’s Health of the National Electricity Market report (Energy Security Board, 2017), 
this could be a Health of the NEM’s Safety Net report. 
The fifth outcome, All households have a capacity to pay their energy bills, has a clear need for 
leadership from social policy. In this case, it is recommended that the focus be on coordinated 
research and analysis that connects energy affordability with general poverty research. The 
absence of a robust evidence base undermines progress on the impact of broader cost of living 
issues based on an understanding of, and response to, energy affordability and the strength 
of the NEM’s consumer safety net. It is recommended that ECA commission research from 
ACOSS that reviews existing energy affordability research and, when the ABS publish data 
from the most recent Household Expenditure Survey, contrast energy consumption and 
affordability with housing and poverty research in the Poverty in Australia series. A critical 
component of this must be to identify attributes of households that are vulnerable to debt and 
disconnection but not eligible for existing energy concessions.  
The recommendations in the above summary has allocated responsibilities to different 
stakeholders. The following sections summarise these from the perspective of these 
stakeholders. 
 
8.2 Energy Consumers Australia 
As the institution resourced to advance consumer issues, ECA has been assigned many of the 
recommendations that emerge from the research documented in this thesis. In summary these 
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are: 
• Allocate resources to researching and preparing a rule change proposal that can be 
initiated soon after the release of the ACCC Inquiry into Electricity supply and prices, due 
in mid 2018. This responds to priority issues 1.1, 1.2 and 2.2. 
• Build on the Power Shift project and initiate a project to identify vulnerable households 
with load profiles that would make ‘opt-in’ to demand tariffs cost effective. Uptake and 
effectiveness can then be evaluated in anticipation of mandatory assignment beyond the 
next 5-year regulatory cycle. This responds to priority issue 1.3. 
• Build on the Power Shift project and initiate projects to identify initiatives that enhance 
the ability of vulnerable households to effectively engage with energy markets and 
exercise choice. This responds to priority issue 2.1. 
• Expanding the scope of Power Shift to incorporate state-based initiatives into the research 
and analysis of what works. This responds to priority issue 3.2. 
• Build on the Power Shift project and commission further research into the risks and 
opportunities for vulnerable consumers from DER. This work should include a focus on 
opportunities from DER for customers with life support equipment. This responds to 
priority issues 3.4 and 4.3 as well as recommendation 6.6 of the Finkel Review. 
• Support National Shelter in advancing policy development of minimum energy 
performance standards for rental housing. This responds to priority issues 3.1 and 5.3. 
• Support Financial Counsellors Australia to develop policy on how the safety net can 
respond to the increasing evidence of a cohort of customers unable to afford ongoing 
consumption let alone repay debt. This responds to priority issue 4.1. 
• consolidate, curate and publish a national picture of energy consumer protection data on 
its website. Similar to the Energy Security Board’s Health of the National Electricity Market 
report (Energy Security Board, 2017), this could be a Health of the NEM’s Safety Net report. 
As part of this, commission research from ACOSS that reviews existing energy 
affordability research and, when the ABS publish data from the most recent Household 
Expenditure Survey, contrast energy consumption and affordability with housing and 
poverty research in the Poverty in Australia series. A critical component of this must be to 
identify attributes of households that are vulnerable to debt and disconnection but not 
eligible for existing energy concessions. This responds to priority issues 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 
and 5.4 
8.3 Community Sector 
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• Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), as the peak body for the community sector, 
consult its membership to develop a position on behalf of vulnerable consumers on the 
recovery of other costs on energy bills. This responds to priority issue 1.4. 
• ACOSS, with support from ECA should review existing energy affordability research and, 
when the ABS publish data from the most recent Household Expenditure Survey, contrast 
energy consumption and affordability with housing and poverty research in the Poverty 
in Australia series. This responds to priority issue 5.4. 
• National Shelter (as the non-government peak organisation that aims to improve housing 
access, affordability, appropriateness, safety and security for people on low incomes), with 
support from Energy Consumer Australia, to advance policy development of minimum 
energy performance standards for rental housing. An independent review of the 
Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards Act 2012 (GEMS Act) was announced in January 
2018 and this is a key opportunity to advance this issue (CoA, 2018). This responds to 
priority issue 3.1. 
• Financial Counsellors Australia (FCA), with support from ECA and the AEC, should lead 
policy development on how the safety net can respond to the increasing evidence of a 
cohort of customers unable to afford ongoing consumption let alone repay debt. This 
responds to priority issue 4.1. 
8.4 CoAG Energy Council 
As the nation’s peak energy policy forum, CoAG Energy Council must respond decisively to 
the findings of the ACCC Inquiry into Electricity supply and prices. Further, 
• It is recommended that CoAG Energy Council commit further funds to ECA in support of 
the extensions to Power Shift detailed herein. 
• It is recommended that MEPS for rental housing become a priority measure of the 
National Energy Productivity Plan. This responds to priority issues 3.1 and 5.2. 
8.5 Australian Energy Regulator 
• It is recommended that AER’s bill benchmarking work be expanded to develop 
benchmark consumption profiles for different households. This responds to priority issue 
3.3. 
8.6 Australian Energy Council 
As the industry peak body for the competitive parts of the market, the AEC will need to take 
a leadership role in the industry’s obligations under the shared responsibility model. Key 
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recommendations are: 
• Support ECA in a project to identify vulnerable households with load profiles that would 
make ‘opt-in’ to demand tariffs cost effective. 
• Support Financial Counsellors Australia to develop policy on how the safety net can 
respond to the increasing evidence of a cohort of customers unable to afford ongoing 
consumption let alone repay debt. This responds to priority issue 4.1. 
8.7 Further Academic Research 
Considering energy affordability in the context of housing affordability and household size 
requires comprehensive statistical analysis that was beyond the scope of this thesis. and the 
recommendations reflect this by incorporating energy affordability research into the Poverty 
in Australia research by ACOSS and the Social Policy Research Centre.  
Beyond this, there are other aspects that would complement the foundation that this thesis’ 
safety net framework provides. 
Access to technology is clearly emerging as the key driver of a redistribution of electricity 
expenditure between households. And, clearly, the ability to take advantage of these 
developments pivots on access to and affordability of these technologies. Advanced metering 
is one example where aspects of the safety net – such as stable pricing – can be supported. 
Further research in this area – combining technical and behavioural disciplines - is warranted. 
The term no regrets has seen wide contemporary use in relation to climate change related risk 
management and links to poverty and vulnerability (Heltberg et al., 2009) and the notion of 
no regrets actions to advance both social policy and energy policy is an appealing concept. It 
acknowledges that not everything that advances the objectives of social policy will also 
advance the objectives of energy policy or vice-versa but that when the opportunities arise, 
they can be and should be prioritised. Prominent infrastructure regulation academic Paul 
Joskow once referred to a key regulatory priority for developing economies as crafting 
regulatory mechanisms “ … that balance efficiency and distributional goals” (Joskow, 1999) and it 
is felt that such no regrets opportunities are a way of doing exactly that without distorting the 
efficiency basis that has taken so long to reach prominence in developed economies. The 
recommendation to identify those households with consumption profiles that should incur 
lower costs under cost reflective tariffs (Priority issue 3.3) is an example of this. There are 
likely to be more and this is considered a prospective area of future research. 
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International perspectives have not received the comprehensive review that they deserve. 
Further research into safety nets and shared responsibility in other liberalised markets will 
need to be put in their local context but it is expected that the framework applied here (the 
five outcomes and the initial steps of theoretical policy cycle) will be equally applicable in a 
range of settings. It is expected that useful lessons are there to be identified, analysed and 
assessed. The repeated application of the framework can only benefit its refinement before a 
repeat application to Australia’s National Electricity Market.  
Reiterating earlier statements, the multi-disciplinary nature of the topic is a defining and 
positive feature of the work that must also be acknowledged as a limitation. The nature of the 
topic is better suited to a research collaboration rather than a single researcher’s thesis and 
this would go a long way to overcome these limitations in future applications of the 
framework.  
 
8.8 Final remarks 
In conclusion, a shared responsibility for the consumer safety net of a liberalised electricity 
market requires a robust framework that allows for a comprehensive perspective and the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities in responding to the issues identified. No 
recommendation has been made for a central entity to manage and coordinate the activity, 
but the proposed framework and the analysis provided should be considered a solid 
foundation upon which further work by multiple stakeholders can pursue the interests of the 
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WHAT?  Energy prices for Australian households have increased significantly in recent years. 
Most commentary has focussed on the causes of the increases; this report is focussed on the 
effects. 
WH O?  While most people would say they struggle to pay their electricity and gas bills, this 
project has analysed actual income and expenditure data to identify those households that have 
the biggest energy bills and the least capacity to pay for them. 
WH Y?  Governments are responding to rising energy prices by accelerating energy market 
reform. Policymakers and consumer advocates can refine their policy responses by understanding 
characteristics of the households in most need. 
WH EN?  The analysis is based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009-10 Household 
Expenditure Survey and Survey of Income and Housing and precedes many of the recent price 
rises. Average energy prices have increased by 40% since the survey but the findings about who is 
most at risk are considered to remain valid. 
WH ERE?  This research has applied lessons from the UK’s approach to measuring fuel 
poverty to the Australian context. 
H OW?  This research has considered five alternative definitions of relative energy poverty. The 
cohorts of households formed by these five alternative definitions have been compared across a 
range of attributes such as income, housing status, household size and family structure.  
KEY  F INDINGS  
• There is no need to select a single definition of ‘energy poverty’ in order to inform policy: all 
five alternative definitions considered in this research identify similar groups of households.  
• Significant proportions of those in relative energy poverty rely on wage and salary income and 
therefore fall outside of the traditional safety nets of the welfare system. 
• Other characteristics that increase the likelihood of being in energy poverty are: 
o Single parent households; 
o People living alone, particularly Aged and Disability pensioners living alone; 
o Low income renters, particularly those who rent privately; 







I N T R O D U C T I O N  
The concept of fuel poverty is well developed in public policy in the UK and Europe. The contemporary 
understanding of fuel poverty emerged over 20 years ago53 and distinguishes those households whose poverty 
is either due to, or made worse by, high required spending on energy to keep warm. 
This terminology and concept has not been widely adopted by public policy in Australia and there is no 
agreed method for identifying those households most at risk of not keeping up with the cost of energy.  
Chester and Morris54 prefer the term energy poverty for the Australian context and that is the term used 
throughout this report. Use of the preface relative is acknowledgement of a global sustainable development 
context where access to energy is seen as a way out of absolute poverty in developing economies55. In that 
sense, what is being discussed in relation to the mature economies of the UK and Australia is one of relative 
poverty. 
The consequences of relative energy poverty can be considered in two ways. Firstly, some consumers will ration 
consumption to a point where health can be put at risk. Secondly, other consumers will continue to 
consume and incur costs that exceed the household’s capacity to pay. This can result in increasing debt, 
compromising on other essentials such as food or medicine and/or, ultimately, disconnection from supply. 
In both respects, there is a clear risk to social policy objectives around public health, social inclusion and 
child protection. 
The aim of this research project has been to examine responses to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) in order to identify those households considered to meet a 
range of alternative definitions of relative energy poverty: a cohort representing around 5-10% of households 
that can be considered to be most at risk of not keeping up as energy prices rise.  
The distributional impacts of energy market reforms will always need to be assessed: it seems reasonable 
that it will always be important to continue to test the resilience of the safety nets and using relative energy 
poverty as a conceptual basis for this appears to be sound. 
Lessons from the UK 
The UK Government has been reviewing its approach to measuring and responding to fuel poverty and 
recently revealed its response to the high profile Hills Fuel Poverty Review of 2011-1256. This research 
project has sought to apply some of the recommendations and lessons from the UK experience to 
Australia’s energy markets.  
The measurement aspect of fuel poverty in the UK has two main public policy purposes. The characteristics 
of the households in the cohort (such as household size and composition, housing tenure etc.) are used to 
                                               
53 The Hills Fuel Poverty review Interim Report acknowledges Dr Brenda Boardman’s 1991 book Fuel Poverty as the origin of the current 
conceptualisation of the issue. It also acknowledges earlier studies that contributed to the development of the concept from the 1970’s. 
54 Chester, Lynne and Morris, Alan, 2012, ‘A new form of energy poverty has become the scourge of liberalised electricity sectors’ 
55 See, for example, The United Nations Sustainable Energy For All initiative at http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/  








design interventions that target those most in need – improving the efficacy and efficiency of public 
expenditure. The size of the cohort is used to indicate both scale and progress.  
This project only seeks to match this first aim. Noting the range of views expressed in consultation on the 
UK’s new approach to measurement57, the approach taken here has been to develop multiple alternative 
definitions of relative energy poverty and to see if these cohorts have similar compositions. The rationale being 
that if a range of definitions suggest similar attributes for those households most at risk then debate over a 
‘best’ measure is less important. 
This research has not sought to quantify the scale of energy poverty in Australia. The UK government 
publish estimates of the total number of households and people in fuel poverty. Such an output is inevitably 
controversial and easily politicised. Instead, this research has examined a number of approaches to defining 
a relative energy poverty cohort in order to understand their attributes for the purposes of informing the design 
of public policy responses. 
The approach 
The five alternative definitions of relative energy poverty include three objective and two subjective 
measures and produce the following five household cohorts that vary in size from 2% to 14% of the 
households in the survey: 
Cohort name Description 
Weighted 
Count 
% of All 
households 
1. Low Income High 
Cost 
Below income threshold, above median energy expenditure 782,409 12% 
2. Low Income and 
energy > 10% 
Below income threshold, energy expenditure > 10% of 
capacity to pay 
386,936 5.7% 
3. Energy > 10% energy expenditure > 10% of capacity to pay 434,054 6.4% 
4. could not pay utility bill Financial Stress Indicator: survey respondent could not pay 
utility bill in last 12 months due to shortage of money 
939,254 14% 
5. unable to heat home Financial Stress Indicator: survey respondent unable to heat 
home in last 12 months due to shortage of money. 
138,520 2.0% 
Table 12: Five possible energy poverty cohorts for comparison 
These five cohorts have been compared and contrasted over a range of household attributes. These are: 
• State or territory of usual residence 
• The number of adults and children in the household, family composition and ‘lifecycle’ stages 
                                               







• Housing status in terms of ownership or landlord type 
• The source of income and the dominant types of pensions and benefits received 
• Eligibility for state based energy concessions 
• The use of gas versus ‘all electric’ homes 
In order to obtain more detailed insights, the analysis was also repeated for four discrete household types 
that emerged from the initial review: 
• Aged Pension recipients 
• Disability Pension recipients 
• Households with children (dependents under 15 years of age) 
• Wage and Salary earners 
 
This report includes a Technical Appendix that documents the methodology and detailed results. 









W H Y  R E L A T I V E  E N E R G Y  P O V E R T Y ?  
An important aspect of the UK’s new fuel poverty target is in the way the Hills Poverty Review reframed 
the problem of fuel poverty58. As acknowledged in the UK Government’s response, Professor Hills 
conceptualised it as a relative and structural issue. This has been interpreted in the government response as 
requiring a different focus for action to: 
“… one of on-going efforts to mitigate and reduce the extent of fuel poverty, to ensure that the fuel poor do not get 
left behind, rather than approach concerned with eradication.” 
The notion that fuel poverty is a relative issue that focuses on the plight of those households at risk of 
getting “left behind” is an appealing one. The UK approach since 2000 has been driven by the WHECA 
which places an obligation on the Secretary of State to deliver on an objective of ensuring that, as far as 
reasonably practicable, no person lives in fuel poverty (i.e a household living on a lower income in a home 
which cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost) 59. 
The consideration of fuel poverty as a relative issue is consistent with the findings of Dilnot and Helm 
(1987)60 in relation to energy as a merit good61. At a time when energy market liberalisation was gaining 
momentum in the UK, the authors concluded that energy for households was both an absolute and a 
participation merit good: that there is both an absolute requirement for survival and a relative requirement 
for ongoing participation and inclusion in society. 
The UK government is convinced the new relative indicator62: 
“… underpins better policy making and allows us to set a framework to encourage continual action and 
improvement”  
The pragmatism of alleviation instead of elimination appears to have been formed on the back of over a decade 
of initiatives since the original fuel poverty targets were established in 2000. In the contemporary Australian 
context of price rises and an expansive energy market reform program that will impact on future prices, 
price structures and total costs, the idea of a method that focuses attention on those most likely to be at 
risk of getting “left behind” seems like a long-term need for robust policy analysis. 
The distributional impacts of energy market reforms will always need to be assessed: it seems reasonable 
that it will always be important to continue to test the resilience of the safety nets and using relative energy 
poverty as a conceptual basis for this appears to be sound. 
  
                                               
58 Fuel Poverty: a Framework for Future Action, UK Department of Energy and Climate Change July 2013, p12 
59 A household is defined as being in fuel poverty if it would need to spend more than 10% of its income to achieve an adequate standard 
of warmth (21oC for the main living room and 18oC for other rooms) – DECC 2013a Fuel Poverty: Government Response to the consultation 
on the framework for measurement July 2013, p6 
60 Dilnot and Helm  Energy Policy, Merit Goods and Social Security in Fiscal Studies August 1987 Volume 8, Issue 3 p29-48. 
61 In this context, the relevant attribute of merit goods is that households tend to under-consume even though there is a private or public 
benefit in them doing so. The most obvious case for energy is that of avoiding the negative health impacts of cold homes. In Australia this 
would translate to both cold winters and summer heat waves. 







T H E  A U S T R A L I A N  P O L I C Y  C O N T E X T  
To quote the most recent Australian Government Energy White Paper (CoA 2012a)63: 
“Ensuring that consumers, particularly those who are most vulnerable, are able to manage energy costs effectively is 
also increasingly important. The continued provision of adequate assistance to vulnerable consumers through a sound 
general safety net, well-targeted jurisdictional concession regimes and appropriate community service obligations 
remains critical.  
Such assistance should be transparent and not undermine competitive pricing structures, which reflect, as efficiently 
as possible, the underlying costs of supply. It is more efficient for assistance to be provided through properly targeted 
social policy settings, rather than energy policy settings, to ensure that energy market signals are preserved.” 
(emphasis added) 
Such statements are consistent with the general approach to energy market reform in Australia since the 
1990’s. In summary, the contemporary energy policy perspective is that markets should do what they do 
well – pursue efficiencies through cost reflective pricing, competition and/or best practice regulation – and 
that the equity objectives of social policy should be transparently and publicly funded. In particular, there 
is a strong message about not distorting prices in order to meet equity objectives. Rather, prices should be 
allowed to rise to efficient levels and any ‘gap’ in affordability should be met through either income 
measures (the references to the safety net) or community service obligations (such as energy specific 
concessions). 
This research has approached this issue from a perspective that public policy in this area represents an 
interface between the traditional domains of energy policy and social policy. As energy policy pursues 
market-led productivity gains and energy prices become more cost reflective, the affordability of energy for 
the least affluent in the community is under significant pressure.  
In Australia, the formal relationship between energy policy and social policy is a fragmented one that spans 
a number of government departments in each of the Commonwealth, state and territory governments. It 
encompasses aspects of the tax and transfer system, housing policy, climate change, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy policy. It is possible to imagine the interface between energy policy and social policy as 
representing the safety net of the energy markets. This net is woven of multiple measures that aim to ensure 
ongoing access to energy, especially electricity, for households. 
In liberalised markets such as in the UK and Australia’s National Electricity Market, the principal interface 
between consumers and the energy markets is the Energy Retailer. In Australia these are largely privately 
owned enterprises that are licensed under state-based or, for some jurisdictions, by the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) under the expanding National Energy Customer Framework (NECF). 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) is 
                                               







Australia’s principal energy policy forum. In relation to the NECF, the SCER states64: 
“The NECF has been developed in recognition that energy is an essential service for all Australians and seeks to 
provide strong protections for Australians struggling to pay their energy bills. It will operate in a complementary way 
with general consumer protection laws that apply in the energy sectors at both state and Commonwealth level, including 
privacy laws and the Australian Consumer Law. 
State and territory energy laws will continue to supplement key customer protection aspects of the NECF through 
measures such as energy ombudsman and guaranteed service level schemes, and social policy initiatives such as 
community service obligations65.” 
The NECF incorporates a concept of customer hardship and the responsibilities of retailers in this regard. The 
NECF is guided by a principle that disconnection is a last resort and provides protection for customers in 
the form of mandatory hardship programs by retailers and protection from disconnection if customers can 
stick to a payment plan agreed between customer and retailer. According to the Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER)66: 
Payment plans 
Ask your retailer for a payment plan—where you pay for your energy in regular agreed amounts (instalments). Your 
retailer must offer you a payment plan unless you have already been on two or more plans in the last year and did 
not keep to them. 
When working out your payment plan instalment amount, your retailer must take into account your capacity to pay 
(what you can afford to pay each week or fortnight), as well as how much you owe and how much energy you are 
likely to use over the coming year. (emphasis added) 
Only agree to an instalment amount you can realistically afford, because if you don’t stick to the payment plan or 
skip payments your plan will be cancelled and you could be disconnected. If you do stick to your payment plan, your 
retailer cannot disconnect you. 
Disconnection can be initiated by a Retailer when a customer accrues arrears for which they do not 
demonstrate a willingness or capacity to repay. The Energy Retailer’s Association of Australia, the 
representative organisation of Australia’s licensed energy retailers, publishes a hardship policy that outlines 
the role seen by retailers in this regard67: 
“At any one time there will be members of the community facing financial hardship. This can be either temporary 
hardship, where someone might be going through a difficult period, or chronic hardship, where people are indefinitely 
in a financially disadvantaged position. Energy retailers provide hardship programs for people who are having 
                                               
64 http://www.scer.gov.au/workstreams/energy-market-reform/national-energy-customer-framework/  
65 Community service obligations primarily refer to energy concessions and state-wide price equalisation schemes. 
66 AER webpage “Experiencing trouble paying your energy bills?” www.aer.gov.au/consumers/my-energy-bill/problems-paying accessed 
15.09.2013 







temporary difficulty paying for their energy consumption.” 
As can be seen, emphasis is placed on differentiating temporary and chronic hardship. In relation to chronic 
hardship, the ERAA policy also states: 
“The role of an energy retailer is not to administer social welfare policy: this is a core function of Governments. 
Hardship is best addressed through comprehensive social welfare policies, because after all, if someone is having 
difficulty paying their energy bills, then they are also probably having trouble paying their other bills and debts. 
… Price regulation is not an effective mechanism to protect people facing hardship.” 
The ERAA position is consistent with the earlier summary of the energy policy perspective that social policy 
has a key role to play in ensuring access to affordable energy that market-focussed energy policy either 
cannot or should not play – especially for those considered to be in “chronic’ hardship. From a consumer’s 
perspective, it is the combined influence of social policy and energy policy that they experience day to day. 
Any efforts to reconcile this policy dilemma should be based on an understanding of those households 
most affected. This is the rationale behind this project. 
W H A T ’ S  C H A N G E D  S I N C E  2 0 0 9 - 1 0 ?  
 
In the time since the Household Expenditure Survey, financial year 2009-10, energy prices have significantly 
outpaced general inflation in the Australian economy as shown in Figure 46 (over 40% in nominal terms). 
As well as persistent media and political commentary on price rises68, the consumption patterns of 
households have been materially impacted by the combined impact of prices on energy conservation and 
the uptake of solar photovoltaic power systems. Figure 47 is adapted from the latest energy forecasts from 
the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) and illustrates the decline in consumption of around 5% 
across the residential and commercial sectors since around 2009-10, the time of the Household Expenditure 
Survey. 
 
                                               












Figure 47: Residential and commercial electricity consumption trends since the 2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey 
(source: AEMO National Energy Forecasting Report 2013)69 
                                               







Figure 48 is also adapted from the latest forecasts from the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) 
and illustrates the exponential growth in small scale solar photovoltaic power systems in the NEM since 
2009-10. 
  
Figure 48: Small scale solar power system uptake trends since the 2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey (source: AEMO 
National Energy Forecasting Report 2013) 70 
The implications of these developments for the findings from the HES analysis have been considered. The 
analysis has sought to understand the distributional impacts of energy expenditure so the findings can be 
expected to be impacted if the subsequent price rises have been distributed differently to expenditure during 
the survey. There is reason to believe that the uptake of solar and redistribution of costs via feed-in tariffs 
will have skewed costs toward those without solar. It is expected, but not known for sure, that the relative 
energy poverty cohort would have a relatively low uptake of solar due to having limited financial capacity 
for the upfront costs but also because of the high proportion of renters.  
On the basis that solar is the main contributor to redistribution, it is considered that the conclusions drawn 
from the 2009-10 HES data will remain valid at the time of this report (2013): the price rises since the HES 
are expected to deepen the energy poverty of those affected but not materially change the composition of 
households in question. 
  
                                               







M E T H O D O L O G Y  S U M M A R Y  
Just like its predecessor, the UK’s new fuel poverty measure plays out on the relationship between income 
and expenditure. However, the new indicator utilises an equivalised, after-housing-cost measure and 
expenditure is also equivalised to allow comparability between households of different sizes. For this 
research, the income dimension is referred to as ‘capacity to pay’ and is represented by equivalised after 
housing cost disposable income on the horizontal axis and equivalised energy expenditure on the vertical. 
The 2009-10 HES data maps onto these axes as shown in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 49:Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay 2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey 
The UK fuel poverty approach is to identify a cohort of households considered most at risk. In general 
terms, the previous UK approach of 10% of income required to be spent on energy would identify a cohort 








Figure 50: Illustration of ‘energy poverty’ defined by exceeding an expenditure threshold expressed as a % of income (or capacity to pay) 
The UK’s new LIHC approach defines the fuel poverty cohort by setting two separate thresholds: one for 
income and one for expenditure. The new indicator, depicted in Figure 51 finds a household to be fuel 
poor if: 
a. Their income is below the poverty line (taking into account energy costs); and 
b. Their energy costs are higher than is typical for their household type. 
 
Figure 51: Illustration of ‘energy poverty’ defined by exceeding an expenditure threshold expressed as a fixed amount and falling below 
an income threshold 
The income threshold is set at the poverty line (after housing costs) plus an amount to cover the cost of 
the energy bills. That is, the income threshold captures all households who, after paying for their energy 
bills and housing costs, are left with an income at or below the poverty line. In turn, the poverty line is set 
as a percentage of the median income for a household of the same size. 
A hybrid approach has also been examined as part of this research. This combines the two UK approaches 








Figure 52: Illustration of ‘energy poverty’ defined by exceeding an expenditure threshold expressed as a % of income (or capacity to pay) 
and falling below an income threshold 
These three alternative definitions of relative energy poverty are discussed in more detail in the Technical 
Appendix accompanying this report.  
In a review of the UK fuel poverty measure for UK energy regulator OFGEM, Owen (2010)71 discusses 
subjective measures as supplements or alternates to the objective measures (i.e. based on actual incomes 
and expenditures). The 2009-10 HES included questions relating to Financial Stress Indicators72 that can 
similarly provide subjective indicators relevant to the research objective. There are two indicators directly 
related to energy expenditure: 
• “Whether could not pay gas/electricity/telephone bill on time due to shortage of money” in 
variable [cfelectr] 
• “Unable to heat home due to shortage of money” in variable [cfnoheat] 
The “could not pay utility bill” cohort represents 14% of households (weighted) while the “unable to heat 
home” represents a cohort of 2% of households.  
A set of five cohorts, three objective and two subjective, can therefore be identified and compared. These 
are shown in Table 13. 
  
                                               
71 Review of the UK fuel poverty measure, Report for Ofgem, Gill Owen, Sustainability First March 2010 from 
http://www.sustainabilityfirst.org.uk/publications.htm  







Cohort name Description 
Weighted 
Count. 
% of All 
households 
1. Low Income High 
Cost 
Below income threshold, above median energy expenditure 782,409 12% 
2. Low Income and 
energy > 10% 
Below income threshold, energy expenditure > 10% of 
capacity to pay 
386,936 5.7% 
3. Energy > 10% energy expenditure > 10% of capacity to pay 434,054 6.4% 
4. could not pay utility bill Financial Stress Indicator: could not pay utility bill in last 12 
months due to shortage of money 
939,254 14% 
5. unable to heat home Financial Stress Indicator: unable to heat home in last 12 
months due to shortage of money. 
138,520 2.0% 
Table 13: Five possible energy poverty cohorts for comparison 
 
These five cohorts have then been compared across a range of attributes. The categories of attributes 
considered are: 
• State or territory of usual residence 
• The number of adults and children in the household, family composition and ‘lifecycle’ stages 
• Housing status in terms of tenure and landlord type 
• The source of income and the dominant types of pensions and benefits received 
• The use of gas versus ‘all electric’ 









F I N D I N G S  
• There is no need to select a single definition of ‘energy poverty’ in order to inform policy: the 
five alternative definitions considered in this research identify similar groups of households.  
• Significant proportions of those in relative energy poverty rely on wage and salary income and 
therefore fall outside of the traditional safety nets of the welfare system. 
• Other characteristics that increase the likelihood of being in energy poverty are: 
o Single parent households; 
o People living alone, particularly Aged and Disability pensioners living alone; 
o Low income renters, particularly those who rent privately; 
o Dual Fuel households – those reliant on mains or bottled gas. 
A. State or territory of usual residence 
Findings 
The risk of energy poverty varies significantly between the states. This is due to a range of factors 
including the range of climates, differences in incomes and housing costs as well as differences in energy 
prices and concession regimes. 
In 2009-10, on objective measures, households in Victoria and Tasmania were more likely to be in 
energy poverty than for other jurisdictions. This is due to colder climates driving above average 
consumption. The climate also drives relatively high consumption in the ACT and NT but this was 
offset by lower prices and higher incomes. 
However, on subjective measures, the difference between states was less pronounced. 
Implications for policy 
On objective measures, the incidence of hardship varied substantially between states. The variations 
are due to a range of factors not just differences in energy prices. The NECF provides a common 
national framework for the relationship between households and energy businesses but the local 
context can be expected to continue to be a strong determinant of who is most at risk of relative energy 
poverty. 
Both Victoria and Tasmania have reformed their concession regimes in the years since the 2009-10 
survey. A longitudinal study that repeats this analysis on the next Household Expenditure Survey may 









B. The size and structure of the households 
Findings 
Energy expenditure is strongly influenced by both income and household size. Income also tends to 
increase as household size increases. The methodology has sought to equivalised both expenditure and 
capacity to pay so that households of different sizes can be compared. Further research in this area of 
equivalisation for household size may be useful for refining energy consumption benchmarks. 
Couple-only households are clearly the least likely to fall into relative energy poverty. This is particularly 
true for couples under 65. Couple-only household are around one quarter of all households in the 
study. 
Those identified as being in relative energy poverty include a significant proportion of people living 
alone (around 40% in each case compared to 23% of all households in the study) 
The family compositions most likely to fall into relative energy poverty are single parent households 
and couples with very young children (eldest< 5 years). 
Implications for policy 
People living alone, single parents and families with young children are the most likely to fall into energy 
poverty.  
Cost reflective pricing is likely to increase fixed supply charges (to, for example, include more capacity-
based prices) and this may particularly impact those living alone, for whom these charges represent a 
greater proportion of bills. 
 
C. Housing Status 
Findings 
On all measures, relative energy poverty is biased towards renters and those renting privately in 
particular. 
All three objective cohorts have households renting from state and territory housing authorities (public 
rental) at lower rates than the proportion of these households that fall below the income threshold. 
This is likely to be a result of capped housing costs. However, the subjective measures show greater 
proportions for public renters, especially those unable to heat their homes due to a shortage of money. 
This may reflect the influence of the ‘worst performing’ public housing stock. 







Renters face particular barriers to energy efficiency (often referred to as the landlord-tenant split 
incentive) and this may explain why those renting privately are most at risk of energy poverty. Renting 
can also mean moving house relatively often and needing to negotiate new energy contracts each time. 
This can represent both a risk and opportunity. 
 
D. The source of income and the types of pensions and benefits received 
Findings 
This study has only considered those households whose main source of income is wages and salaries 
or government pensions and benefits. This is around 80% of all households. 
By all measures, at least one quarter of those in relative energy poverty have wages or salaries as the 
main source of household income. At least half of these households receive ‘no social assistance 
benefits in cash’ and would therefore be considered to be outside the welfare system. The other half 
mainly receives the Family Tax Benefit. All of these households would be unlikely to be eligible for an 
energy concession in any jurisdiction. 
Households reliant on government pensions and allowances as their main source of income represent 
around two-thirds to three quarters of each energy poverty cohort. The adequacy of the income safety 
net is therefore a critical determinant of relative energy poverty, but not a comprehensive one. 
Implications for Policy 
The safety nets of income support and concessions do not reach a significant proportion (around one 
quarter) of those in relative energy poverty. These households are still eligible to access the various 
jurisdictional emergency payment schemes (discretionary payments dispensed on need rather than 
regular payments based on fixed eligibility criteria). Policymakers should consider the relative 




The concession information in the HES microdata is added post-survey as part of the ABS Fiscal 
Incidence Study (FIS) based on interpreting eligibility criteria. There are significant mismatches in the 
number of eligible households between the ABS data and that published by jurisdictional regulators. 
Implications for Policy 
Issues exist in relation to reconciling the FIS data with the concession data published by jurisdictional 







not eligible to receive a concession and suggest that further work on the targeting of concessions is 
warranted. 
 
F. Dual Fuel households versus ‘all electric’ 
Findings 
Even when corrected for household size, dual fuel households tend to spend 25-30% more on energy 
than all-electric households. 
For low income households, being all-electric reduces the likelihood of falling into energy poverty. 
Implications for Policy 
Gas prices have risen significantly since 2009-10 and are projected to increase even further as export 
parity pricing increases its influence on domestic gas markets. Concessions and emergency payments 
will need to consider their ability to preserve affordability as prices rise. 
 
G. Analysis of Specific Household Types 
G1. Aged Pension Recipients 
Findings 
Aged Pension recipients most likely to be in relative energy poverty are those living alone (>50% of all 
cohorts), those renting (especially privately) and dual fuel households. 
Implications for Policy 
The UK’s approach to fuel poverty73 considers the aged to be particularly vulnerable to negative health 
effects of cold homes and this is consistent with the findings of recent climate risk and adaptation 
vulnerability analyses being developed for Australia74. Combined with the analysis in this report, a 
particular focus on the elderly living alone may be justified. 
G2. Disability Support Pension Recipients 
Findings 
Disability Support Pension recipients most likely to be in relative energy poverty are those living alone, 
                                               
73 For example, John Hills 2012 “Getting the measure of fuel poverty. Final report of the Fuel Poverty Review” p15 
74 This work is being coordinated by the National Climate Change Adaptation and Research Facility (NCCARF; www.nccarf.edu.au). For 
example refer to Sevoyan, A, Hugo, G, Feist, H, Tan, G, McDougall, K, Tan, Y & Spoehr, J 2013, Impact of climate change on disadvantaged 







single parents, those renting (especially privately) and dual fuel households. 
Implications for Policy 
The findings here should be interpreted in conjunction with other sources such as the 2012 Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) report “MORE POWER TO YOU: electricity and people with 
physical disability”75 and the Productivity Commission’s 2011 “Disability Care and support – Inquiry 
Report”. The introduction of medical heating and cooling rebates and utilities allowances should be 
considered in a broader review of concessions. 
G3. Households with dependent children 
Findings 
The households with children most likely to be in relative energy poverty are single parent households, 
couples with very young children (eldest < 5 years) and those renting (especially privately). Of note, 
households whose primary source of income is wages or salaries make up over 40% of each of the 
energy poverty cohorts.  
Implications for Policy 
Families in energy poverty include a large proportion that fall outside of the traditional safety nets and 
are ineligible for most jurisdictional concession regimes. 
G4. Wage and Salary earners 
Findings 
In summary, other than falling outside the traditional safety nets, this cohort does not appear to have 
any particular distinguishing risk factors other than those seen in other analyses: people living alone, 
renters, single parents and couples with young children. 
Policy implications 
The source of income defines entitlements to energy concessions and this group, while being a 
substantial proportion of those in relative energy poverty (>25%), are not currently eligible for such 
assistance. This highlights the need for a review of concessions and a consideration of the resources 
allocated to concessions compared to other forms of assistance (such as emergency payments). 
                                               













RELATIVE  ENERG Y P OV ERTY  IN  AUSTRALIA  
Australia’s national, state and territory governments provide a number of safety nets to ensure households 
are able to pay their energy bills and remain connected. As energy prices rise, who is most at risk of falling 
through the net? 
 
A research report for policy makers and consumer advocates funded by the Consumer Advocacy Panel 
(Project No. 565) 
 











Prepared by: Andrew Nance 
 st.kitts.associates 
 11 Parker Terrace, CLARENCE PARK 5034 

















T H E  U K  A P P R O A C H  
The UK Government released its new approach to tackling Fuel Poverty in England76 in July 2013. The 
new policy follows the conclusion of the independent Hills Review of Fuel Poverty77 in 2012. The principal 
task of the Hills review was to provide a first principles examination of the way in which trends in fuel 
poverty, and identification of those at risk from it, have been measured. The new policy adopts the 
recommendation of Professor Hills for a new way of measuring the breadth and depth of the problem: the 
Low Income, High Cost (LIHC) indicator. 
The Hills Review also confirmed the concept of fuel poverty as a distinct and serious problem. The concept 
has had cross-party support at least since the introduction of the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation 
Act (WHECA) in 2000. The policy response from successive UK governments has seen a unique alignment 
of health, energy, climate change and economic development policies to focus on improving the energy 
efficiency of dwellings and avoiding excess winter deaths. 
Public policy in Australia has not embraced the concept in anything like the same way.  
Australian research and analysis is quite limited. In “A new form of energy poverty has become the scourge of ‘liberalised’ 
electricity sectors”, Chester & Morris78 explore energy market liberalisation globally and identifies rapidly rising 
electricity prices as a common out-turn of this process. The paper then goes on to translate the largely 
northern hemisphere concept of fuel poverty to the Australian context. The work of Chester & Morris 
emphasises and highlights the relative paucity of data and analysis in Australia. This is particularly apparent 
in comparisons with the relatively mature and sophisticated approach of the UK, highlighted most recently 
in the finalisation of the Hills Fuel Poverty Review (Hills 2012). Another important contribution to the 
literature is from AGL Energy’s Simshauser and Nelson79. The analysis of AGL Energy’s 2.4m electricity 
and gas customer provided some important insights – especially around the incidence of hardship on 
families and working families in particular. 
Before seeking to apply the UK approach to Australia it is important to acknowledge that there are very 
material contextual differences between the UK and Australia – in relation to drivers of consumption and 
the governance arrangements of a response - including the climate, the number and roles of the layers of 
government. Yet there are of course significant similarities in terms of the liberalisation of energy markets; 
from where Australia has sourced many of its reform cues over the years. The Hills review had measurement 
                                               
76 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fuel-poverty-a-framework-for-future-action  
77 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/final-report-of-the-fuel-poverty-review “Getting the measure of fuel poverty” Prof John Hills, 
London School of Economics, Final report 2012. 
78 Chester, Lynne and Morris, Alan, 2012, ‘A new form of energy poverty has become the scourge of ‘liberalise electricity sectors’ 
79 Paul Simshauser and Tim Nelson “The Energy Market Death Spiral – Rethinking Customer Hardship”, AGL Applied Economics and 








of fuel poverty as its prime object and there are some very relevant lessons for Australia in this regard – 
certainly in terms of approach if not results. 
The Hills review aimed to overcome a number of shortcomings in the original headline indicator derived 
from the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 (WHECA) of 10% of income being required to 
maintain a prescribed level of warmth. The review recommended that the Government: 
“…adopt a new approach based on directly measuring the overlap between low income and high costs … under which 
households are considered fuel poor if: 
• They have required fuel costs that are above the median level; and 
• Were they to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty line.” 
The comparable data sources for Australia are collected and published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS). Of particular relevance was the release in late 2011 of the 2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey 
(HES) (6530.0) and, from the Survey of Income and Housing (SIH), the 2009-10 Housing Occupancy and 
Costs (4130.0) and 2009-10 Household Income and Income Distribution (6523.0). 
The new indicator is part of changing the definition of fuel poverty. The consultation report “Fuel Poverty: 
Changing the framework for measurement”80 outlines the rationale behind details of the new indicator. 
“At its most basic, a household is fuel poor if it is below the poverty threshold and has higher than typical energy 
costs” 
The new indicator (Figure 53) finds a household to be fuel poor if: 
c. Their income is below the poverty line (taking into account energy costs); and 
d. Their energy costs are higher than is typical for their household type. 
It also reveals what is referred to as the “fuel poverty gap”. This is the difference between a household’s 
modelled bill and what their bill would need to be for them to no longer be fuel poor. In Figure 53, example 
fuel poverty gaps are depicted by the red arrows. The end result is twin indicators of the ‘extent’ and ‘depth’ 
of fuel poverty – how many households are considered fuel poor and how much they are spending in excess 
of the median bill for a household of their size. 










Figure 53: The low income high costs definition (source: UK Department of Environment and Climate Change, 2013) 
The income threshold is set at the poverty line (after housing costs) plus an amount to cover the cost of 
the energy bills. That is, the income threshold captures all households who, after paying for their energy 
bills and housing costs, are left with an income at or below the poverty line. In turn, the poverty line is set 
as a percentage of the median income for a household of the same size. 
The UK Government states that, historically, the main fuel poverty numbers reported have always used 
Before Housing Costs (BHC) income81. This issue had been raised by stakeholders as a concern. Professor 
Hills recommended that housing costs could not be considered to be discretionary and so should not be 
included when calculating income. The new indicator is therefore based on After Housing Cost (AHC) 
income. 
The new indicator entails equivalising income and energy costs in order to be able to compare households 
of a different size on the same scale. Adjusting income thresholds to account for different household sizes 
is a widely used practice and the equivalence scale used by the UK government is the same as that utilised 
by the ABS to produce equivalised income estimates for Australian households: the modified OECD 
equivalence scale. Unlike income, there are no widely used factors for equivalising energy costs. In his 
review Professor Hills proposed a number of factors to be used as the basis of equivalising based on the 
different energy costs for different household types.  
Statistics on fuel poverty in England have been derived using information from the English Housing Survey, 
combined with the Building Research Establishment Domestic Energy Model (BREDEM) to calculate 
household energy costs. It is an important attribute of the UK approach that cost thresholds are set based 
on “need to spend” – the cost of the energy required to deliver a warm home, as opposed to the actual 
                                               
81 Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK Government July 2013 “Fuel Poverty: changing the framework for measurement. 







costs incurred. In this way, the definition captures those who economise to the point of being detrimental 
to their health. 
In applying the LIHC indicator to Australia, no equivalent of the BREDEM is applied with the ABS Survey 
of Income and Housing (SIH) and Household Expenditure Survey (HES). As a result, the Australian 
application is based on actual costs incurred rather than “need to spend”. This approach will therefore not 
capture those households who under-consume and would therefore be more likely to underestimate the 
extent and depth of the problem compared to the UK approach.  
An Australian approach based on actual expenditure should therefore be complemented by consideration 
of other factors. To this end, two subjective indicators were also considered82. These two are ‘financial stress 
indicators’ from the survey that directly related to energy: a question about being unable to pay utility bills 
due to a shortage of money and a question about whether they were unable to heat their home due to a 




                                               








A  M E T H O D O L O G Y  F O R  A U S T R A L I A  
 
As shown, the UK’s new fuel poverty measure examines the relationship between income and modelled 
expenditure. Deriving a meaningful LIHC indicator for Australia requires consideration of the available 
data (the HES unit record files in this case) and the purpose for which the measure is intended to be used. 
For an Australian application, the income dimension or ‘capacity to pay’ is represented by equivalised after 
housing cost disposable income. The rationale adopted for the Australian context is discussed below: 
The source data is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 
confidentialised unit record files (CURF)83. 
 
The Sample 
The overall HES sample has been edited in order to ensure the analysis is representative of the vast majority 
of household situations. As recommended by Saunders et al (2012)84, two groups were excluded: 
• All households who report zero or negative incomes 
• All self-employed households 
The rationale being that reported income data is often an unreliable indicator of living standards and is 
therefore not suitable for assessing poverty status. For this research, this was extended to all households 
who reported before housing cost income of less than $200 per week on the basis that this was below the 
safety net income available in Australia at the time and would be unlikely to represent the ongoing 
circumstances of the household. Further, records related to households who reported energy expenditure 
for multiple properties (such as holiday homes) were excluded as being unrepresentative (due to multiple 
supply charges). 
The end result was a sample size of 8272 HES records representing households who reported their main 
source of income85 as either wage and salary or government pensions and allowances. This constrains the analysis 
to just over 80% of all households. These were then analysed using the IBM SPSS® statistical software 
package. The ABS provides the microdata with survey weight information to reflect how representative 
each record is of the broader population. The statistical analysis was performed with weights included. 
 
 
                                               
83 The May 2013 Federal Budget include a funding allocation to conduct the HES four-yearly. If achieved, the results of the next HES might 
be available late 2015. 
84 Poverty in Australia: New Estimates and Recent Trends - Research Methodology October 2012. Peter Saunders, Bruce Bradbury and 
Melissa Wong; Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC), University of New South Wales. 








Capacity to pay 
A household’s capacity to pay is determined by a range of factors but it is important to select an appropriate 
measure from the possibilities provided by the combined Survey of Income and Housing and Household 
Expenditure Survey responses. For the purposes of this analysis, it was decided to use “disposable 
household income” since it accounts for (unavoidable) taxation and Medicare Levy expenditure86. 
• Variable = dispsch8 “Current weekly HH disposable income” 
Similarly, the survey results provide a number of ways of estimating housing costs. The HES results include 
a summary expenditure item “current housing costs”. This item includes the following components: 
• Variable = exp01 “Household weekly expenditure on current housing costs (selected dwelling)” 
which combines87: 
 Weekly rent payments 
 Weekly body corporate payments 
 Weekly general and water rates payments 
 Weekly mortgage payments (interest only) 
 House and contents insurance 
 Repairs and maintenance (generally applies to owners not renters) 
Guidance on the derivation of poverty line estimation was taken from the research methodology (Saunders 
et al 2012)88 adopted by the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) for their 2012 “Poverty in 
Australia” report89. The basic income variable used in the analysis is household disposable (i.e. after-tax) 
income, adjusted for need using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The OECD scale assigns a value 
of 1.0 to the first adult in the household, 0.5 to each subsequent household and 0.3 to each dependent child 
(where dependent children are defined as being under 15 years of age). Income is divided by this scale to 
calculate equivalised income. 
The equivalence value is calculated by the ABS and attached to each survey record in the variable EQUIVH. 
Consistent with the approach of Saunders et al, in producing the after housing costs estimates, weekly 
housing costs are deducted from income, and this difference is then divided by the equivalence scale. The 
                                               
86 ABS 6503.0 SIH and HES User Guide 2009-10 page 2 
87 ABS SIH and HES User Guide 2009-10, p102 
88 Poverty in Australia: New Estimates and Recent Trends - Research Methodology October 2012. Peter Saunders, Bruce Bradbury and 
Melissa Wong; Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC), University of New South Wales. 







median of this adjusted measure is then derived and the poverty line is set as a percentage of the new 
median. 
The equivalised AHC income measure is calculated as EAHCDI = (dispsch8 - exp01)/EQUIVH. The 
attributes of this variable are shown in Figure 54. 
SPSS Descriptive Statistics 
EAHCDI1 








Figure 54: Descriptive statistics of the equivalised disposable AHC income variable 
The median value determined above has been used as the basis for the establishment of the poverty lines 
that define the income thresholds. It is noted that the median of $577 per week is slightly lower than that 
used in the 2012 Poverty in Australia Report of $584.8090. This appears to be due to the selection of the 
comprehensive housing expenditure variable as the ACOSS result can be replicated by using housing cost 
variable hcosts2h rather than exp01. The key difference between exp01 and hcosts2h is inclusion of the costs 
of house and contents insurance and repairs and maintenance on the dwelling91.  
According to Saunders et al, almost all Australian poverty researchers now use one of two poverty lines set 
at 50% and 60% of median income. The poverty line recommended in the Hills Fuel Poverty Review is the 
households below average income (HBAI) produced by the Department for Work and Pensions. This 
approach defines someone as receiving a relative low income if they receive less than 60% of the median 
equivalised net household income. 
                                               
90 Poverty in Australia: New Estimates and Recent Trends - Research Methodology October 2012. Peter Saunders, Bruce Bradbury and 
Melissa Wong; Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC), University of New South Wales, p2 







In order to preserve comparability with the UK, the 60% poverty line threshold has been adopted for the 
final report of this research project. Consistent with the Hills recommendation, the income threshold is 
applied so that income net of energy expenditure is less than the poverty line. 
 











The HES reports energy expenditure as Domestic fuel and power, and includes electricity, gas and other fuels 
such as firewood. This represents actual expenditure incurred and bill totals are net of concessions (ie 
concessions are accounted for as reduced expenditure rather than as increased income).  
• Variable = exp02 “Household weekly expenditure on domestic fuel and power” 
The energy expenditure variable aggregates detailed expenditures on electricity, mains gas, bottled gas and 
other fuels such as firewood. The only analysis performed on this next layer is to examine the results for 
dual fuel households – those using mains or bottled gas (LPG) as well as electricity. 
The Low Income High Costs (LIHC) indicator, as it is known, utilises equivalence scales to adjust for 
household size and composition. In doing so, the indicator identifies some 2.5 million92 households as living 
in fuel poverty compared to 4.0 million using the original indicator (Hills 2012). The recommendations of 
the final report differed somewhat from the 2011 draft in how the equivalence scale for consumption is 
derived. The subsequent Government response included a further change. 
The UK LIHC approach has highlighted the sensitivity of the approach to how it seeks to ‘equivalise’ the 
indicator of fuel poverty between households of different size. Put simply, if energy poverty is indicated by 
some relationship between disposable income and (actual or required) expenditure, how can a single person 
household’s risk of fuel poverty be compared to that of a couple or a household with children. 
Equivalisation of income is a widely accepted concept in both Australia and the UK and is based on 
attempting to equate well-being or standard of living between households of different sizes and compositions. 
It is apparent that if the measure is to equivalised income to ensure comparability between samples then an 
equivalent must be applied to expenditure as well. 
Options include adopting an income equivalence scale such as the modified-OECD scale (1 point for the 
first adult, 0.5 points for each subsequent adult and 0.3 for each child) as used by the ABS or the square-
root scale as used in some OECD publications93 where the value of each additional person is the square 
root of the household size e.g the second person contributes √2 (=1.41), the next person takes the scale to 
√3 (=1.73), the fourth to √4 (=2) and so on. 
Alternatively, the actual expenditure patterns of households can be examined to see the impact of household 
size. A summary of energy expenditure by income and household size is shown in Figure 55. households 
                                               
92 Department of Environment and Climate Change (DECC) Fuel Poverty: A Framework for future action – Analytical annex, p6 2.5m 
households out of a total 21.6 (12%) were categorised as “fuel poor”. 
93 Refer to OECD (2013), OECD Framework for Statistics on the Distribution of Household Income, Consumption and Wealth, OECD 







An equivalence scale can be estimated from the change in median expenditure from a single person 
household in each. For the purposes of this research, the equivalence scale across the bottom two income 
quintiles is compared to the two income scales discussed above. 
For example, estimating the equivalence scale for a 2 person household compared to a one person 
household: For the lowest income quintile expenditure increases from $15.57 to $24.62, a multiple of 1.58. 
For the second quintile expenditure increases from $16.64 to $24.51, a multiple of 1.47. The arithmetic 
mean of 1.58 and 1.47 is 1.53 and that is the estimate used. The same approach is then applied to three 
person households, four person households and so on. 
 
Figure 55: Derivation of an estimate of an energy expenditure equivalence scale, Australia 2009-10 
As can be seen in Figure 56 each method provides a similar result and the scale derived from actual 
expenditure patterns is largely bracketed by the two income scales. This suggests that there is little reason, 
for this initial level of analysis at least, to pursue a bespoke expenditure equivalence scale that is different 
to that used for the equivalence of income. Since both the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the UK 
National Statistics Office use the modified OECD equivalence scale, this project has used this for both 








Figure 56: Estimated energy expenditure equivalence scales, Australia 2009-10 
This allows for the development of a new variable for equivalised expenditure: eqexp02 = exp02/equivh 







T H E  S P E C T R U M  O F  I N C O M E  A N D  E X P E N D I T U R E  
 
As shown in the discussion of the UK’s new LIHC indicator, the UK’s fuel poverty measures play out on 
the relationship between income and expenditure. For this research, the income dimension is referred to as 
‘capacity to pay’ and is defined as equivalised after housing cost disposable income on the horizontal axis 
and equivalised energy expenditure on the vertical. The 2009-10 HES data maps onto this as shown in 
Figure 57. 
 
Figure 57:Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay 2009-10 Household Expenditure Survey 
This scatter plot can be enhanced with the addition of the income and expenditure thresholds ($346pw 








Figure 58: Scatter diagram of Figure 57 with income and expenditure thresholds shown 
The expenditure threshold (the median equivalised expenditure) is shown as a horizontal line. The income 
threshold is shown as a right leaning vertical line (indicating that the threshold is a constant after 
consideration of energy expenditure: $346 for expenditure = $0, $446 for expenditure = $100). Consistent 
with the UK LIHC approach, the upper left quadrant (shaded grey in Figure 58) represents those that would 
be categorised as being in energy poverty.  
An alternative way of defining an energy poverty cohort would be similar to the previous UK threshold of 
10% of income. The ratio of energy expenditure to capacity to pay can be illustrated as dotted lines through 
the origin in Figure 59. An energy poverty cohort is represented by the shaded area above the 10% line. As 
can be seen, this type of approach can include households with incomes well above the poverty line 








Figure 59: Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay with various thresholds shown 
A hybrid approach has also been examined that combines the expenditure ratio with the income threshold 
to identify the cohort illustrated in Figure 60. 
 







In a review of the UK fuel poverty measure for UK energy regulator OFGEM, Owen (2010)94 discusses 
subjective measures as supplements or alternates to the objective measures based on actual income and 
expenditure information. The 2009-10 HES included questions relating to Financial Stress Indicators95 that 
can similarly provide subjective indicators relevant to the research objective. There are two indicators 
directly related to energy expenditure: 
• “Whether could not pay gas/electricity/telephone bill on time due to shortage of money” in 
variable [cfelectr] 
• “Unable to heat home due to shortage of money” in variable [cfnoheat] 
The “could not pay utility bill” cohort represents 14% of households (weighted) while the “unable to heat 
home” represents a cohort of 2% of households.  
A set of five cohorts can therefore be identified and compared. 
Cohort name Description 
Weighted 
Count. 
% of All 
households 
1. Low Income High 
Cost 
Below income threshold, above median energy expenditure 782,409 12% 
2. Low Income and 
energy > 10% 
Below income threshold, energy expenditure > 10% of 
capacity to pay 
386,936 5.7% 
3. Energy > 10% energy expenditure > 10% of capacity to pay 434, 054 6.4% 
4. could not pay utility bill Financial Stress Indicator: could not pay utility bill in last 12 
months due to shortage of money 
939,254 14% 
5. unable to heat home Financial Stress Indicator: unable to heat home in last 12 
months due to shortage of money. 
138,520 2.0% 
Table 14: Five possible energy poverty cohorts for comparison 
These five cohorts have then been compared across a range of attributes. The attributes considered are: 
• State or territory of usual residence 
• The number of adults and children in the household, family composition and ‘lifecycle’ stages 
• Housing status in terms of tenure and landlord type 
                                               
94 Review of the UK fuel poverty measure, Report for Ofgem, Gill Owen, Sustainability First March 2010 from 
http://www.sustainabilityfirst.org.uk/publications.htm  







• The source of income and the dominant types of pensions and benefits received 
• The use of gas versus ‘all electric’ 
The following sections present the composition of the five cohorts against these attributes. Commentary is 
provided to interpret the results. 
A. State or territory of usual residence 
Table 15 presents the composition of the five cohorts (columns 1-5) by state or territory of usual residence. 
The ABS basic CURF data used for this analysis consolidates the sample for the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) and the Northern Territory (NT) so no separate results are provided for the territories.  
  
Table 15: State and territory distribution of five possible energy poverty cohorts 
The composition of cohorts 1 and 2 (those that include the income threshold) should be compared to the 
composition of the ‘low income’ cohort in column A. Cohort 3 (energy expenditure >10% of capacity to 
pay) should be compared to the composition of all households in the survey sample (ie, representing 80% 
of all households) in column B. As can be seen, cohorts 1, 2 and 3 provide similar results to each other but 
notably different compositions to the low income cohort. Both Victoria and Tasmania can be seen to be 
significantly over-represented while Queensland is under-represented in each cohort.  
The AER’s energy bill benchmarking project96 and the recent ABS Household Energy Consumption Survey 
(HECS)97 confirm relatively high electricity and gas consumption in Victorian and Tasmania as well as high 
expenditure and, particularly for Tasmania, relatively low incomes. The Queensland result appears to be 
due to relatively low energy prices. The ACT and NT also include relatively high consumption but this is 
apparently offset by higher incomes and lower prices. 
                                               
96 Refer to the technical reports of the AER’s consultants ACIL Tasman at http://www.aer.gov.au/node/9751  







The composition of the financial stress cohorts, 4 and 5, (the “subjective” measures) should be compared 
to the composition of all households in the survey sample (ie, representing 80% of all households) in 
column B. In contrast to the objective measures, the composition of these cohorts is closer to the 
proportions of the full sample for Victoria, Tasmania and Queensland. This mismatch between objective 
and subjective measures has parallels with observations discussed in Owen (2010, p19)98.  
Colder climates in Victoria and Tasmania see them represented at well above their population shares in the 
‘high costs’ cohorts. It is noted that both jurisdictions have increased their concessions since the 2009-10 
survey. In particular, the Victorian concession has been extended to a fixed percentage of bills, the most 
generous of the state concession regimes99. However, the full distributional impact of these changes and of 
price rises since 2009-10 will be revealed in the next Household Expenditure Survey100. 
Findings 
The risk of energy poverty varies significantly between the states. This is due to a range of factors including 
the range of climates, differences in incomes and housing costs as well as differences in energy prices and 
concession regimes. 
In 2009-10, on objective measures, households in Victoria and Tasmania were more likely to be in energy 
poverty than for other jurisdictions. This is due to colder climates driving above average consumption. The 
climate also drives relatively high consumption in the ACT and NT but this is offset by lower prices and 
higher incomes. 
However, on subjective measures, the difference between states was less pronounced. 
Implications for policy 
On objective measures, the incidence of hardship varies between states. The variations are due to a range 
of factors not just differences in energy prices. The NECF provides a common national framework for the 
relationship between households and energy businesses but the local context can be expected to continue 
to be a strong determinant of who is most at risk of relative energy poverty. 
                                               
98 As part of a review of alternate fuel poverty measures, Owen (2010) discusses the findings of Waddams Price, C et al. Identifying fuel 
poverty using objective and subjective measures. CCP Working Paper 07-11. UEA, 2007 
99 A good annual summary of concessions in jurisdictions can be found in the Price Comparison Reports of the Office of the Tasmanian 
Energy Regulator (OTTER) available from http://www.economicregulator.tas.gov.au  
100 The May 2013 Federal Budget include a funding allocation to conduct the HES four-yearly. If achieved, the results of the next HES 







Both Victoria and Tasmania have reformed their concession regimes in the years since the 2009-10 survey. 
A longitudinal study that repeats this analysis on the next Household Expenditure Survey may be able to 








B. The size and structure of the households 
Table 16 presents the composition of the five cohorts (columns 1-5) by household ‘types’ defined using the 
standard ABS nomenclature.  
 
Table 16: Family and lifestyle attributes of five possible energy poverty cohorts 
The composition of cohorts 1 and 2 (those that include the income threshold) should be compared to the 
composition of the ‘low income’ cohort in column A. Across the range of household types, this comparison 
clearly shows that couple only households are the least likely to be categorised as being in energy poverty. 
In most other respects, the composition of these cohorts is very similar to that of all households that fall 
below the income threshold. 
Cohort 3 (energy expenditure >10% of capacity to pay) should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample in column B. The composition of this cohort is biased towards single 
parent households, couples with very young children and people living alone. 








Table 17: The size of households in five possible energy poverty cohorts 
It should be noted that the basic CURF dataset does not include household sizes above 6 persons. The 
category ‘6+’ therefore refers to households with at least 6 persons. Since this is also a relatively small 
sample size (n=63) the ‘over-representation’ of this cohort would need further analysis before any 
interpretations can be made for policy development. 
The composition of cohorts 1 and 2 (those that include the income threshold) should be compared to the 
composition of the ‘low income’ cohort in column A. Again, the low income high cost cohort (column 1) 
generally reflects the composition of the broader low income group (column A). 
Cohort 3 (energy expenditure >10% of capacity to pay) should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample in column B. The notable attribute is the bias toward people living alone. 
This is however consistent with the proportion of one-person households that fall below the income 
threshold, and not surprising given the bias towards lower income illustrated in the scatter plot of Figure 59. 
The composition of the financial stress cohorts, 4 and 5, should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample) in column B. In contrast to the objective measures, the composition of 
cohort 4 (unable to pay utility bill due to shortage of money) is skewed more toward larger households. 
Cohort 5 (unable to heat home due to shortage of money) is closely aligned to the proportions of cohorts 
2 and 3 
Findings 
Energy expenditure is strongly influenced by both income and household size. Income also tends to 
increase as household size increases. The methodology has sought to equivalised both expenditure and 
capacity to pay so that households of different sizes can be compared. 
Couple-only households are clearly the least likely to fall into relative energy poverty. This is particularly 
true for couples under 65. Couple-only household are around one quarter of all households in the study. 







(around 40% in each case compared to 23% of all households in the study) 
The family compositions most likely to fall into relative energy poverty are single parent households and 
couples with very young children (eldest< 5 years). 
Implications for policy 
People living alone, single parents and families with young children are the most likely to fall into energy 
poverty.  
The Low Income High Cost indicator adapted from the new UK approach to measuring fuel poverty can 
be seen to mainly reflect the attributes of the ‘low income’ cohort rather than distinguish any clear attributes 
that might drive the ‘high cost’ component. This limits its potential application to the Australian Context. 
Cost reflective pricing is likely to increase fixed supply charges (to, for example, include more capacity-
based prices) and this may be of particular impact on those living alone, for whom these charges represent 








C. Housing Status 
Table 18 presents the composition of the five cohorts (columns 1-5) by housing status defined using the 
standard ABS nomenclature.  
 
Table 18: Housing status of households in five possible energy poverty cohorts 
The composition of cohorts 1 and 2 (those that include the income threshold) should be compared to the 
composition of the ‘low income’ cohort in column A. Again, the low income high cost cohort (column 1) 
generally reflects the composition of the broader low income group (column A). Cohort 2 however shows 
a bias towards renters and those renting privately in particular (taken as the sum of landlord types ‘real 
estate agent’ and ‘person not in same household – other person’ 33.7% of the cohort compared to 24.2% 
of all low income households) .  
Cohort 3 (energy expenditure >10% of capacity to pay) should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample in column B. The composition of this cohort is similar to that of cohort 
2 and similarly biased towards private renters (32.8% compared to 22.3% of all households in the study) 
The composition of the financial stress cohorts, 4 and 5, should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample) in column B. Similar to cohorts 2 and 3, cohorts 4 and 5 are clearly skewed 
to renters. 
Findings 
On all measures, relative energy poverty is biased towards renters and those renting privately in particular. 
All three objective cohorts have households renting from state and territory housing authorities (public 







likely to be a result of capped housing costs. However, the subjective measures show greater proportions 
for public renters, especially those unable to heat their homes due to a shortage of money. This may reflect 
the influence of the ‘worst performing’ public housing stock. 
Implications for Policy 
Renters face particular barriers to energy efficiency (often referred to as the landlord-tenant split incentive) 
and this may explain why those renting privately are most at risk of energy poverty. Renting can also mean 
moving house relatively often and needing to negotiate new energy contracts each time. This can represent 








D. The source of income and the types of pensions and benefits received 
Table 19 presents the composition of the five cohorts (columns 1-5) by income source defined using the 
standard ABS nomenclature. As discussed, the full survey sample has been culled through the removal of 
households who reported zero or negative income or own unincorporated business income. 
 
Table 19: Income sources of households in five possible energy poverty cohorts 
The composition of cohorts 1 and 2 (those that include the income threshold) should be compared to the 
composition of the ‘low income’ cohort in column A. As would be expected, the cohorts contain 
households reliant on the safety net (government pensions and allowances) at a much higher proportion 
than for those who don’t receive any such income. Again, the low income high cost cohort (column 1) 
generally reflects the composition of the broader low income group (column A). 
Cohort 2 however includes proportionally more wage and salary earners. 
Cohort 3 (energy expenditure >10% of capacity to pay) should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample in column B. The composition of this cohort includes proportionally more 
wage and salary earners than cohort 2 (which, in turn, contains more than cohort 1).  
The composition of the financial stress cohorts, 4 and 5, should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample) in column B. In contrast to the objective measures, the composition of 
cohort 4 (unable to pay utility bill due to shortage of money) includes wage and salary earners at close to 
their population share. Cohort 5 (unable to heat home due to shortage of money) however reverses the 








This study has only considered those households whose main source of income is wages and salaries or 
government pensions and benefits. This is around 80% of all households. 
By all measures, at least one quarter of those in relative energy poverty have wages or salaries as the main 
source of household income. At least half of these households receive ‘no social assistance benefits in cash’ 
and would therefore be considered to be outside the welfare system. These households would be unlikely 
to be eligible for an energy concession in any jurisdiction. 
Households reliant on government pensions and allowances as their main source of income represent 
around two-thirds to three quarters of each energy poverty cohort. The income safety net is therefore a 
critical determinant of relative energy poverty. 
Implications for Policy 
The safety nets of income support and concessions do not reach a significant proportion (one eighth to 
one quarter) of those in relative energy poverty. These households are still eligible to access the various 
jurisdictional emergency payment schemes (discretionary payments dispensed on need rather than regular 
payments based on fixed eligibility criteria). Policymakers should consider the relative resourcing of these 









The HES data includes estimates of energy concessions received in the variable wklyelc. The values are 
applied post-survey by the ABS as part of the Fiscal Incidence Study (FIS). The FIS shows the distributional 
effects of government benefits and taxes on household income. Concessions form part of a category called 
‘social transfers in kind’ (STIK)101.  
Eligibility for concessions is determined state by state but are usually based on eligibility for a range of 
Commonwealth health and concession cards. The value of concessions varies significantly between 
jurisdictions102. Further, it is apparent that differences exist between the interpreted eligibility criteria of the 
FIS and the number of household actually receiving a concession. In South Australia for example, the 
weighted HES estimate is that 123,000 households were eligible for the concession103 in 2009-10. The 
Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) report a figure of 196,000 in the annual 
market performance report for 2009-10104. Media reports in September 2013105 stated that an IT project 
reconciling concession payments with Centrelink (Commonwealth) records had revealed that around 20% 
of concession payments may have been to ineligible households over this timeframe. This would explain 
most of the difference. Similar comparisons for other jurisdictions suggest that the HES records also 
underestimate the number of concession recipients in other jurisdictions. 
Noting some other small data issues106, the HES data permits an assessment of concession targeting by 
considering the rate of concession receipts for those households identifies as being in relative energy 
poverty in the above steps.  
Table 20 illustrates that only around 60-70% of those identified under the objective definitions of relative 
energy poverty are in receipt of a concession. This also indicates that only 55% of households with 
concessions fall below the income threshold and only 40% have an expenditure ratio greater than 5% of 
disposable income. 
For the subjective indicators, 71% of those reporting being unable to heat their homes due to a shortage 
of money were already eligible to be receiving an energy concession while less than half (46%) of those 
unable to pay a utility bill due to a shortage of money were concession eligible. 
                                               
101 ABS 6530.0 Household Expenditure Survey and Survey of Income and Housing User Guide 2009-10, p38 
102 A good annual summary of concessions in jurisdictions can be found in the Price Comparison Reports of the Office of the Tasmanian 
Energy Regulator (OTTER) available from http://www.economicregulator.tas.gov.au  
103 Noting that the HES records analysed for this research does not include all households. However, it does include all recipients of 
government benefits and should therefore be considered representative. 
104 www.escosa.sa.gov.au/electricity-overview/reporting-and-compliance/annual-performance-reports.aspx  
105 Kevin Naughton, InDaily, “Manual Checking move in concessions bungle” (25.09.13) and “One in five receiving concessions “ineligible”” 
(24.09.13) http://indaily.com.au/news/2013/09/25/manual-checking-move-in-concessions-bungle/  
106 Errors were identified in the value of concessions applied to some jurisdictions. For example, the concession value applied for South 
Australian households was $3.03 per week or $157.50 per annum. The South Australian Government’s energy concession in 2009-10 was 








Table 20: Indicators of energy concession targeting, Australia 2009-10 
Figure 61 illustrates the expenditure vs capacity to pay for concession eligible households. 
 
Figure 61: Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay for concession eligible households 
Findings: 
Issues exist in relation to reconciling the FIS data with the data published by jurisdictional regulators. 
However, the results indicate that around 30-40% of those in relative energy poverty are not eligible to 







F. Dual Fuel households versus ‘all electric’ 
Table 21 presents the composition of the five cohorts (columns 1-5) by whether or not the household use 
either mains or bottled gas (other than for a BBQ). 
 
Table 21: Dual Fuel status of households in five possible energy poverty cohorts 
The composition of cohorts 1 and 2 (those that include the income threshold) should be compared to the 
composition of the ‘low income’ cohort in column A. Cohort 3 (energy expenditure >10% of capacity to 
pay) should be compared to the composition of all households in the survey sample in column B. In all 
three cases, dual fuel households are more likely to be included than all-electric. 
Table 22 provides more detail of gas expenditure and shows that dual fuel households tend to be larger and 
have higher incomes so that all-electric and dual fuel households tend to spend similar proportions of their 
incomes on energy. However, it is also clear that even when corrected for household size, dual fuel 
households tend to spend 25-30% more on energy than all-electric households. This supports the findings 
for the cohorts defined by objective measures (cohorts 1-3) discussed above.  
 
Table 22: Energy expenditure details of dual fuel vs all-electric households  
The composition of the financial stress cohorts, 4 and 5, should be compared to the composition of all 
households in the survey sample) in column B of Table 21. In contrast to the objective measures, these 
cohorts are biased toward more all-electric households. One possible interpretation of this apparent conflict 
between the subjective and objective measures is that expenditure divided up over more but smaller bills is 
perceived as more manageable.  
Findings 








For low income households, being all-electric reduces the likelihood of falling into energy poverty. 
Implications for Policy 
Gas prices have risen significantly since 2009-10 and are projected to increase even further as export parity 
pricing increases its influence on domestic gas markets. Concessions and emergency payments will need to 
consider their ability to preserve affordability as prices rise. 
 
G. Analysis of Specific Household Types 
In order to obtain more detailed insights, the analysis was also repeated for four discrete household types 
that emerged from the initial review: 
• Aged Pension recipients 
• Disability Pension recipients 
• Households with children (dependents under 15 years of age) 
• Wage and Salary earners 
The results are presented and discussed in more detail below. 
 
G1. The Aged 
This cohort has been defined as those households who reported being in receipt of the Aged Pension. This 
identifies a cohort of 1.2m households (18% of the sample) that is summarised in Table 23. 
 
Table 23: Affordability indicators of Aged Pension Recipients, Australia 2009-10 
The expenditure vs capacity to pay scatter plot is provided as Figure 62 and illustrates that this cohort tends 








Figure 62: Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay for Aged Pension recipients (ABS 
Household Expenditure Survey 2009-10) 
Repeating the previous approach shows that Victoria and Tasmania continue to be strongly represented in 
all of the high costs cohorts. The full set of results can be found in Figure 63. In terms of household 
composition, those living alone were a majority in each case but were already a majority of those living 
below the income threshold. Elderly renters, especially those renting privately, are strongly represented in 
each cohort. The use of gas (dual fuel households) has been shown to result in greater expenditure overall 
and the effect of this is quite pronounced in the aged cohorts. 
Findings 
Aged Pension recipients most likely to be in relative energy poverty are those living alone (>50% of all 
cohorts), those renting (especially privately) and dual fuel households. 
Implications for Policy 
The UK’s fuel poverty policy considered the aged to be particularly vulnerable to negative health effects of 
cold homes and this is consistent with the findings of recent climate risk and adaptation vulnerability 
analyses being developed for Australia107. Combined with the analysis in this report, a particular focus on 
                                               
107 This work is being coordinated by the National Climate Change Adaptation and Research Facility (NCCARF; www.nccarf.edu.au). For 
example refer to Sevoyan, A, Hugo, G, Feist, H, Tan, G, McDougall, K, Tan, Y & Spoehr, J 2013, Impact of climate change on disadvantaged 






























The only variable in the HES data to indicate the presence of a person with a disability or long term health 
condition is the receipt of the Disability Support Pension as the primary source of government pensions 
and allowances. This identifies a cohort of 0.4m households (6% of the sample) that is summarised in Table 
24. Around 10% of this cohort also have dependents under 15 years. 
 
Table 24: Affordability indicators of Disability Support Pension Recipients, Australia 2009-10 
The expenditure vs capacity to pay scatter plot of DSP recipients is provided as Figure 64 and illustrates 
that this cohort tends to fall well below the income threshold but have expenditure around the median. 
 
Figure 64: Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay for Disability Support Pension recipients 
(ABS Household Expenditure Survey 2009-10) 
The full set of results can be found in Figure 65. Again, Victoria and Tasmania are strongly represented in 
the low income, high cost cohorts for this group. Single parent families and people living alone stand out 
as the attributes of those most likely to have relatively lower incomes but higher energy costs. Similarly, 





























Disability Support Pension recipients most likely to be in relative energy poverty are those living alone 
single parents, those renting (especially privately) and dual fuel households. 
Implications for Policy 
The findings here should be interpreted in conjunction with other sources such as the 2012 Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre (PIAC) report “MORE POWER TO YOU: electricity and people with physical 
disability”108 and the Productivity Commission’s 2011 “Disability Care and support – Inquiry Report”. The 
introduction of medical heating and cooling rebates and utilities allowances should be considered in a 
broader review of concessions. 
  
                                               







G3. Households with dependants under 15 years 
The HES data records the number of dependants under 15 for each household in variable numu15bc. This 
identifies a cohort of 2m households with at least one dependant under 15 (29% of the sample) that is 
summarised in Table 25. Around 2% also appear in the analysis of Disability Support Pension recipients. 
 
Table 26: Affordability indicators of Households with dependents under 15 years, Australia 2009-10 
The expenditure vs capacity to pay scatter plot of households with children is provided as Figure 66 and 
shows that this cohort tends to have a similar range of expenditures as the others but a much broader range 
of incomes.  
 
Figure 66: Scatter diagram of equivalised energy expenditure vs capacity to pay for Households with children (ABS 
Household Expenditure Survey 2009-10) 
The full set of results can be found in Figure 67. The standout attribute of households in the high costs 
cohorts are single parent households. Tasmania is mainly represented at its population share in this cohort 
but Victoria continues to be strongly represented at greater than its population share. Households in private 







significant in this cohort and may be due to improved economies of scale of gas consumption for larger 
households.  
For couples, those with the youngest children (eldest < 5 years) appear to be the most likely to be 
categorised as being in energy poverty. 
An opportunity identified by Simshauser and Nelson109, Family Tax benefit as a mechanism to target 
support, appears to be well founded with around three quarters of each of the high costs households 
receiving either the Family Tax Benefit or Parenting Payment. 
Findings 
Households with children are most likely to be in relative energy poverty are single parent households, 
couples with very young children (eldest < 5 years) and those renting (especially privately). Wage and salary 
earners make up over 40% of each of the energy poverty cohorts.  
Implications for Policy 
Families in energy poverty include a large proportion that fall outside of the traditional safety nets and are 
ineligible for most jurisdictional concession regimes. 
 
                                               
109 Paul Simshauser and Tim Nelson “The Energy Market Death Spiral – Rethinking Customer Hardship”, AGL Applied Economics and 






















G4. Wage and Salary earners 
The earlier analysis of households by income source and the analysis of households with children above, 
have highlighted the presence of a sizeable group that essentially falls outside the welfare system – those 
low income families who rely mainly or exclusively on wages or salaries rather than pensions and benefits.  
Of the households in the study, 71.6% have wage and salary as their primary source of income (refer to 
Table 19). As shown in Table 27, 62.6% of this subset report receiving ‘no social assistance benefits in cash’ 
and are analysed separately in Table 28. 
The composition of each of the five cohorts (columns 1-5) should be compared to that of households in 
column A in each case. People living alone, single parents and couples with young children again appear 
strongly in the energy poverty cohorts. 
Around half are homeowners with a mortgage (50.5% compared to 38.7% of all households in the study) 
and this continues into the energy poverty cohorts at around 40-50% by composition. Renters make up 
28.1% of this group but 40-50% of those considered to be in relative energy poverty. Those renting privately 
are most likely to fall into relative energy poverty. 
Findings 
In summary, other than falling outside the traditional safety nets, this cohort does not appear to have any 
particular distinguishing risk factors other than those seen in other analyses: people living alone, renters, 
single parents and couples with young children. 
Policy implications 
The source of income defines entitlements to energy concessions and this group, while being a substantial 
proportion of those in relative energy poverty (>25%), are not currently eligible for such assistance. This 
highlights the need for a review of concessions and a consideration of the resources allocated to concessions 














   







11 Appendix B – Energy Security Discussion Paper 2012 
For a public policy objective around access and affordability, the responsibilities appear to lie 
across a spectrum from (almost) purely energy policy at one end, to (almost) purely social 
policy at the other. In between, there are a number of roles and responsibilities that are divided 
up between the policy portfolios and between levels of government. 
 
Figure 68: illustrative spectrum of public policy responsibilities shared between energy and social 
policy domains 
Figure 68 provides a basic representation of the policy interface. The broad objectives of the 
interface being related to maintaining or preserving affordability and access for vulnerable 
households. The model identifies six discrete public policy responsibilities shared between the 
two policy domains. Each of these is described briefly below. 
Social Safety Net – refers to the Commonwealth Government lead provision of income support 
to ensure a general minimum income. This also covers the Utilities Allowance provided to 
some recipients. As illustrated, this is a Social Policy lead domain. The role of energy policy 
in this domain can be considered to be advocacy for adequacy. As stated in the Energy White 
Paper and in the other quotes provided earlier, the market intends to rely on the provision of 
an adequate safety net to preserve affordability. In this case, it is incumbent upon energy 
policy to maintain some level of engagement to ensure that this linkage is preserved. 
Concessions and CSOs – refers to the State Government lead provision of energy specific 
community service obligations. These are usually in the form of a general energy or utilities 
concession as well as more targeted support for specific needs such as medical heating and 
cooling needs. Further, most jurisdictions require some sort of ‘statewide’ pricing equalisation. 
The depiction of the model implies that this domain is led by Social Policy but, since it refers 







provide adequate economic resources to consume a range of goods and services) an 
increasing role for energy policy is required. 
Consumer Protection – refers to the various provisions to uphold the rights of consumers 
against unfair practices; only some of which is specific to the provision of energy. This also 
covers the provision of independent dispute resolution. This domain focusses on the access 
objective and is generally unrelated to matters of price except for those related to market 
power or other anti-competitive behaviour. ACL and NECF. Why ACL does not cover some 
energy consumer issues – industry specific requirements … Again, the depiction of the model 
implies that this domain is led by Social Policy but, since it refers to energy affordability 
specifically (as opposed to general consumer protections provided through the Australian 
Consumer Law) an increasing role for energy specific policy is required. 
Energy Productivity – is a term taken from the Energy White Paper and refers to a range of 
matters related to energy consumption and includes energy efficiency policy, demand 
management/participation in the NEM as well as housing policy. Public policy intervention is 
generally limited to the extent that markets fail to deliver efficient outcomes. This domain also 
relates to Governments as housing providers and funders as well as Governments as 
regulators of energy performance of dwellings. The model depiction shows that this domain is 
considered to be led by energy policy but with a significant role for social policy to ensure that 
activities and information are appropriately targeted and accessible for consumers considered 
to be vulnerable. 
Consumer Information – refers to a range of activities that allow consumers – both individually 
and in aggregate – to engage with the energy markets. The scope of this domain includes the 
ability for consumers to exercise effective choice in the market, to know enough about their 
own consumption patterns and needs to elicit efficient prices and for independent monitoring 
and analysis of market performance and trends. This domain must also recognise the diversity 
of general literacy and numeracy in the community as well as the increasingly popular 
terminology of energy literacy or utility literacy. This is an area of active reform as part of the 
NECF. Examples of activities include recent calls for accreditation of energy contract 
comparison sites (see Choice, CALC, CUAC). The model depiction shows this to be led by 
energy policy due to the rather energy specific and technical nature of the information in 
question but with a role for social policy to ensure that this information is provided to 
consumers in an appropriate and accessible way and to ensure information is collected in a 
way that effectively informs social policy development. 
Efficient Market – refers to the out-turn of the competitive and regulated aspects of the energy 







in Chapter 3, the markets are tuned to deliver energy at least cost (reflecting productive and 
dynamic efficiencies) and at efficient prices (reflecting allocative efficiencies). The terms and 
conditions of contract are largely allocated to the Consumer Protection domain. 
The model depiction shows this as being led by Energy Policy. The small wedge indicating a 
role for social policy can be considered to focus on allocative efficiency and pricing outcomes 
that do not un-necessarily disadvantage vulnerable consumers. This is recognition that all 
consumers (from households to industry) benefit from overall cost efficiencies. However, even 
given overall efficient costs, discretion exists in the recovery of these costs from consumers 
and perverse cross subsidies can and do exist that can, often inadvertently, exacerbate 
vulnerability and disadvantage. Ensuring that energy market reform prioritises outcomes that 
deliver both efficiency and equity dividends is an appropriate role for social policy in this 
domain. This is probably more likely to take the form of advocacy rather than direct 
intervention. 
Refining the model 
After the above model had been discussed with colleagues it became evident that some 
refining and initial simplification was possible. At the social policy lead end of the spectrum, 
the domains of the Social Safety Net and Concessions & CSOs were initially separated to 
reflect the jurisdictional distinctions of being led by the Commonwealth and State & Territories 
respectively. This level of distinction was considered not necessary for an initial depiction of 
the policy spectrum. It was therefore proposed to combine these into a domain simply called 
Safety Net and to rationalise the categories from six to five. 
Further, it is possible to depict these categories or domains in terms of their overall contribution 
to the aggregate objective of access and affordability; the joint policy outcomes. For example: 
• Safety Net becomes adequate and targeted safety net 
• Consumer Protection becomes robust consumer protection 
• Energy Productivity becomes energy used efficiently [needs over wants; least cost 
demand; quantity and time of use]. 
• Consumer Information becomes informed and engaged consumers 
• Efficient Market becomes efficiently priced energy 
Revisiting the objectives of affordability and access, these terms are reminiscent of the 
language used in international development and anti-poverty policy; particularly in the context 
of 2012 being the United Nations International Year of Sustainable Energy for All. The idea 







to as energy security; broadly defined as adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of 
energy (IEA, 2009b). 
Energy Security is a term usually applied at the nation-state level and most commonly in the 
context of international oil markets. In the last decade however, energy security concepts have 
been seen applied to other forms of energy (Yergin, 2006), including Australia’s own National 
Energy Security Assessment (CoA, 2011b), although largely still at the nation-state level. More 
recently, the term and concepts have begun appearing in the context of poverty and 
sustainable development (IEA, 2010; Slay, 2009). 
Slay (2009) for example has argued the need to “ … disaggregate concerns about energy 
security … from the nation-state to the households, and particularly to poorer households…” 
in discussions of transitioning economies of the former Soviet Union.  
With reference to Australia’s most recent Energy Policy White Paper process, this energy 
security concept is not wholly incompatible with the stated broader national energy policy 
objectives of providing accessible, reliable and competitively priced energy (CoA, 2011a). 
What we have been able to observe though is that the concept of affordable has been 
considered to be more appropriately substituted with a concept of competitively priced at the 
market level. As will be expanded on though, for residential consumers and particularly for 
those at the margins (those regarded as vulnerable to disconnection for an inability to pay) 
affordability is a fundamental. However, as should be clear by the analysis to this point, the 
stated and intended role of the competitive market is to deliver electricity efficiently, the public 
policy objective of affordability involves forces over which the market may not reasonably be 
expected to have control. This is not to say that the market is absolved of responsibility in this 
regard; just there are other policy instruments that can more effectively (and efficiently) deliver 
key aspects of this objective.  
Noting the semantic issues of this subject matter, this framing of energy security for 
households is considered to be a useful one, particularly when seeking to add affordability to 
the list of energy policy objectives (as opposed to energy market objectives).  
Another impetus for considering an alternate framing such as energy security, is the 
observation that Australia’s electricity markets have so far not offered a basic electricity 
product: the equivalent of the standard home telephone, the no-frills or home-brand 
supermarket staples, the base-model automobile etcetera. The energy security component of 
adequate is what pertains to this. Is it reasonable that the electricity service on offer, even if 







between the two that is adequate for basic needs and priced accordingly? 
Historically, the closest would probably be pre-payment meters however, their introduction into 
competitive markets has been resisted by social policy advocates due to the ever-present self-
disconnection capability and that the cost of the technology (at least at the scale of voluntary 
adoption in a competitive market) has resulted in electricity prices that are not particularly 
competitive. The introduction of pre-payment meters into South Australia by the Tasmanian 
Government owned energy business Aurora in 2006 had limited success. Customer numbers 
peaked at around 3,500 in 2009-10 (less than 0.5% of households) - and are now declining 
rapidly as they withdraw from the state110. The offer obviously had some appeal to lower 
income households though as the majority of pre-payment customers were concession card 
holders, averaging over 55% across this period compared to an average 30% of all customers 
(ESCOSA, 2011). The prices offered in 2012 exceeded those of the standing contract 
available under the regulated offer from AGL Energy (AGL, 2012c; Aurora, 2012). 
The United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change 
(AGECC) released the report Energy for a Sustainable Future in April 2010 (UN, 2010) in 
response to the role of energy in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG). The report is now part of a global movement to expand access to electricity across 
the developing world with 2012 declared the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All 
by the UN General Assembly (UN, 2011). The AGECC report’s call for universal energy 
access spawned the United Nations Energy Access Facility (UN-EAF) which is described as: 
“ .. a collaborative programme of UNDP, UNEP and UNIDO in collaboration with 
governments and private sectors partners aimed at supporting developing countries in 
dramatically expanding access to modern and clean energy services for the poor to 
help achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).” 
The report also provided a useful depiction of the levels of access to energy services to 
describe the natural progression from ensuring access in order to meet basic human needs 
through to the needs of participation in modern society. 
                                               
110 Aurora website http://www.auroraenergy.com.au/your-home/products-and-offers/npayg/ accessed September 25th, 2012: “Current 
customers of Aurora PAY AS YOU GO have been advised that the product is no longer available in South Australia. If you still have Aurora 








Figure 69: Depiction of the conceptual levels of energy access. Source: (UN, 2010) 
This depiction of Figure 69 also illustrates the idea that a certain level of access is required in 
order to meet basic needs and that it is possible to conceive of discretionary vs. essential 
consumption of energy. This is not a new concept by any means but one that has achieved 
limited traction in policy debates in developed economies and competitive markets. Water 
industry reforms in Australia however have tended to accept this more willingly. In the case-
study state of South Australia for example, it is possible only to impose a flow restriction on 
potable water in cases of failure to pay and even then as a last resort, but not to permit outright 
disconnection. In the regulated water markets of the neighbouring state of Victoria, this flow 
restriction is prescribed to be a minimum 2 litres per minute (ESCV, 2010b).  
This ‘partial disconnection’ does not have an energy equivalent in Australia as yet although 
load limiting devices have been deployed in developing countries (Smith, 1995) in order to 
manage electrification capacity and in the US as an alternative to disconnection (WEC, 2010). 
It is also understood to be a smart meter functionality that has attracted some regulatory 
interest (Ofgem, 2010) and consumer research (Ofgem, 2011) in the UK. The potential has 
also been raised in the roll-out of smart meters in Victoria where the use of capacity control 
for credit management purposes has been banned until December 2013 (ESCV, 2010a) while 
further investigations into consumer protection issues are investigated. 
However, the use of smart meters for supply capacity control (ESCV, 2011), or trickle 
disconnection as it also referred to (CUAC, 2011), is not the only application of quite similar 
functionality. The use of similar controls applied to individual appliances is referred to as Direct 
Load Control or DLC and has successfully achieved meaningful reductions in peak demand 
from appliances such as air-conditioners and pool pumps (ETSA Utilities, 2011; IEA, 2009a; 
Johnston, 2010; Utilities, 2011). The prospect of smart meter roll-outs in the UK and in 







and it is clear from the regulatory literature so far that valid concerns exist even if there appears 
to be a slippery slope or thin edge of the wedge basis for some of the concerns, it would be 
naive to dismiss them out of hand. The following does not attempt to resolve all of these issues 
but to highlight the potential benefits should it be also possible to address these consumer 
protection issues. 
The pursuit of energy security for vulnerable consumers also makes this shortcoming quite 
clear. An electricity product based on energy security would aim for a price-service mix that 
better suited the adequacy, reliability and affordability requirements of this consumer cohort. 
Such consideration could be expected to contribute to the adequate and affordable 
dimensions of energy security as well as the allocative efficiency dimension of the NEO. 
Faruqui’s dynamic pricing research (Faruqui A, 2012; Faruqui A et al., 2010) reiterates an 
observation, in the US context at least, that lower income households tend to have flatter than 
average load profiles – better capacity factors or load factors in the industry language. Part 2 
of this thesis, and Chapters 10 and 11, in particular will present, analyse and discuss load 
factors in our case-study market of South Australia and illustrate that the peak demand 
phenomenon in this market is driven by the climate and, in particular, the combination of 
sustained heat waves and high air-conditioner penetration. Further it will be shown that tenants 
of public and social housing are a cohort that, due to relatively low penetration of air-
conditioning capacity and smaller homes, do not have the physical capacity to contribute to 
the average load factor and that, based on indicative values of capacity are extremely likely to 
be providing a cross-subsidy to other consumers.  
The Australian Government’s DRAFT Energy White Paper made reference to this apparent 
cross-subsidy that exists within the ‘small customer’ cohort. The paper makes an assertion 
that a key factor behind the growth in peak demand is inefficient pricing structures that are not 
cost reflective and that this (CoA, 2011a): 
“… results in some consumers paying more than they should, and effectively cross-
subsidising those who are driving the growth in peak demand.” 
The document expands on this somewhat when it states: 
“This means that the less well-off, who generally do not run multiple air conditioners 
and television sets, are cross-subsidising those consumers who do.” 








“Households that do not run their air conditioners during peak periods or do not have 
one at all are largely subsidising the cost to the network to service other households’ 
air conditioners operating during those peak periods.” 
Given that tenants of public and social housing have demonstrably low incomes and, as shown 
are already paying a higher proportion of income on energy and housing costs, it would appear 
that unwinding this cross-subsidy could be a no regrets way of improving affordability and 
hence energy security while enhancing allocative efficiency in the market.  
The term no regrets has seen wide contemporary use in relation to climate change related risk 
management and links to poverty and vulnerability (Heltberg et al., 2009) and the notion of no 
regrets actions to advance both social policy and energy policy is an appealing concept. It 
acknowledges that not everything that advances the objectives of social policy will also 
advance the objectives of energy policy or vice-versa but that when the opportunities arise, 
they can be and should be prioritised. 
Prominent infrastructure regulation academic Paul Joskow once referred to a key regulatory 
priority for developing economies as “ … crafting regulatory mechanisms that balance 
efficiency and distributional goals” (Joskow, 1999) and it is felt that such no regrets 
opportunities are a way of doing exactly that without distorting the efficiency basis that has 
taken so long to reach prominence in developed economies. 

















12 Appendix C – Summary of Studies seeking to estimate the 
impacts of different climate policies on electricity prices. 
Four studies are selected for thorough analysis as they comprise a representative spectrum 
of approaches (Jacobs for the Climate Change Authority, CSIRO and the Energy Networks 
Association, Frontier Economics for the AEMC and Jacobs for The Climate Institute). Other 
studies which used a variant of one of these approaches are discussed more briefly. 
12.1 Jacobs for the Climate Change Authority 
In December 2014, the then Minister for the Environment asked the Climate Change Authority 
(CCA) to conduct a Special Review into Australia’s policies and future targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. The CCA subsequently commissioned Jacobs to undertake 
electricity market modelling of 7 alternate climate policy options against a reference case 
(Jacobs 2016b) and Victoria University to model economy wide impacts. 
The emissions reduction target is based on cumulative emissions derived from a target 
consistent with global efforts to limit warming to 2oC. An electricity sector emissions constraint 
of 1,580 Mt CO2-e over the period 2020 to 2050 is imposed in each case (Jacobs 2016b, p2). 
This results in electricity sector emissions of around 50Mt CO2-e by 2030 under most 
scenarios, down from 2005 electricity emissions of 197Mt CO2-e (AGEIS 2016) or a reduction 
in the order of 75% compared to the less aggressive 28% from 2005 of the current Australian 
government target. 
The modelling by Jacobs illustrates the relative impacts of different targets111. Jacobs state 
that (p21) “… the reference cases for each set of results are not projections of the sector under 
‘business as usual’ but designed so that differences between the policy cases are due 
specifically to the policies rather than the policies and other features.” Their ‘3 degrees of 
warming’ scenario increases projected residential retail prices by up to 15% relative to their 
reference case (Figure 71). Their ‘2 degrees of warming’ scenario increases projected 
residential retail prices by around 12% to 23% relative to their reference case (Figure 72)  
The CCA work also suggests that, depending on the policy tools applied, the impact on long 
run costs to consumers of stronger targets is not as pronounced as the price outcomes in the 
period to 2030. For example, Figure 73 illustrates how the price trajectory from an Emissions 
Intensity scheme is quite different under the two different emissions targets. By contrast, the 
modelling results for the ‘technology pull’ option similar to the reverse auctions used by the 
ACT to pursue their renewable energy target shows similar gradual increases in prices under 
                                               







the two different emissions targets (Figure 74). 
 
Figure 71: Illustrative impacts on national average residential electricity prices – 3oC of warming scenario 
(Source: Jacobs 2016b) 
 
Figure 72: Illustrative impacts on national average residential electricity prices – 2oC of warming scenario 








Figure 73: Illustrative impacts on national average residential electricity prices from identical Emissions Intensity 
Schemes under different emissions reduction targets (Source: Jacobs 2016b) 
 
 
Figure 74: Illustrative impacts on national average residential electricity prices from identical Feed-in + Contract 









12.2 Electricity Network Transformation Roadmap: ENA and CSIRO 
Energy Networks Australia (the peak body representing electricity transmission and 
distribution and gas distribution businesses) and the CSIRO have developed an Electricity 
Network Transformation Roadmap (the Roadmap). The Key Concepts Report was developed 
over 2 years and published in December 2016. It was described as “… a comprehensive plan 
to keep the lights on, bills affordable and decarbonise electricity.” 112 
The report describes a transformation of the electricity system driven by customers taking 
control of their energy use, embracing new technologies and supporting action on climate 
change. The future described by the Roadmap – the Whole of Roadmap scenario – is 
contrasted with a counterfactual scenario in order to demonstrate the economic benefits 
available. The Whole of Roadmap scenario includes three key elements: 
● Network tariff reform proceeds on an opt-out basis and distributed energy resources 
are harnessed to deliver reductions in peak demand and, consequently, reductions in 
capacity at individual substations. The counterfactual scenario relies on the current 
‘opt-in’ approach to cost reflective pricing. 
● Further improvements in the utilisation of existing network capacity through 20% 
adoption of electric vehicles by 2035 – sharing fixed costs and reducing consumption 
charges for all consumers. The counterfactual scenario assumes that electric vehicles 
are not embraced by consumers. 
● Electricity sector decarbonisation achieves a 40% reduction from 2005 levels by 2030 
then accelerates to net zero emissions by 2050. Orchestration of distributed energy 
resources is a critical component. The counterfactual scenario delivers abatement of 
35% by 2030 and 65% by 2050. 
The Whole of Roadmap scenario delivers $414 annual savings in average household 
electricity bills by 2050113 compared to the counterfactual while retaining security and 
reliability. 
 
12.3 Frontier Economics for AEMC 
The AEMC report Integration of energy and emissions reduction policy114 responds to a 
request from the COAG Energy Council to examine the potential impacts of alternate 
emissions reduction policies on the National Electricity Market. The focus is on the 
                                               
112 ENA/CSIRO Media release 6 Dec 2016 “No choice needed between Energy Security or Low Emissions – if we act now”  
113 More modest savings are also available by 2030 







mechanisms rather than the targets and the AEMC concludes that an Emissions Intensity 
Target (EIT) has the lowest cost of abatement to meet a given emissions target than the 
alternatives considered: an expanded large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) and a 
Regulated closure program for high-emissions generators (REG).  
Frontier Economics’ Table 1 provides a high level summary of results for their base case: 
 
The table illustrates that an EIT results in the least amount of costs being transferred to 
consumers. The modelling showed that consumers would in fact be better off over the period 
2020-2030 as the costs of the transition are absorbed as losses by incumbent thermal 
generators (Frontier Economics 2016, page ii). The table also illustrates the significant 
retirement of capacity under both the EIT and REG options and how this is primarily replaced 
by Gas-fired generation. 
The base case EIT certificate price (an implied carbon price since each certificate represents 
a tonne of CO2 equivalent) range from $28 in 2020 to $40 in 2030. This is comparable to the 
basis for AEMO’s estimated residential price impacts (Jacobs 2016a). A scenario representing 
a higher abatement task (50% by 2030) delivers EIT certificate prices from $35 (2020) to $52 
(2030). 
12.4 The Climate Institute 
A Switch in Time study commissioned modelling by Jacobs that provides guidance on the 
ability of various policy combinations to meet a “2oC carbon budget” over the study period. 
The carbon budget is derived in the same manner as that in the CCA’s modelling. (The 
difference between them is the result of an extra year’s electricity emissions in the TCI budget 
- 1,760 Mt CO2-e between 2020 and 2050 (TCI, p8) compared with 1,580 Mt between 2021 







The work finds a carbon price rising to $40 per tonne by 2030 would produce emission 
reductions similar to the government’s current national 2030 target of 26-28 per cent below 
2005 levels. This is consistent with the range of costs used in the modelling of residential 
prices by Jacobs for AEMO (Jacobs 2016a). TCI describes this as the ‘Weak Start Carbon 
Price’ scenario, noting that over 90% of the carbon budget is consumed by 2030, necessitating 
a major policy adjustment at that point that results in a carbon price of $120 and a rapid and 
disruptive decarbonisation of the generation mix. 
TCI recommend a number of measures complementary to a ‘weak’ carbon price including a 
structured closure of older power stations that would reduce electricity emissions by 45% 
below 2005 levels in 2030 and represent greater progress towards the stated carbon budget. 
Further measures are proposed in order to achieve deeper emissions cuts.  
12.5 Jacobs for the Energy Networks Association 
The Energy Networks Association also commissioned Jacobs to model alternate policies 
against two emissions reduction targets: Australia’s current commitment of 26-28 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2030, and a 45% reduction, consistent with ALP pre-election policy. This 
study has all stationary energy consumption in its scope, not just electricity. Policy scenarios 
comprised ‘Business as usual’ - existing policies with the federal safeguard mechanisms 
adjusted downward to meet the emissions reduction target and the extension of the RET in 
the 45% target scenarios; ‘Technology Neutra’ - the safeguard evolves into a baseline and 
credit scheme, existing renewable policies are adjusted to support gas as well, and a LET (low 
emissions target) is added in the 45% scenario; and “Carbon price’ - a carbon pricing trajectory 
consistent with the emission reduction targets.  
Emissions within the electricity sector fall by more than the overall target, declining by 35% 
below 2005 levels in the 26-28% scenarios, and 47-58% in the 45% scenarios. Electricity 
prices rise the least in the Technology neutral scenarios. For the 28% target residential retail 
prices rise by 5-10% over the 10 years to 2030; for the 45% target residential retail prices rise 
by 10-20%. By comparison, prices in the Business as usual scenarios rise by 20% for the 28% 
target and 10-20% for the 45% target. This is an illustration of the fact that a more efficient 
policy can achieve a more ambitious emissions reduction target at less expense to households 
than a less ambitious target pursued via a less efficient policy. 
12.6 CSIRO National Outlook 
The National Outlook 2015 is the first release of its kind and aims to demonstrate that Australia 
is able to pursue economic growth with more sustainable resource use and environmental 
pressure. The study has a particular focus on the water-energy-food nexus. Of specific 







“Despite rising unit prices and demand across all scenarios, energy affordability for 
Australian households changes only modestly, with greater energy efficiency more 
than offsetting higher electricity prices over the long term in most cases. … Much larger 
improvements in the affordability of electricity could be achieved through better 
managing peak demand, and associated network infrastructure costs” 
This was elaborated on by CSIRO researchers in an associated paper published in Energy 
Policy (Graham et al, 2015). As was the case for AEMO’s price forecasting (Jacobs 2016a), 
the modelling employs a carbon price as a proxy for the impact of a range of potential climate 
policy measures. Emphasising the potential relative contributions to residential electricity unit 
prices, the medium carbon price, low peak demand scenario leads to a fairly similar outcome 
as the case with no carbon price and no management of demand growth. 
12.7 Jacobs for AEMO 
This modelling of future retail electricity prices (Jacobs 2016a) was performed for the 
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) to inform AEMO’s 2016 National Electricity 
Forecasting Report (NEFR). The modelling assumes a 28% reduction in greenhouse 
emissions from the National Electricity Market by 2030 in line with the current national target. 
The modelling incorporates a carbon price in the wholesale electricity market as a proxy for a 
range of potential measures to achieve the target. The values chosen were a carbon price of 
$25/t CO2-e in 2020 escalating in a linear fashion to $50/t by 2030 (and remaining at this level 
thereafter). The abatement target is largely achieved through the closure of coal-fired power 
stations as a consequence of the rising carbon price and their replacement with lower emission 
generation. 
The residential price findings show a significant diversity in price levels for the five NEM States 
after 2016 but similar trends: modest increases or falls from 2016 to 2020, steady growth to 
around 2030. 
12.8 ClimateWorks Australia Pathways to Deep Decarbonisation in 2050 
ClimateWorks Australia, ANU, CSIRO and CoPS produced a study of deep decarbonisation 
across the Australian economy. Within the electricity sector, three different decarbonisation 
pathways were explored (100% renewable energy, inclusion of nuclear, inclusion of carbon 
capture and storage), with shifts in generation driven by a strong and rising carbon price. The 
study notes that the three pathways all arrive at a similar long-run marginal cost of electricity 
supply of $150/MWh. This increase in generation cost contributes to an increase in residential 
retail electricity unit costs to around 38c/kWh in 2012 dollars by 2050. However, by increasing 
energy efficiency in the home and car, the analysis found that overall household energy costs 







12.9 ISF for GetUp! And Solar Citizens 
The ISF Study was commissioned to inform the Home Grown Power Plan produced by GetUp! 
And Solar Citizens and presents a model for a transition to a renewable energy system. The 
study presents a Renewable scenario and an Advanced Renewable scenario as well as a 
reference scenario representing the status quo. The Renewables scenario is focused on 
renewable energy only in the stationary energy sector while the Advanced Renewable 
scenario presents a decarbonized electricity sector by 2030 and a fully renewable energy 
system (including transport and industry) by 2050. Scenarios include strong improvements in 
energy productivity. 
The study does not present impacts on residential electricity prices but notes that longer term 
investment costs under the renewables scenarios is lower than the long term savings in fuel 
costs compared to the reference case. While such net present value comparisons are 
important insights, other studies that include a time series of price impacts are more directly 
relevant to this research topic. 
